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This thesis develops the substantive theory about "learning (to achieve) efficient coupling"
as a way of organizing thought about the relationship between environment and develop-
ment and about organizational change. It uses three case studies in the Czech and Slovak
Republics to specify this conceptual framework in a concrete setting'. These cases, three
sets of actions and interactions around industrial modernization development projects, are
examined by sociological means of grounded theory procedures in order to provide under-
standing of how actors in the three industrial modernization projects managed to achieve
environmental improvements in a climate of general economic decline. I argue that the
project outcomes of efficient couplings are shaped in and emerge out of a field of interac-
tion of the major social actors each inquiring into their own particular problematic situa-
tion. Whether or not efficient couplings occur, and what their nature is, depends on the
conditions of interaction that hold in a given modernization project and on the processes
by which the actors learn in and from a project.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
My thesis presents an empirical study of three cases of
industrial modernization development projects in the context
of interaction between environment and development and of
institutional transition in Central and Eastern Europe.
These cases, three sets of actions and interactions around
industrial modernization development projects, are examined
from the perspective of organizational learning in a socio-
economic domain of action in order to provide understanding
of what learning of efficient coupling on the part of the
actors is possible and how it occurs. Consequently, prac-
tices conducive to this organizational learning and manage-
ment are identified as a basis for policy recommendations.
I believe that sustainable development has to be seen as a
social problem solving process of policy inquiry (Schon
1971, Lindblom 1990). One way to get insight into sustain-
able development as policy inquiry is to study how organiza-
tions learn in practice (Schon and Argyris 1974) in a
socioeconomic domain of action. By organizational learning I
understand organizational inquiry which yields new behavior.
Not all behavioral change can be explained by learning; some
change is due to other possibilities such as motivation or
maturation.
My research is founded on a basic proposition that condi-
tions of interaction in the process of modernization project
development and actors' learning in and from the situation
significantly influence the emergence of efficient cou-
plings. Efficient coupling is broadly understood as a
project design solution which combines environmental
improvement with enterprise return to profitability without
losses to regional economy in such a way that it achieves a
high "mutual effect."
The following research questions are investigated in my
research:
What types of productive organizational learning can I
find in the situation of the interaction around moderniza-
tion project development?
What conditions of interaction shaped this learning and
the emergence of efficient couplings in the projects?
What sort of efficient couplings have been achieved in
these projects?
I interpret activities in my cases as a process of organi-
zational interaction which gives rise to episodes of organi-
zational learning and of efficient coupling between
industrial production and environmental quality. Process is
conceptualized as a change in conditions of sufficient
degree that it brings about a corresponding change in
action/interactional strategies which are carried out to
maintain, obtain, or achieve some desired end in relation to
phenomenon under study (Strauss and Corbin 1990). The phe-
nomenon under study is the modernization project develop-
ment.
The process of a modernization project development
throughout the period of political and economic transition
provides a wealth of interactions and organizational pro-
cesses to study the organizational learning and efficient
couplings. The selected projects represent complex signifi-
cant experiments in environmentally beneficial moderniza-
tion. Building efficient couplings in the transition process
was important for both the financially strapped enterprises
and the governments. The transiency of the situation highly
increased complexity and uncertainty of the project develop-
ment.
The organizational change is viewed as driven by the mech-
anism of policy dialectic: problematic situations give rise
to organizational inquiry - problem setting and problem
solving - which, in turn, create new problematic situations
within which new inconsistencies and incongruities in orga-
nizational action theory come into play (Schon and Argyris,
1995).
For example, the cases show that the process of interac-
tion follows a pattern of progressive movement through four
evolutionary stages: socialism building stage 1945-1965;
socialism reform stage 1965-1989; institutional transition
stage 1989-1994; post-transition stage 1994-present. Within
these stages, action strategies were adapting to transforma-
tions in performance criteria and intermediate objectives
brought about by the shifting context. However, the instru-
mental learning curve in pursuing the strategies became dis-
continuous - the meaning of what was an improvement shifted
in the institutional stages.
Along with the pattern of institutional stages, the pro-
cess of interaction also shows patterns of growing central-
ity of green and of technological advance. It also shows
changes in a problem specific context such as changing cast
of actors, image projecting efforts, problem ownership,
problem attention, technological complexity, financial/eco-
nomic complexity, and environmental complexity.
These shifting patterns of interaction gave rise to a
variety of action strategies and their consequences through-
out the different stages of the transformation process in
Central and Eastern Europe. These consequences, in turn,
could create new problems for the actors. For example, I
found a pivotal period when window of opportunity for the
efficient coupling between environmental quality and eco-
nomic improvements occurred most frequently. However, this
very way of problem solving, the coupling of environmental
and economic benefits in business strategy and technological
modernization, created a new range of problems during the
next stage of inquiry. In this stage, the achievement of the
efficient coupling became vulnerable to unexpected shocks in
organizational task environment these two constituted for
each other, such as hostile takeovers of enterprises or for-
eign investor acquisitions.
The types of tasks the actors strove to achieve included
bringing in investment, modernizing enterprises, resolving
technological design, making profit, and reducing pollution
load on the natural environment. Environmental improvement
benefits were associated with increased product volume,
decreased consumption of inputs, reduction in pollution and
waste disposal charges, increased product price, substitu-
tion of inputs, saved pollution abatement costs, improved
access to product market, access to capital and reduced cap-
ital costs, job maintenance, forward/backward economic link-
ages, and tax generation.
My findings contribute to the literature on organizational
learning and to the literature on sustainable development
which currently focuses almost exclusively on technical
analysis. I propose that there is a need for a qualitative
study that takes into account organizational behavior in
relation to various aspects of the institutional environment
and change processes under conditions of discontinuity, com-
plexity, uncertainty and the dialectic between problem-set-
ting and problem-solving - conditions prevalent in Central
and Eastern Europe.
The outlined analysis of the process of industrial modern-
ization project development suggests formulation of the sus-
tainable development problem in terms of actor learning. It
shows that the simple concept of instrumental learning usu-
ally utilized in technical studies is complicated by the
discontinuity in performance criteria by which action is
evaluated. It is further complicated by the occurrence of
problems being reset when intentions are transformed through
actions and by solutions creating problems for the next
stage of interaction. Seeing the process of sustainable
development as a process of non- linear, unbalanced growth
and determining which policies and practices are conducive
to learning in such a process will help to derive policy rec-
ommendations in new ways.
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Chapter 2
THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
The following sections explore the research problem as it
appears in practice and in research literature. The first
section explores the issue from the practice of interna-
tional development and the perspective of transition in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe. The section on literature review
surveys some major research formulations in areas of sus-
tainable development and organizational change as they
relate to the research problem under consideration.
2.1. The Research Problem in Practice
During the current period of economic reconstruction and
transition to democracy, the Central and East European coun-
tries must generate sufficient economic resources and clean
up the frightening levels of pollution that have accumulated
over the past several decades wherever possible. At the same
time, they have to prevent causing further environmental
degradation when pursuing strategies for economic develop-
ment. The pursuit of this task has the potential for becoming
a pursuit of "sustainable development." But governments,
development banks, NGO's, industrial enterprises and the
task system comprised of them need yet to learn better how to
achieve a satisfactory relationship between environment and
development.
For instance, we see examples of international financial
institutions redesigning their strategies to make them more
effective in achieving coupling between environment and
economy in their operations. Recently, international devel-
opment banks have learned to focus on seeking environmen-
tally beneficial investments that can simultaneously support
the economic transition. The World Bank (1993) identified
"win-win" strategies in energy and water conservation -
metering, reducing leakages -, in introducing low- input and
low-waste technologies, and in plant improvements which
reduce spills, leaks, and material use. The Project Prepara-
tion Committee has been pursuing "soft loan" financing by
offering subsidy incentives for projects with positive
external effects lying outside of the perceived project
rational. Subsidy incentives use a variety of forms such as
investment grants, guarantees, or interest subsidies (Melzer
and Zylicz 1995, Laurson 1995). The Calvert Emerging Europe
Fund for Sustainable Development of the US Oversees Private
Investment Corporation, a private equity fund, provides ven-
ture capital to support investment opportunities in effi-
cient and clean production technologies, energy industries,
and infrastructure development that "meet the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future genera-
tions to meet their own needs." Both the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development and the International Finance
Corporation condition lending for the restructuring and mod-
ernization of industrial enterprises with environmental man-
agement action plans.
Because the Central and East European countries are making
new investments in industrial modernization and are able to
draw on advances in technology and management practices
already made in Western industrial countries, they might be
able to go straight to low-polluting practices. They need to
be aware that while in the past economic growth was associ-
ated with severe environmental degradation, the trade-off
between development and environment is not always necessary.
The key is not to produce less, but to learn to produce dif-
ferently.
In observing the situation in Central and Eastern Europe,
we see that some firms learned to produce differently and
that they managed to make environmental improvements in
spite of the general economic decline. How did they manage to
improve the environment during the economic decline? How did
they overcome in their behavior the decades of total depen-
dence on the central administration to provide themselves
with a viable future in the new decentralized economic and
political system? What was the nature of the solutions they
achieved? These questions provide research puzzles that I
hope to answer though my investigation.
2.2. The Research Problem in Literature
In the following sections, aspects of the research problem
as they appear in literature on organizational change and on
sustainable development are reviewed. These sections assess
the literature, review its methodological and conceptual
approaches and identify areas for further useful research.
This literature review fulfills the four functions identi-
fied by Merrian (1991, pp.62-63):
- take into account previous work in the same area;
- interpret and synthesize what has been published and
researched in the area of interest;
. assess the work to date and offer suggestions for future
inquiry;
. help in the formulation of the problem, in the selection
of methodology, and in the interpretation of research
results.
In the discussion concluding the review, I argue that the
current state of research on environment-development rela-
tionship and on organizational learning calls for a practice
oriented, qualitative research study.
2.2.1. Perspectives on Sustainable Development
Policy research often treats sustainable development as a
technical problem. Policy analysts often strive to formulate
it in a relatively value-neutral way, susceptible to speci-
fiable measurements or to deduce it formally as a moral obli-
gation from ethical and legal theories. As Raskin (1993)
points out, the discourse on sustainable development usually
makes a connection between distributional equity and envi-
ronmental sustainability within developing countries, within
industrialized countries, among countries, and between gen-
erations. The following perspectives represent some of the
dominant conventional formulations to researching the policy
problem of sustainable development and to providing policy
advice for intervention.
Macroeconomic Analysis
Macroeconomic analysis may try to optimize economic growth
under the constraint of inter-generational distributional
equity (Solow 1991). Sustainable development becomes defined
as a problem of intergenerational resource allocation.
According to this perspective, we are morally obligated to
preserve productive capacity for the indefinite future. It
is our moral obligation that we conduct ourselves so that we
leave to the future the option or the capacity to be as well
off as we are. It is recognized that the obligation cannot be
specific; we do not know the tastes, the preferences and the
technology of the future generations.
The question of sustainable development then turns into a
decision between present consumption, investment and social
capital versus future consumption, investment and social
capital. In exchange for depleted resources, each generation
should add to the social capital in other forms, enough to
maintain the aggregate social capital intact.
Sustainability also becomes a question of an appropriate
development path for a modern industrial society. As Solow
(1992) states, what needs to be preserved is a generalized
capacity to produce economic well-being. A sustainable path
for the national economy is one that allows every future gen-
eration the option of being as well off as its predecessors.
The task of public policy under this perspective is to
find a way to charge the economy for the consumption of its
resource endowment and the environmental pollution. In order
to do that, proper measurement of stocks and flows is neces-
sary.
Based on this perspective, the main thrust of policy
reform deals with correcting national economic accounts to
reflect environmental amenities and consumption of non-
renewable resources. For example, Solow (1992) proposes to
treat environmental quality as a stock, a kind of capital
that depreciates by the addition of pollutants and invested
in by abatement activities. Similarly, rents derived from
using up non-renewable resources should be kept and rein-
vested in building social capital. Solow (1991) believes
that most environmental protection can be regarded as an act
of investment.
The above framing of the question of sustainable develop-
ment makes it possible to apply the logic of the economic
theory of capital and use the same general principles as to
other forms of capital. It also provides a practical step to
sustainable development within the current institutional
framework. If implemented, such an approach would make
reproducible capital, renewable and nonrenewable resources,
and environmental capital subject to the same scale of val-
ues and the same bookkeeping conventions. The main task for
policy makers would be ensuring that the benefits from an
expanding economy are reinvested.
Human Development School
Alternatively, the human development school of economics
holds that sustainability is logically independent from eco-
nomic growth. This school maintains that economic growth is
only a means towards an end of a full human development
(Anand and Sen 1994).
Proponents of human development school argue that human
development should be based on principles of universalism.
Human beings should have rights irrespective of class, gen-
der, race, community, or generation (Anand and Sen 1994,
49). Universalism is defined as an elementary demand for
impartiality - applied within generations and between them
(Anand and Sen 1994, 4). The human development school then
focuses on the capability of people and the freedom to lead
lives that people today and in the future would value (Anand
and Sen 1994, 17).
Anand and Sen (1994, 5) find that the integration of human
progress and environmental conservation has emerged as one
of the central challenges faced by the modern world. Because
the moral value of sustaining of what we now have depends on
the quality of what we have, sustainable development directs
us as much towards the present as towards the future. Anand
and Sen believe that the concept of human development can be
broadened without any difficulty to accommodate claims of
the future generations and the urgency of environmental pro-
tection. The basic underlying concept is universalism, they
stress, and the key concept is justice.
The human development school distinguishes itself from
standard macroeconomic analysis with its focus on wealth
maximization at the aggregate level. The human development
school is critical of this approach which focuses entirely
on making the community as a whole as wealthy as possible,
irrespective of distribution and irrespective of what that
wealth does to human life. Although human development school
regards economic growth to be important, it does not take it
to be in itself a sufficient basis of human development. The
human development approach has tended to focus on public
action and poverty reduction; it recognizes economic growth
as a non-unique means for human development. There are other
means of human development such as social organization.
The human development school views sustainability as a
matter of distributional equity in a very broad sense. It
treats it as a matter of sharing the capacity for well-being
between present people and future people in an acceptable
way, that is in a way which neither the present nor the
future generations can readily reject (Anand and Sen 1994,
p.31). They argue that human development should be seen as a
major contribution to the achievement of sustainability.
Thus the pursuit of human development becomes also a pursuit
of sustainable development. This argument is contrasted with
the position of the World Bank (1992) discussed below, which
suggests poverty alleviation as an instrument to protect the
environment from degradation.
As the macroeconomic approach above, human development
school proposes using quantitative reporting to monitor
progress to sustainable development. This reporting is pro-
vided by "human development index" which provides an alter-
native to the GNP per capita measure. However, the index is
not exhaustive. It needs to be complemented by a detailed
information on human development as provided in Human Devel-
opment Reports.
Positive Linkages Approach
This approach is discussed amply in the Brundtland Commis-
sion's Report (WCED 1986) and in the World Development
Report 1992: Development and Environment (World Bank 1992).
The positive linkages approach to sustainable development
emphasizes integration of environment and economic develop-
ment as a common and mutually supportive objective (WCED
1986, ix) . Environment is seen in a broad sense as a place
where we live - bioregion, local community, or the globe.
Development is what we do within that setting to improve our
lives. Environment does not exist as a sphere separate from
human actions, ambitions and needs. Development is not just
what poor nations should do to become richer. The achieve-
ment of mutually supportive objectives must take account of
the interrelationships between people, resources, environ-
ment, and development (WCED 1986, ix-xi). Sustainable devel-
opment is development that lasts (WB 1992, p.34) . It is
economic development that does not destroy environmental
setting within which economic development takes place.
The World Development Report 1992 explores the two-way
relationship between development and the environment. First,
it describes how environmental problems can and do undermine
goals of development. The report identifies two ways in
which this can happen:
- environmental quality is itself part of improvement in
welfare that development attempts to bring. If the
benefits from rising incomes are offset by the costs
imposed on health and the quality of life by pollution,
that cannot be called development;
- environmental damage can undermine future productivity.
Soils that are degraded, aquifers that are depleted, and
ecosystems that are destroyed in the name of raising
incomes today can jeopardize the prospects for earning
income tomorrow.
Thus damage to the environment has potential costs to
present and future human welfare: human health may be
harmed; economic productivity may be reduced; and the plea-
sure of satisfaction obtained from an unspoiled environment
may be lost. For example, the Report quotes that water pollu-
tion and water scarcity lead to more than 2 million deaths
and billions of illnesses a year attributable to pollution
and to poor household hygiene and added health risks caused
by water scarcity. They also lead to declining fisheries,
rural household time and municipal costs of providing safe
water, aquifer depletion leading to irreversible compaction,
and constraint on economic activity because of water short-
ages.
Secondly, the Report explores the impact of economic
growth on the environment. The most important of these
relates to poverty reduction - attacking poverty is essen-
tial prerequisite for environmental sustainability. The poor
are both victims and agents of environmental damage. Poor
families often lack the resources to avoid degrading their
environment. About half of the world's poor live in rural
areas that are environmentally fragile. Land-hungry farmers
may resort to cultivating unsuitable areas - steeply sloped,
erosion prone hillsides; semiarid land where soil degrada-
tion is rapid; and tropical forests where crop yields on
cleared fields frequently drop sharply after a few years.
The Report stresses that the distinction between develop-
ment and environment is a false dichotomy. Strong environ-
mental policies also complement and reinforce development
and vice versa. The Report also identifies the conditions
under which policies for efficient income growth can comple-
ment those for environmental protection and identifies
trade-offs. The authors of the report find that there are
strong "win-win" opportunities that remain unexplored.
Often, policies that are justified on economic grounds
alone can deliver substantial environmental benefits. The
following are sample policies that improve both economic
efficiency and the environment: eliminating subsidies for
the use of fossil fuels and water, giving poor farmers prop-
erty rights on the land they farm, making heavily polluting
state-owned companies more competitive, and eliminating
rules that reward with property rights those who clear for-
ests.
Another World Bank publication, Mainstreaming the Environ-
ment (WB 1995, p.10) urges that "we go for the win-win
options first." The authors point out that although trade-
offs exist, there is often scope for improving the environ-
ment by adopting policies and investments that are justified
for reasons other than the environment. These "free
lunches", they caution, need to be exploited carefully.
Three patterns of relationships between rising economic
activity and environmental problems are identified:
- some problems decline as income increases. This is
because increasing income provides the resources for
public services such as sanitation and rural
electricity. When individuals no longer have to worry
about day-to-day survival, they can devote resources to
profitable investments in conservation. These problems
provide synergies between economic growth and
environmental quality.
- Some problems initially worsen but then improve as
incomes rise. Most forms of air and water pollution fit
into this category, as do some types of deforestation
and encroachment on natural habitats. Countries need to
introduce deliberately policies to ensure that
additional resources are devoted to dealing with
environmental problems.
. Some environmental problems worsen as income increases.
Emissions of carbon and of nitrogen oxides and municipal
wastes are current examples. In these cases abatement is
relatively expensive and the costs associated with the
emissions and wastes are not yet perceived as high -
often because they are borne by someone else.
Overall, two broad sets of policies are recommended by the
World Development Report 1992 that are in conformity with
the findings of the Brundtland Report. These policies, that
are both necessary, are needed to attack the underlying
causes of environmental damage. First, we need policies that
seek to harness the positive links between development and
the environment by correcting or preventing policy failures,
improving access to resources and technology, and promoting
equitable income growth. Second, we need policies targeted
at specific environmental problems: regulations and incen-
tives that are required to force the recognition of environ-
mental values in decision making. On the analytical level,
benefits and costs of all projects need to be formally val-
ued, quantified and weighted against each other.
2.2.2. Perspectives on Organizational Change
Environment-development interaction may be seen as a prob-
lem of collective action and of problem solution emergence
where processes of coordination and integration need to be
achieved among environmental and economic institutional
actors who also learn about direction of their efforts in
action. Organizations, and organized systems are considered
as, at the same time, the necessary means and the basic oper-
ational constraints of collective action (Crozier 1977).
Social interaction is viewed as a process by which actors
collectively solve problems (Mead 1934, Dewey 1938). Organi-
zation learning theories may provide insight into why strat-
egies for economic development went wrong during the past
four decades in Central and Eastern Europe and whether bene-
ficial learning occurs during the present period of transi-
tion. The following research perspectives and approaches are
the most relevant to the research problem of this thesis.
Organizational Adaptation
The organizational adaptation perspective views learning
as an adaptive behavior. In its pure form, it is based on
methodological behaviorism which emphasizes explanations for
behavior in purely environmental terms. For example, Cyert
and March (1963, p.123) state that organizations learn by
exhibiting adaptive behavior over time. They focus on adap-
tation with respect to three different phases of the deci-
sion process: adaptation of goals, adaptation in attention
rules, and adaptation in search rules. Cyert and March
assume that organizations change their goals, shift their
attention, and revise their procedures for search as a func-
tion of their experience.
Similarly, Vogeler (1987) defines adaptive learning as a
change in organizational behavior in response to change in
its environment in pursuit of a constant objective. Diverg-
ing from the purely behaviorist perspective, Fiol and Lyles
(1985 in Tyre and Hippel 1993) define adaptive learning as
both the investigation and subsequent changes in behaviors,
technologies, or beliefs undertaken in response to negative
feedback. In this sense, adaptive learning has both a behav-
ioral component (changes in performance) and a cognitive
aspect (change in understanding).
A classical theory of organizational adaptation in an
inter- organizational domain has been developed by Selznick
(1984). Selznick studied the ideal of the grassroots in
action in order to show how the ideal itself and the organi-
zation by which it was executed changed over time. He took a
rather skeptical view of showing to radical idealists "the
tyranny of means and the impotence of ends" - a process by
which true organizational goals became deflected in action.
Selznick (1984, 4) proposed the following questions for
his study:
- What is the organization which is thought to embody
the ideal sought?
- What is the nature of its democratic technique?
- What are its implications and consequences?
- What will a close and critical study of the organiza-
tion in action tell us about these problems?
For Selznick, the TVA is both an instrument of implement-
ing the goal of the grassroots development and a living orga-
nization. In order to be effective in executing its task, the
TVA has to adapt to its institutional environment whose
power centers force the organization into self-defensive
behavior. Policy and action of the TVA become caught up and
shaped by the needs of the organization to adjust to its
environment and by pressures exercised from intra- and
inter-organizational coalitions of actors.
Selznick argues that the doctrine of the grassroots was
logically self-defeating in its basic tenets:
. working through existing institutions;
- using voluntary associations;
* managerial autonomy.
While demands for managerial autonomy alienated the TVA
from other federal agencies, the policy of working through
existing institutions and using voluntary associations in
the exercise of administrative duties opened the TVA to the
co-optation by local interests. Co-optation as a defensive
strategy is "a process of absorbing new elements into the
leadership or policy-determining structure of an organiza-
tion as a means of averting threats to its stability and
existence" (Selznick 1984, 13). The adaptive mode of action
also led the TVA to use the official doctrine of "the grass-
roots" as a protective ideology.
Selznick's main contribution seems to be in showing that
an administrative agency's task to carry out predetermined
purposes to achieve social change may be thwarted by its
being also a living organism comprised of actors who develop
their own independent objectives and commitments. This situ-
ation is exacerbated in the case of a grassroots method of
administration by the need to adapt to the power interests in
the institutional environment which may become counter-
effective forces of change. A government agency in a hostile
local environment adjusted to this situation through infor-
mal co-optation of opposition elements into its leadership
structure, but this method of organizational adjustment gave
rise to fundamental revisions in official policies and in
organizational goal displacement.
In the end, Selznick (1984, 265) accepts the ambiguity of
the situation as inevitable. Power in a community may not
only result in the perversion of policy determined through
administrative institutions, but provide a tool for ensuring
responsibility of public agencies to their client public. He
does not see the existence of private organizations paral-
leling but independent of a governmental administrative
structure, and exercising a decisive influence on social
policy, as inherently bad.
Still, it appears that the main problem of the TVA's
administration lies in its defensive relation to its envi-
ronment. The TVA was a grassroots oriented organization
seeking to adapt its behavior in response to changes in its
environment as it pursued constant objectives. Rather than
bringing in social change to a conservative region, it kept
one step behind changes in its environment to which it strove
to adapt.
Strategic Bargaining
Organizational action and learning are approached differ-
ently by Crozier (1977) who builds on Selznick's (1984, 12)
notion of the TVA as a living social organization. Crozier
distinguishes his dynamic framework from deterministic
approaches which focus on organization's rationality, objec-
tives, functions, or structures. In this respect, he differs
from Selznick's concern with instrumental implementation of
organizational objectives. In Crozier's theory, organiza-
tions are structured systems of action. They are constituted
of underlying "games" which mediate between the means and
the ends of collective action. Balance among actors is main-
tained through the mechanism of bargaining.
Crozier believes that actors always possess some irreduc-
ible margin of discretionary freedom to choose among alter-
native options. He argues that actor's behavior should be
analyzed "as the expression of a rational strategy whose aim
is the use of power to increase his "winnings" through par-
ticipation in the organization" (Crozier 1977, 45). Organi-
zation is studied "from the point of view of the relations of
power by means of which the actors continually use the avail-
able zones of uncertainty to negotiate over the implementa-
tion of their respective strategies" (Crozier 1977, 44).
Crozier distinguishes four broad sources of organizational
power (1977, 40):
- special skills and functional specialization;
. relations between an organization and its environment
(gatekeeping);
e control of communication and information;
. existence of general organizational rules.
In all these instances, uncertainly is the basic source of
power. Power is associated with social influence rather than
with administrative hierarchy. For this reason, the superi-
ors may not possess the power in the system of action to make
their inferiors act on their orders. The actors maneuver to
protect or increase their own margin of freedom of action
while attempting to constrain the other's options. In pursu-
ing their individual divergent and often contradictory
strategies, the actors are being pulled by centrifugal ten-
dencies away from collective action. They bargain with oth-
ers to negotiate their participation and to make them "pay"
for it.
For Crozier, learning happens within such a system of
action. It is "the discovery, creation and acquisition by
the actors concerned of new relational models, new modes of
reasoning, and similar collective capacities" (Crozier 1977,
221) . Also, learning is "a process of trial and error whereby
a new behavior can be worked and developed into a system"
(Crozier 1977, 223).
The existing power relations constrain possibility for
learning and discovery within the system of action. For one,
threatening information will not be processed which, in
turn, results in poor communication. Also, to be processed,
problems have to be redefined either to fit prevailing games
or to allow for the creation of some artificial uncertain-
ties so that bargaining can proceed. The most serious prob-
lem associated with decision-making will be the
impossibility of obtaining unbiased information.
Knowledge of the concrete system of action will make it
possible to understand which decisions can be made in such a
system, what are the limits on performance that can be antic-
ipated and how the system itself can be changed. This sort of
knowledge comes to actors through experience.
Experiential learning is important for actors also in
order to understand what they have, often unaware, been
seeking. Crozier (1977, 242) believes that people discover
their desires in relation to the opportunities they per-
ceive. Through acting in the social system and understanding
their opportunities, the actors come to realize their own
preferences. Thus learning has a dual consequence. It
increases opportunity for actors to initiate change and it
deepens their self-understanding of the kind of change they
desire.
Like Selznick, Crozier accepts ambiguity and contingency
as inevitable. He argues that we live in a world of conflict,
power and manipulation (Crozier 1984, 248). Further, high
organizational integration is undesirable because a tightly
integrated society will have difficulty in changing and
transforming itself (Crozier 1977, 226). Change is facili-
tated by the existence of slack and conflict in the social
system.
Crozier's research framework provides many insights for
the present research, particularly, his orientation to the
inter- organizational domain as a system of action and the
recognition of importance of active learning within this
domain. But, it appears that Crozier's placing power rela-
tionships and strategic action in the center of his theoret-
ical framework introduces a questionable bias and limits
excessively the scale of possible interactions. In real
life, actors interact in a domain characterized, in various
degrees, by antagonism and cooperation (Schon and Rein
1994). Also, they often seem to set problems and invent solu-
tions that evolve as a result of their transactions with the
situation and with each other (Schon and Rein 1994, xix),
rather than only calculate choices and bargain under the
constraints of the system of action (Crozier) or adapt to the
external environment (Selznick) . A framework of design con-
versation and organizational inquiry develops these alterna-
tive insights building on notions of "design rationality, "
"action frames," and shifting stages of interaction (Schon
and Rein 1994).
Organizational Inquiry
These approaches to organizational learning build on the
work of John Dewey (1938) who treated inquiry as the inter-
twining of thought and action that proceeds from doubt to the
resolution of doubt. The action theory of Schon and Argyris
(1996) provides an extension of this Dewey's insight. Schon
and Argyris bring up in their book Dewey's thought that
inquiry begins with an indeterminate, problematic situation,
a situation whose inherent conflict, obscurity, or confusion
blocks action (p.30-31) . Inquiry, they say, combines mental
reasoning and action.
The Deweyan inquiry finds further extension in two famil-
iar organizational theory concepts. "Organizational dialec-
tics" as an internal process of change through problem-
setting, problem-solving, is a characteristic of an inquiry.
The inquirers participate in constructing the situation to
which they also respond. As inquirers seek to resolve what is
problematic about a situation of action, they bring new
problematic features into being. The transaction between
inquirer and situation is continuing and open-ended; the
inquirer participates in constructing the situation to which
he also responds.
"Detection of error," the second organizational concept,
sets in motion the inquiry aimed at correcting the error.
Schon and Argyris define the detection of error as the mis-
match of outcomes to expectations. When outcomes of our
action are mismatched to expectations, the inquirer experi-
ences surprise - an experience essential to learning, to the
process of coming to think and act in a new way. Thus learn-
ing is a beginning of an inquiry and may lead to other oppor-
tunities for learning. A "dialectics of learning" is a
concept that needs yet to be examined.
In their recent book Organizational Learning II, Schon and
Argyris (1996, p.10-11) define organization as a cooperative
system governed by the constitutional principles of a polis.
Following Chester Barnard (1938), they see organizations as
systems of action in which individuals (or in my case insti-
tutional actors) cooperate to perform tasks. Schon and Argy-
ris point out that the organization's task system, its
patterns of interconnected roles, is at once a division of
labor and a design for the performance of work. Organization
members' behavior is rule-governed; members of an organiza-
tion enact rules for decision, delegation, and membership.
They must:
- devise agreed-upon procedures for making decisions in
the name of collectivity,
- delegate to individuals the authority to act for the
collectivity, and
- set boundaries between the collectivity and the rest
of the world (S&A 1996, p.8).
The definition of an organization as a task system might
be extended to cover a situation of multiple institutional
actors interacting around a project design.
Schon and Argyris define an improvement of an organiza-
tion's task performance over time as a case of instrumental
learning. Such instrumental learning rests on a schema which
refers to an action's effectiveness in achieving its
intended objectives and to criteria and measures for assess-
ing that effectiveness (p.4). They point out that instrumen-
tal learning may be good or bad depending on the values used
to define "improvement." They introduce a distinction
between single and double-loop learning to differentiate
instrumental learning within a constant frame of values from
learning to change the values that define the "improvement."
It appears that the double-loop learning may occur either
due to intentional action or due to shifts in institutional
environment.
The concept of inquiry shows also in Schon and Rein's
Frame Reflection: Toward the Resolution of Intractable Pol-
icy Controversies. In this book, Schon and Rein (1994) con-
trast design rationality with instrumental, means-ends
rationality. They summarize fundamental structure of design
rationality in the following points (1994, 172- 3):
- There is always a process of making something out of
materials, and under conditions of uncertainty and
complexity.
. This means that intentions are always, to some degree,
emergent. The designer must be able to form new
intentions on the basis of her discovery of the evolving
nature of the design situation in which she is engaged.
. The designer is always in conversation with the design
situation. Design rationality is always, in part, a
function of the conduct of that conversation, as the
designer seeks to grasp the meaning of his moves, and of
others' responses to his moves, and to embody his
interpretations in the invention of further moves.
There is always a process of problem setting and
solving, which can be evaluated in terms of its adequacy
to the emerging intentions, values, and interests of the
designer and other stakeholders in the design, and by
reference to features of the design situation discovered
through design inquiry.
Design rationality becomes of particular interest when it
is located in a social system. Schon and Rein (1994, xviii)
believe that when policy controversies (such as sustainable
development) are situated in politically contentious arenas,
they may lend themselves to pragmatic resolution through
design rationality. They identified four types of pragmatic
resolution: contention, marketing, negotiation, and codesign
(Schon and Rein 1994, 124-5). However, Schon (1978) recog-
nizes in his earlier work yet another mechanism for improv-
ing performance and resolving conflict - the organizations'
ability to learn to learn. Thus both single and double loop
learning should be associated with the design rationality
and the study of a project design process within a politi-
cally contentious arena should provide access to understand-
ing this learning.
I understand that the actors and their domain of action
are embedded within a larger socio-economic and natural
environment which from a greater part may be considered non-
deterministic particularly due to the dynamics of institu-
tional change. The actors may influence this larger environ-
ment, but they cannot control it. They will face messy
problematic situations which must be converted into manage-
able projects. It will be imperative for the actors to learn
to listen to "back talk" of the situation and to understand
conflicting conceptual frames in order to be able to correct
for design flaws in the projects and avoid "stalemates,"
"pendulum swings" and "transaction effects" (Schon and Rein
1994). The projects will perform best if the actors learn to
co-design them (Schon & Rein 1994) - the actors understand
and anticipate meanings the users will attach to their
design projects.
The concept of situational context within the theory of
inquiry is well developed by Tom Burns who studies it from
the perspective of social institutions. In his co-authored
book Man, Decisions, Society: The Theory of Actor-System
Dynamics for Social Scientists, Burns (Burns et.al. 1985)
distinguishes his approach from rational choice and struc-
tural determinist theories. Burns argues among other, that
the rational choice approach takes as given the factors and
processes which structure options available for choice and
their outcomes (Burns et.al. 1985, p.9). The rational choice
approach fails to recognize that preference structures,
action alternatives and outcomes are structured and restruc-
tured as part of the historical development of societies.
Thus social structuring, Burns argues, cannot be adequately
specified and analyzed within the framework of rational
choice theories.
The structural theories, on the other hand, lack concepts
with which to describe and analyze human problem-solving,
creative activities and conflict (Burns et.al. 1985, p.11).
They do not allow for the idea that structure is being con-
tinuously opened up and reconstructed by the problem-solving
behavior of individuals responding to concrete situations.
Burns believes that we should investigate the human capabil-
ities to overcome constraints by means of creative restruc-
turing of their material, social, and cultural worlds.
Burns' actor-system theory provides a dynamic view of
social interaction. The dynamics may be explained by a dia-
lectical process in which human concepts and models of real-
ity reshape the reality thus giving rise to new
incongruences. Ultimately, ideas change themselves through
process of action. People encounter problems, learn, and
make discoveries. They come to realize new ideas and possi-
bilities, discover new material, social and cultural forms
and elements. When these are put into practice or influence
action, the stage is set for further learning, change, and
development (Burns et.al. 1985, p.12).
2.3. Discussion
The macroeconomic approach can capture the problem of dis-
tribution of wealth between present and future generations
and measure performance of economy on an aggregated level.
It is based on a macroeconomic framework from which uniform
policy prescriptions can be derived at the country level.
The power of well formulated economic theory is to the advan-
tage as long as the concept fits its boundaries that is as
long as it can be conceptualized as a problem of economizing
over scarce resources.
Since the resource allocation framework presents environ-
ment and economy as a "zero-sum" allocation game, it does not
seem to provide room for creating value through social
action as a creative destructive force (Schumpeter 1947) -
innovating, restructuring, and transforming the conditions
of life. The macroeconomic framework does not give advice on
the kinds of learning essential to sustainable development
at the level of the region, sector, organization, or
project. As Schon points out (Schon and Rodwin 1995, 92-93)
the modeling/forecasting approach does not seem to provide
an explicit account of the learning involved in a shift from
present patterns of development to the patters of sustain-
able development.
Also, even if the problem of development can be reduced to
the problem of economy rather than seen as a problem of human
self-realization and growth, the theory of sustainable
development cannot be implicitly prescriptive with respect
to organization of economy and society or human behavior
over the long term. A distinction may be made between formal
and substantive economics (Polanyi 1958). In the first
sense, "economic" means to economize - to choose among
alternatives for the purpose of maximizing output, profit,
or gain in exchange or to minimize the cost of producing
something in the face of material scarcity. The second sense
relates to the arrangements and activity for acquiring, pro-
ducing, or using material items or services for individual
or community purposes. While the formal economics is not
very useful for the study of planned economy or economies of
traditional societies, the substantive approach can be
applied in a cross-institutional context.
Although the recognition in Anand and Sen's approach of
the possibility to specify social ends on the basis of ethics
and political deliberation is noteworthy, the principle of
universalism seems to abstract from the wealth of institu-
tional and cultural heritage social groups possess. It
appears to avoid the difficulty of setting boundaries for
the community that benefits from the welfare arrangements.
Most importantly, universalism is non historical, disregard-
ing the historical continuity of social groups and their
change.
Even when ultimate ends may be specified theoretically on
the basis of ethics, the chosen means and intermediate goals
towards achieving the ends will not be universal and
abstract. They will be specific - determined by present
institutional arrangements, social customs and historical
experiences. Burns (1985, 17) points out that different
social positions and powers of actors lead to incompatibili-
ties or conflicts not only in their goals and preference
structures, but also in their viewpoints on action possibil-
ities and decision strategies and their conceptions of
appropriate arrangements for social action in particular
institutional areas and for the identification and resolu-
tion of conflicts in these areas. He states that conflicts
manifest themselves in social patterns as a result of insti-
tutional specialization and the different roles actors and
groups play in the organization of, and the decision and con-
trol processes in, society. Also, conflict patterns in soci-
ety are shaped by differential socialization and membership
in communities or groups adhering to different cultures and
incompatible rule regimes.
Priorities in pursuing the ends will also be individual
rather than universal. Social groups will want to choose
which ends should be given relative priority given the cir-
cumstances and risks associated with pursuing certain
courses. As Bell (1992) points out, we do not want to make
the mistake of doing certain harm to present people in the
name of future happiness that may never come.
Given the existence and desirability of differences among
social groups in pursuing universally recognized ends, it is
quite possible that chosen means and intermediate goals of
different social groups will conflict. The conflicts, inter-
action among problems, and needs for organizational arrange-
ments among various social groups pursuing their common
goals, including goals of their own future generations, will
be intensified in an open liberal economy. They will also be
exacerbated by geographical determinants such as population
density, ecosystem resilience, availability of natural
resources, size of territory, and climatic conditions. The
theory of sustainable development will need to be able to
address and analyze these differences.
The third approach seems closest to the purpose of my
study because it approaches the problem of sustainable
development at a project level allowing to see actor inter-
action. However, it does not recognize critically that any
practical specification of goals or determination of costs
and benefits is embedded in the social system. For example,
goals may be specified with respect to societal functions,
organizational outputs, investors, system, or product char-
acteristics (Perrow 1968). Measurements of costs and bene-
fits will be variable to economic regimes determining
economic value such as specification of price as an expres-
sion of marginal utility in the market economy or as produc-
tion costs in the planned economy. It will also be variable
to legal regimes such as internalizing environmental exter-
nalities through legislative acts.
Also, this approach needs to recognize better that the
problems of environment and development not only interact
with each other but also that their framing as a problem
changes over time. Problems are not technical; they are con-
structed by human beings in their attempts to make sense of
complex and troubling situations (Schon 1980, Lindblom
1990).
All of the three approaches above face the challenge of
translating the outcome of sustainable development into
operational criteria if it is treated at the level of policy
analysis. Brooks (1992, p.32) argues that "for the concept
of sustainability in the process of development to be opera-
tionally useful, it must be more than just an expression of
social values or political preferences disguised in scien-
tific language." He states that the usefulness of the sus-
tainability concept depends on the degree to which it can be
formulated in a relatively value-neutral way, susceptible to
specifiable measurements.
Brooks (1992) summarizes some of these difficulties of
operationalizing the concept of sustainable development to
provide criteria for the choice of development strategies
and for the selection and adoption of new technologies to
support these strategies in a real world ecological, social,
economic, political, and cultural context.
For example, Brooks points out that there is some ambigu-
ity in what we define as "investment," and what we define as
"current consumption" in the macroeconomic framework. Help-
ing the poor today may be seen either as consumption or as
investment in social capital to the extent that building
sense of community will result in greater participation in
society in future and hence increased capacity for coordi-
nated action by the entire human community. We do not know
how we decide with certainty whether this is investment or
consumption (Brooks 1992, p.32).
In order to exercise rational choice, it is necessary to
foresee sufficiently clearly where present trends and
choices are leading and what alternative endpoints to those
projected might be possible through the adoption and exploi-
tation of new and emerging technologies or policy innova-
tions. Thus rates of change in demography, social structure,
and technology are important determinants of sustainability.
But what may be sustainable in a slowly changing system may
become unsustainable under conditions of more rapid change.
Since the context is constantly changing, in part due to num-
ber of variables involved that are constantly changing on
different time and space scales, no developmental scenario
can be sustained indefinitely. Sustainability is an evolu-
tionary concept, confined to finite epochs in time (Brooks
1992, p.36).
Brooks (1992) concludes that the difficulties of opera-
tionalizing the concept of sustainable development are mul-
tiplied when the enormous number of possible social,
economic, technical, and cultural variables are considered
especially in the light of their complex interactions and
interdependencies. This difficulty is exacerbated by the
intrusion of a wide diversity of implicit or explicit and
frequently conflicting value perspectives from both devel-
oped and developing worlds. Even when sustainability is
acceptable in its general form, the existence of the diver-
sity of value perspectives, derived from different life
experiences and cultural histories, tends to undermine the
possibility of any consensus in the most concrete decisions.
Even when Brooks is right in his observation on the diffi-
culty of operationalizing the concept of sustainable devel-
opment in technical terms, it is quite possible that some of
the difficulties discussed by Brooks of studying sustainable
development are rather due to formulating the research ques-
tions at the level of rational choice policy analysis. The
structural difficulties of policy analysis approach to
studying policy problems have been noticed in the research
community.
In The Moon and the Ghetto, Nelson (1977) discusses the
limits of policy analysis. He asks the question of why we
were so successful in sending astronauts to the Moon while we
failed to solve the problem of the ghetto. He believes that
this fact is due to the different nature of the problem to
solve. Some problems are intractable, difficult to define
and solve through the rational choice approach.
The normative structure of "rational analysis", Nelson
states, rests on the logic-of-choice approach. But the logic
of choice depends on prior specification of objectives, or
agreement about the nature of relevant benefits and costs.
The power of the logic also depends on the strength of the
underlying scientific understanding of a problem that
enables one to trace relationships between means and ends
and to identify salient alternatives (Nelson 1977, p.24).
The key elements of policy analysis are an agreement regard-
ing objectives and strong scientific understanding of the
topography of the problem.
The critics of the policy analysis raised a number of con-
cerns about this approach. They pointed out that the higher-
order value-determining processes tend to be ambiguous with
respect to precise criteria. Although market criteria used
for valuation are relatively precise, government policy is
for the most part not concerned with areas in which it is
believed markets work well. Thus it is difficult to define
benefits of particular classes of programs.
Further, the critics questioned whether analysts were not
overstepping their legitimate role and interjecting their
own values, or specifications of values that were analyti-
cally convenient into the policy-making process. They
pointed out that policy analysts were biasing analysis of
alternatives in dimensions that could be measured, and down-
played considerations that were difficult to quantify. Also,
they claimed that the very process of policy analysis, in
particular the attempt to make issues explicit and air them
openly, was politically non-neutral (Nelson 1977, p.28).
However, the criticisms of policy analysis did not concern
only the question of what is a good analysis and how to con-
duct a good analysis. They also brought up a more fundamental
issue; there are many problems that are not adequately char-
acterized as involving a "central steersman controlling a
well-working rudder." Often, the chief problem of the cen-
tral administration is to pick and choose a limited number of
places and situations for strategic intervention, rather
than seriously trying to "steer the ship" in any detailed way
(Nelson 1977, p.34).
Like any social ideal, such as "freedom" or "grassroots
democracy," sustainable development has been an elusive con-
cept that resists operationalization in technical terms. It
is a dynamic concept whose meaning constantly evolves. It
mobilizes people to act to search for its meaning in action.
The answer to the problem of policy research on sustainable
development may be to look not only at the level of policy
analysis but also at the level of policy practice.
Rather than proceeding as the science foundationalists,
beginning at a high level of abstraction and generality and
looking for some apex value or some other key principle or
concept from which to deduce a policy prescription, I will
take the route of policy inquiry (Lindblom 1990). I will
begin with relatively concrete questions and propositions
asking: Who are the people for whom the relationship between
environment and development is a problem? What is their sit-
uation? What do they think about it and why? What do others
think about it and why? Can I find relatively concrete per-
suasive reasons for agreeing or disagreeing with either? On
what grounds might my line of thought then in turn be chal-
lenged? (Lindblom 1990, p.42). To this set of questions I
wish to add yet another one: How do the actors learn in a
problematic situation?
The problematic situation arises because the problems of
environment and development interact as a result of a chang-
ing social context and actor learning, problem-solving and
creative processes.
The above review of literature on organizational change
suggests a number of questions to ask about learning in an
inter-organizational domain of action. The most relevant to
my research are the following:
- What action strategies were pursued by the actor sys-
tem in order to achieve their task?
. What were the consequences of pursuing these
strategies?
- What kinds of intervening conditions facilitated or
constrained actional/interactional strategies?
- What were the specific properties of the modernization
project problem?
- How were problems generated over the length of the
project?
- When and how did organizational learning occur?
In my research, I will primarily follow the organizational
inquiry framework. I will study organizational learning when
actors inquire into the relationship between environment and
economic development and design and implement projects under
conditions of complexity, uncertainty, and institutional
change that meet both the substantive requirements of prob-
lem-setting and -solving and the requirements, political and
interpersonal, of sustaining the design coalition (Schon &
Rein 1994, p.170). This framework is combined with induc-
tive, action/interaction oriented analytical method of
grounded theory (Strauss and Corbin 1990) and with institu-
tional context framework of actor-system dynamics (Burns
1985). All of these perspectives on organizational inquiry
share some common characteristics:
- the process of change is seen as non-linear,
- problems are not obvious but socially constructed,
- intentions get transformed through action, and
- consequences of actions may lead to new problematic
situations.
The basic conceptual framework of my research is discussed
in the next section on research approach and method and is
illustrated by examples drawn from my cases.
Chapter 3
RESEARCH APPROACH AND METHOD
The above review of literature suggests that sustainable
development can be approached as a process of social change
and actors' inquiry into the relationship between environ-
ment and development. This relationship is perceived as
problematic and stimulates actors to search for problem
solutions. Thus the phenomenon of a modernization project
design is analyzed as a process of organizational change and
learning.
The literature review also suggests that an unfilled space
exists to study the environment-development relationship
from the practice perspective. Such a research will employ
naturalistic, qualitative methods in contrast to positivist
methods common in quantitative research. Employing qualita-
tive methods might lead to new insights not available to
rational choice policy analysts or to system level macro-
economists.
The qualitative, naturalistic theoretical orientation may
be characterized by the following (Lincoln and Guba, 1985,
in Merriam, 1991, p.55):
natural settings, humans as primary
data-gathering instruments, use of tacit
knowledge, qualitative methods, purpo-
sive sampling, inductive data analysis,
grounded theory, emergent design, nego-
tiated outcomes, case-study reporting
mode, idiographic interpretation, tenta-
tive application of findings, focus-
determined boundaries, and special cri-
teria for trustworthiness.
The three cases studied represent particular instances of
such an inquiry. The project design is shaped in and emerges
out of a field of interaction of the major social actors each
inquiring into their own particular problematic situation.
Separate actors leave and enter throughout the process and
exercise greater or lesser control over shaping of the
project design. The government inquires into the problem of
shifting development path from extensive means of growth to
intensive growth. The development bank inquires into the
ways of stimulating economic growth in an environmentally
sound way. The enterprise inquires into improving its per-
formance according to performance criteria presented to it.
The investors inquire into making profit. The center of the
field of interaction focuses on attempts of the actors to
resolve the inquiry through achieving efficient coupling of
environmental quality and industrial production.
Data for this study was gathered from three projects in
the Czech and Slovak Republics involving industrial modern-
ization, foreign investment, and environment: an aluminum
smelting modernization case, a paper pulp production modern-
ization case, and a power plant modernization case. I
researched background documentation on these projects in the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the
World Bank, ran newspaper article search on electronic data-
bases, and visited the sites. I was able to make over 60
interviews with managers and workers of the enterprises,
government regulators, NGO's, development bank officials,
community leaders, consultants and policy observers. I also
gained substantial insights into the project development
process through short term engagements as a consultant to
the development banks.
The process of a project development throughout the period
of political and economic transition provides a wealth of
interactions and organizational processes to study the
inquiry into the environment and development relationship.
The modernizing industrial plants in Central and Eastern
Europe were both heavily polluting and economically ineffi-
cient thus providing opportunity for projects that promoted
both economic growth and improvements to the environment.
The selected projects represent complex significant exper-
iments in environmentally beneficial modernization. They
were selected out by purposeful sampling (Merriam 1991) from
the group of industries dominated by large plants known to be
responsible for a significant share of industrial pollution
- energy supply, ferrous and non ferrous metallurgy, indus-
trial chemicals, paper and pulp, cement, and mining. All of
these projects were supported by a loan from a development
bank (Appendix B). Building on efficient couplings was
important in the transition process for both financially
strapped enterprises and governments. The transiency of the
situation highly increased complexity and uncertainty of the
project development. Interaction among organizational actors
was key to achieving efficient coupling in these projects.
3.1. Research Question
The problem of change, learning and need for the efficient
coupling between environment and economic development are
most dramatically raised in the context of the industrial
modernization process in Central and Eastern Europe. The
situation suggests the major problem of how organizations
can learn to manage better the industrial modernization
projects so that they achieve efficient coupling. I believe
that we can learn this by trying to understand the following
general questions:
How do multiple organizational actors learn to
design industrial modernization project in the
context of interaction between environment and
development and of institutional transition?
What is the nature of efficient coupling in the
specific industrial modernization projects?
What types of productive organizational learning
can I find within the model of development project
organizational dialectic? How can we support this
productive learning?
Can organizational change research derive policy
recommendations in new useful ways?
3.2. The Transactional System
The conceptual framework provides focus for bounding the
data collection and analyzing the interplay between the
actors' efforts to manage industrial restructuring and envi-
ronmental improvements through investment and technological
modernization and the policy dialectic which shapes these
activities. The key concepts of the basic interactional
framework - problem generating conditions, problem and its
specific properties, problem solving strategies, conse-
quences, and social context - are schematically described in
Figure 3.1. The case specific conceptual framework of
"learning efficient coupling" is shown in Figure 5.1 on
page 170 and further developed in detail in Chapter 4. In
order to make the framework more specific, I will describe it
by the way of characterizing its key concepts and providing
illustrations from my cases.
intervening conditions! structural context
Figure 3.1: Basic Model of Interaction
3.2.1. Action/Interaction Strategies
Action/interaction is directed at managing, handling, car-
rying out, or responding to a problem as it exists in context
or under a specific set of perceived conditions (Strauss and
Corbin 1990, p.10 4 ). Action/interaction is processual,
evolving in nature. It is purposeful, goal oriented, done
for some reason - in response to or to manage a problem. How-
ever, failed or absent action/interactions are just as
important to look for as when action/interaction is actually
taken or occurs.
Some of the strategies found in the case data included
bringing in investment, resolving technological design,
green marketing, enterprise image building, enterprise
restructuring, taking modernization loan, issuing stock to
raise money, or even reforming the economy.
Industrial restructuring and modernization offer many
strategies for improved environmental management: moderniz-
ing polluting technological processes and closing down the
most obsolete ones; improving management practices on indus-
trial sites; transferring technology, know-how and invest-
ment by attracting foreign partners; including environmental
compliance and provisions in contracts; changing product
structure and improving product performance levels; remedi-
ating past pollution on industrial sites; improving environ-
mental health and safety conditions; leap-frogging
technological development; shifting to less material and
energy intensive production; reducing waste streams; and
installing pollution control equipment (Figure 3.2 on
page 75).
3.2.2. Consequences
Action/interaction taken in response to, or to manage, a
problem have certain outcomes or consequences. These might
not always be predictable or what was intended. There may be
consequences to people, places, or things. Consequences may
be events or happenings, or they may take the form of respon-
sive actions/interactions. They may be actual or potential,
happen in the present or in the future. The consequences of
one set of actions may become part of the conditions affect-
ing the next set of action/interactions occurring in a
sequence. Therefore, what are consequences of action/inter-
action at one point in time may become part of the conditions
in another (Strauss and Corbin 1990, p.106).
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A number of consequences can be found in the case data.
For example, the enterprises restructure and privatize as a
consequence of governments reforms. They discover under-
ground pollution as a result of environmental appraisals
requested for development bank loans. Also, they simulta-
neously improve their environmental performance and increase
production as a result of the modernization project.
3.2.3. Problems
Problems or problematic situations are the phenomenon at
the heart of my study. Following Dewey's insights, problem-
atic situation is described as a situation whose inherent
conflict, obscurity, or confusion blocks action (in Schon
and Argyris 1996). Problems can be seen as the central idea,
event, happening, about which a set of actions/interactions
is directed at managing or handling, or to which the set is
related (Strauss and Corbin 1990, p.100). The central prob-
lem of my research is the industrial modernization project
design.
There are a number of mechanisms by which problems are
generated and reshaped. For example, new problems become
visible as the others obstructing view are removed (clearing
screen), new problems are created as the old ones are solved,
actors' "push pull" creates problems for each other, or the
specific or structural conditions change (Figure 3.1 on
page 72).
3.2.4. Specific Context
A specific context represents the specific set of proper-
ties that pertain to a problem. It is also the particular set
of conditions within which the action/interaction strategies
are taken to manage, handle, carry out, and respond to spe-
cific problem (Strauss and Corbin 1990, p.101). For example,
the problem of modernization project design has the property
of high financial requirements, innovative technological
design, increasing centrality of attention, and problem own-
ership by changing cast of actors from government, managers,
development banks, to foreign investors (Table 3.1 on
page 78).
The organizational actors have certain characteristics
themselves. They have their own cognitive perceptions, value
or preference structures, action strategies, social orienta-
Table 3.1: Properties of the Specific Context
technological complexity
cast of actors types technology suppliers
investors
commercial banks
government agencies
NGO's
enterprises
development banks
properties cognitive perceptions
value or preference struc-
ture
action strategies
social orientations
knowledge
performance capabilities
objectives
social orientations
environmental complexity number of issues (single -
multiple)
significance (local -
regional)
financial/economic com-
plexity
problem attention
problem ownership
tions, knowledge, and performance capabilities. The project
problem-setting and problem-solving activities are shaped by
these actors as they acquire more or less influence over the
project activities.
In my case, the following institutional actors are consid-
ered: government agencies, non governmental groups, enter-
prises, development banks, commercial banks, investors, and
technology suppliers. These actors may have to learn over
time to harmonize better their sometimes conflicting goals
and achieve synergy in pursuing their aims as they each
inquire into their problematic situations.
The foreign investors acquiring the privatized enterprises
often seem to act under the profit making objective. How-
ever, there are a number of alternative reasons that lead
foreign investors to the decision to invest abroad. For
example, Aharoni (1966) describes the usual initiating
forces behind foreign direct investment: drive of a high-
ranking executive, outside proposals, fear of losing a mar-
ket, the "band wagon" effect, strong competition from
abroad, market for components and other products, utiliza-
tion of old machinery, capitalization of know-how and
spreading fixed costs, and indirect return to lost markets.
The investors developed their strategies for environmental
issues. For example, they strive to avoid responsibility for
the past contamination using management contracts, leasing
of properties and acquiring only assets, or building on
greenfield sites.
The situation of development banks is more complex because
they operate under multiple, conflicting objectives. In this
respect, they resemble the situation of the state enterprise
which also has to deal with the necessity of managing tension
between public control and industry autonomy (Vernon 1985 in
Vogeler 1987). The development banks operate under environ-
mental procedures that condition funding of their projects
on environmental soundness. However, being a dominant orga-
nizational actor, they show contingency reducing tendency -
they tend to act on their environment so as to reduce its
uncertainty and to shape it to requirements of their opera-
tions (Tendler 1975).
Both banks act under imperatives of "moving money" and
"developing fundable projects" (Tendler 1975). Although they
espouse the other objectives, their dominant measure of per-
formance is expressed as an amount of money transferred into
the region. The more money moved, the better performance.
Staff members desiring career promotion are thus strongly
motivated to focus on capitally intensive projects and on
searching for new opportunities to invest money.
The governments of the transition countries act under the
difficult imperative of restraining their expenditures at
the time when domestic revenues are shrinking. In this situ-
ation, foreign investment provides an important opportunity
of financial freedom to the otherwise hard-pressed govern-
ment.
In contrast to banks, the NGO's seem to act under the
imperative of raising operating funds from a voluntary mem-
bership. Their activities must appeal to a broad audience of
supporters who contribute by paying membership fees. Their
fundamentally activist orientation requires them to maintain
the legitimacy of initiators of social change.
At the same time, the international "watch dogs" follow
flows of foreign direct investment from banks and multina-
tionals into countries of Central and Eastern Europe in an
attempt to shape them to environmental purposes. Development
banks in particular, from among the international financial
institutions, are closely watched by the NGO's. These groups
often believe that they have better chances of influencing
environmental issues indirectly through operations of inter-
national financial institutions than directly influencing
industry and governments of Central and East European coun-
tries. They make appeal to public accountability and trans-
parency of decision-making.
Strategies of international NGO's differ according to
position they occupy in the broad spectrum, from radical,
direct action oriented to the more conservative, lobbying
ones.
3.2.5. Social/ Structural Context
Social processes exhibit a high degree of context sensi-
tivity (Burns et.al. 1985, p.237). A process may undergo
adaptations or transformations as a result of changes in
context. The changes in the context, on the other hand, can
result from operations of the process itself or from exoge-
neous influences outside of the actors domain of action.
This broader structural context pertaining to a phenomenon
may be conceptualized as intervening conditions (Strauss and
Corbin, 1990). Intervening conditions are the broad and gen-
eral conditions bearing upon action/interaction strategies.
These conditions include, among others, time, space, cul-
ture, economic status, social norms, regimes, and structures
of roles.
Knowledge of specialized rules, rule systems relating to
particular institutional settings and social organizations,
is essential to effective participation in a society. Since
the knowledge of specialized rule systems varies among the
members of society, variation of this knowledge provides a
source of strategic advantage and translates to different
performance capabilities and effectiveness in social action.
In practice, a rule system is almost never fully imple-
mented. The actual, informal, rule system worked out in
practice through persuasion, negotiation, conflict and the
exercise of power among agents in the setting usually dif-
fers to a greater or lesser extent from the ideal, formal
system. Any rule system in practice will contain "unwritten
rules" which are known to those who practice the system. The
informal rules may be unknown or invisible to those outside
the system, uninitiated into the actual practices. The rule
systems may be structured and change as a result of learning
and innovation.
The social context is distinguished primarily by three
types of rule systems - rule regimes, role structures, and
process algorithms.
A rule regime is an institutionalized rule system shared
by the members of a group, organization, society, or culture
(Burns et.al. 1985, p.263). A social institution is a rule
regime which applies to a particular sphere of activity or
class of settings and governs the social action and interac-
tion of agents engaged in the sphere. A social organization
is a specific instance of a social institution, a system of
rules applied in a concrete setting.
Rule regimes are a source of expectation, a basis for
actors to predict one another's behavior in the sphere of
activity to which the regime applies. Rule regimes also reg-
ulate social action and interaction of the actors governed
by the regime in the sphere to which it applies. Among other
things, regimes specify who does what, when, how, and where.
They identify different categories of actors and assign to
them roles - actor specific rule systems.
The most relevant normative aspects of the social context
in this research are shown in Table 3.2 below.
Throughout the periods of enterprise modernization pro-
cesses studied, the organization of economic activity and
structure of roles of state administration and industrial
organization were repeatedly shaped and reshaped in the pro-
cess of the government's inquiry into improving the coun-
try's economic performance. New conceptions of the problem
of unsatisfactory economic performance were followed by
Table 3.2: Properties of the Structural Context
institutional regime - the social organization of economic activity and of environmental
protection at the level of a country
different categories of actor role structures
typical process algorithms for a project design
interaction situation or game
social relationships
centrality of green
technological advance
external pressures
motivating forces
structural reforms that usually led to a new set of difficul-
ties and a redefinition of the problem.
For example, the period of transition in Central and East-
ern Europe has been determined by a large number of policy
reforms. Along with macroeconomic stabilization and market
liberalization, privatization has been seen as a chief
strategy for achieving economic development and industrial
restructuring. These reforms were intended to modernize and
restructure industry and to reduce administrative controls
over economic activity, particularly in areas where vested
interests and rent-seeking opportunities were at stake
(Kaufmann 1994).
Industrial restructuring commonly proceeded through priva-
tization. It usually involved the steps of changing legal
status from publicly owned enterprises to enterprises incor-
porated under private law (corporatization), commercializa-
tion and restructuring, and transfer of ownership to private
sector (divestiture). This transfer was usually mediated by
a holding company (state fund for privatization) and super-
vised by a Ministry for Privatization. The Ministry for the
Environment may have been consulted on environmental issues
depending on administrative procedures adopted by individual
countries.
Restructuring strategies differed according to policy
objectives emphasized by individual governments at various
points of time. Countries may have stressed speed of priva-
tization, restructuring before sale according to industrial
policy, achieving high cash value to pay foreign debt, or to
preserve and create employment.
The pre-transition period was characterized by radically
different policies and institutions. All industry was state
owned and fell under government control. Trade with the west
was limited and enterprises had to conduct it through desig-
nated state monopoly trade organizations. Prices of inputs
and outputs were administered and did not reflect the actual
market value of goods and services. Decision making was cen-
tralized and politically directed. Enterprise managers were
mostly members of the ruling communist party loyal to the
political system. Information was not exchanged easily and
technological innovations difficult to learn about. Environ-
mental quality information was also inaccessible and even if
available, public voice to demand improvements was sup-
pressed.
The post-transition stage is characterized by a shift of
control from enterprise managers to investors, and stock
owners. The enterprises have already been privatized and
their stock is being freely exchanged. Basic economic insti-
tutions of market economy such as taxation law, bankruptcy
law, and securities laws are in place. Foreign investors are
free to purchase companies and restructure them to their
liking. Government largely withdrew from productive economic
activity which is left to the private sector. Capital is eas-
ier to obtain and the role of development banks is diminish-
ing while the role of foreign investment banks increases.
Domestic banks also become able to provide loans for a longer
term and on a lower interest. Commercial risk of the transi-
tion is being seen lower. Basic environmental laws have gen-
erally been written so that expectations for environmental
quality are more clear.
The international project financing through the develop-
ment banks faces many constraints. For example, loan can
often be issued only with sovereign guarantee of the recipi-
ent government to cover the country credit risk. The govern-
ment must allocate for a specified amount of funds in its
state budget to provide this guarantee thus straining its
already limited balance of payment capacity. This situation
is complicated by currency exchange risks. While the loans
are issued in foreign currency, project revenues are mostly
in a local currency. Thus the ability to repay the loan may
change dramatically with shifts in currency exchange rates.
Also, the international banks are constrained by prohibi-
tively high transaction costs that allow them to lend money
only to the large projects exceeding minimum of about $5 mil-
lion. Next, direct borrowing from the international develop-
ment banks can only cover a part of the investment costs,
usually about 30-60% of the total cost. Lastly, the standard
repayment terms that the banks are providing do not always
match the debt service capacities of the projects. Short
grace periods and loan maturities may lead to financing gaps
while too long periods expose the projects to additional
currency and interest rate risks.
3.2.6. Dialectic Process of Change
The actor interaction over time is viewed as a process of
change. Actors set problems and invent solutions that evolve
as a result of their transactions with the situation and with
each other (Schon & Rein 1994, xix). Process can be seen as
the linking of sequences of action/interaction as they per-
tain to the management of, control over, or response to, a
problem (Strauss and Corbin 1990, p.143).
The linking of sequences in a process can be accomplished
by noting:
. the change in conditions influencing action/interac-
tion over time;
- the action/interactional response to that change;
- the consequences that result from that action/interac-
tional response;
. describing how those consequences become part of the
conditions influencing the next action/interactional
sequence.
Table 3.3: Critical Learning Processes
type problem solving reframing
effective task performance
skill acquisition
associative learning classical conditioning
instrumental conditioning
observation learning imitation
navigation into a new situa-
tion
sensitization
habituation
chaining/sequencing
concept formation
benchmarking
aikido
double loop learning
forgetting
insightful learning
role performance
exploration
frequency high - low
productivity high - low
Change can be the consequence of planned action/interac-
tion or it may occur as a result of contingency, an unantic-
ipated and unplanned for happening that brings about change
in conditions. Process explains why action/interactional
routines break down, why problems occur in the course of life
events, and why when looking back at life one sees growth,
development, and movement (Strauss and Corbin 1990, p.144).
The process of change can be seen as learning when we can
identify performance that improves over time. Also, learning
activity must be new to the actor, begin and end with more
than one event, and be transferable from one kind of situa-
tion to another (Schon 1994, p.40). The critical learning
processes found in these cases are shown in Table 3.3 on
page 90.
3.3. The Concept of Efficient Coupling
The concept of efficient coupling is descriptive of what
were the desired project outcomes in my cases. It is useful
to other people as they try to think about how to create con-
ditions at the local level for successful project outcomes.
The concept of coupling has a long history of usage in
literature and in technical discourse. In its broad sense,
coupling means joining in couples, pairing, or linking, for
example the pairing of the sexes in the sexual union (Oxford
English Dictionary). The word coupling also refers to any-
thing that couples, or is used to join together.
The word coupling has many technical and scientific uses
In mechanical engineering, it is the name of various con-
trivances for connecting parts of constructions or machin-
ery, especially in order to transmit motion. For example, it
describes the contrivance for connecting the ends of shaft-
ing together, either permanently, or so as to admit of their
being disconnected when needed. It also refers to the chain
or link connecting two carriages or trucks of a railway
train. Next, it describes carriage-building such as the con-
nexion or joint upon which the fore-carriage turns or locks,
or the attachment of whatever kind uniting the hind to the
fore wheels. When speaking of organ, coupling means the con-
trivance for connecting two manuals, or a manual with the
pedals, or two keys an octave apart on the same keyboard, so
that both can be played by a single motion (Oxford English
Dictionary).
In genetics, coupling usually refers to the situation in
which two dominant factors were contributed by the same par-
1. For example, we find electromagnetic coupling, magnetoelastic coupling, bending-torsion stiff-
ness coupling, cross-coupling, mode coupling, mutual coupling, reactor coupling, wave coupling,
strong coupling, weak coupling, computer coupling, direct coupling, dynamic coupling, functional
coupling, non-linear coupling, reductive coupling, thermodynamic coupling, and vibronic cou-
pling.
ent. In physics, coupling is used to describe a connection
between two oscillating systems which results in a mutual
dependence of their oscillations, so that oscillation in one
system causes an oscillation in the other and partly deter-
mines its character. Such a connection may be either physi-
cal or inductive. The strength of this interdependence is
being characterized as tight or loose coupling and is mea-
sured by the coupling coefficient. If a considerable portion
of the field of force of the first circuit is embraced by the
second, the coupling is fast (tight); if only a small por-
tion, the coupling is loose. The looser the coupling between
the two circuits, the less rapidly is the energy of the
oscillating circuit used up and the more persistent is the
oscillation.
In atomic, nuclear, and particle physics, coupling is used
to describe physical interaction between two particles,
between a particle and a field, or between two fields; spe-
cifically, it refers to an interaction between the magnetic
moments of the electrons in an atom. It is also used of the
combination of mathematical quantities (in quantum mechan-
ics) which corresponds to the physical interactions. The
strength of the type of interaction between a particle and a
field or between particles is measured by a coupling con-
stant, for example, the strong interaction between mesons
and nucleons, and the weak interaction between four fermi-
ons. This is analogous to the electric charge, which is the
coupling constant between charged particles and electromag-
netic radiation. Maximum coupling is 1 and no coupling is 0.
Electrical engineering also makes extensive use of the
word coupling. Two or more electric circuits so arranged
that energy can transfer electrically or magnetically from
one to another are called coupled circuits. Coupling is
again described as close or loose. A close coupled process
has elements with small phase shift between specified vari-
ables; close coupled systems have large mutual effect shown
mathematically by cross-product in the system matrix.
Computer systems that share equipment and can exchange
information are also called coupled systems. The manner and
degree of interdependence between software modules is clas-
sified into standard types that include common-environment
coupling, content coupling, control coupling, data coupling,
hybrid coupling and pathological coupling (IEEE standard
610.12-1990) . Common-environment coupling is a type of cou-
pling in which two software modules access a common data
area. Content coupling is a type of coupling in which some or
all of the contents of one software module are included in
the contents of another module. Control coupling is a type of
coupling in which one software module communicates informa-
tion to another module for the explicit purpose of influenc-
ing the later module's execution. Data coupling is a type of
coupling in which output from one software module serves as
input to another module. Hybrid coupling is a type of cou-
pling in which different subsets of the range of values that
a data item can assume are used for different and unrelated
purposes in different software module. Pathological coupling
is a type of coupling in which one software module affects or
depends upon the internal implementation of another.
In all these various uses of the concept coupling, the
main idea seems to be that of an interaction between differ-
ent properties of a system, or an interaction between two or
more systems. The extent of this interaction is expressed by
the coupling constant or coefficient. The coupling coeffi-
cient determines the coupling efficiency. A highly effi-
cient, close coupling exhibits high mutual effect that can
be measured as a cross-product in the system matrix. How-
ever, it also simultanteously shows high instability and low
persistance.
The properties of coupling relevant to the project out-
comes of the researched cases are shown in Table 3.4 on
page 96. The coupling is said to have members consisting of
Table 3.4: Properties of Efficient Coupling
environmental improve-
ment
type (eliminated sub-
stances from use;
improved product quality;
closed release of emis-
sions/effluents; remedia-
tion of historic damage;
occupational health/
safety;)
company profitability type (reduced operating
costs; reduced capital
costs; increased product
price; increased sale/ pro-
duction volume;
improved organizational
performance;
regional economy jobs
taxes
linkages
manner of coupling monopolistic coupling
market coupling
managed coupling
persistence high -- low
degree of interdependence tight, loose coupling coefficient (deter-
(strong, weak) mines the coupling effi-
ciency)
technological advance high -- low
enviromental improvements, economic benefits and benefits to
regional economy. These memebers are couplied in a specific
members of coupling
manner as either monopolistic coupling, market coupling, or
managed coupling. The coupling has a certain degree of per-
sistence, and interdependence. It also has the property of
technological advance which is valued by the actors who are
motivated by technological prestige.
In choosing the word efficient coupling as a descriptive
concept to characterize desirable project outcomes pursued
by the actors in my cases, I omitted other descriptive and
normative concepts frequently encountered in discussion on
sustainable development. The concepts such as one solution
for two problems, synergies, linkages, joint benefits, inte-
gration of goals, although similar in meaning, do not cap-
ture what seems to me to be important about project outcomes
in my cases.
When closely analyzed, the above concepts of the sustain-
able development discourse differ in critical aspects from
the descriptive concept I selected for this study. One solu-
tion for two problems does not say much about the character-
istic of the solution other than that it somewhat economizes
on energies spent in pursing it. Integration of goals again
does not say much about the characteristic of the outcome,
but rather prescribes the process of going about it.
Synergies understood as increased effectiveness, or
achievement produced as a result of combined action or co-
operation (Oxford English Dictionary) or a product-market
posture with a combined performance that is greater than the
sum of its parts (Ansoff 1965, p.75) implies the process by
which the increased effectiveness is to be attained. Effi-
cient coupling while also meaning the increased effective-
ness, or achievement, remains neutral with respect to a
mechanism by which the outcome is achieved. Since the mecha-
nism is a subject of inquiry, efficient coupling appears to
serve better my purpose.
Linkages, on the other hand, hints at a key property of
the solution - its interdependent nature. However, it seems
more general in its meaning than efficient coupling whose
strength lies in its formal usage in scientific and engi-
neering literature with associated specific properties.
Joint benefits, commonly used in literature on negotiation,
appear to miss the key property of interdependence which
makes the description of outcomes so difficult to grasp.
One of the key feature of the outcome of efficient cou-
pling is that it occurs through a collapse of two interacting
values of the coupling. When the coupling becomes efficient,
the relationship between the two values of economy and envi-
ronment is self-referential. As it will be amply shown in the
cases, the analyst is being left confused about what is envi-
ronmental benefit and what is economic benefit when they
constantly influence each other. The puzzlement about what
is external to the situation is typical for the efficient
coupling whose mutual effect is calculated as a system
cross-product rather than as aggregation of individual val-
ues typical for economic determination of cost-benefits.
Efficient coupling as a concept is more specific than the
"diabolic" concept of sustainable development. However, I
hope that if used normatively, the concept of efficient cou-
pling might serve as a "practical step toward sustainable
development." For example, the concept of efficient coupling
could be used as a criterion to guide to sustainable develop-
ment at the project level.
In the following sections, the outcomes of efficient cou-
pling and the process of problem-setting, problem-solving
and pursuing efficient coupling are illustrated on three
case studies of industrial modernization combined with envi-
ronmental improvements and foreign investment. The first
case describes a process of aluminum production moderniza-
tion which brings couplings among technological moderniza-
tion, increased product volume, decreased consumption of
inputs, tax base generation and past pollution remediation,
improving workers health and safety conditions, reducing air
pollution and increasing energy efficiency. The second case
of paper pulp production modernization is a case of elimi-
nating a toxic chemical from a production process while
simultaneously closing the waste stream. This is achieved
with an increase of production capacity and an expansion of a
new product to an environmentally aware market. The last
case details a large scale program of air pollution cleanup
conducted by a monopoly power company. Although this project
utilizes end-of-pipe pollution control technology, benefits
are still achieved through an increased social legitimacy
which is necessary for utility rates increases.
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Chapter 4
LEARNING EFFICIENT COUPLING IN ENTER-
PRISE MODERNIZATION PROJECTS
The following sections present detailed case study analyt-
ical interpretations of the industrial modernization
projects - aluminum plant modernization, pulp and paper
plant modernization, and power plant modernization. They
discuss first the conditions of interaction which gave rise
to actors' learning in the situation and led to emergence of
efficient couplings. Next, they analyze the richness of
learning experiences which shaped the project designs
throughout the process. Last, they analyze the specific
nature of the efficient couplings that were achieved in
individual cases.
4.1. Power Plant Modernization
4.1.1. Conditions of Interaction in Power Plant Modernization
The complex program of the CEZ to modernize its power
plants in order to reduce their environmental impact
resulted from a sequence of earlier actions. In particular,
it was an attempt for dealing with heritage of centralized
planning in the energy sector.
Initially, the Czechoslovak government's inquiry into fur-
thering economic development was based on orientation
towards heavy industry. The strategy of boosting up economic
growth as fast as possible and of building heavy industry
called for energy supply to feed the economy. Decision was
made to construct a large number of coal fired thermal power
plants concentrated largely on a brink of open pit coal mines
in Northern Bohemia.
At that time, the autonomy of the CEZ to make any decision
was curbed by its role as a state owned monopoly producer of
energy in the country. The CEZ simply executed decisions of
its superiors in the Ministry of Industry and Energy. At
first, environmental impacts of coal mining and coal burning
in power plants did not matter in the government's strategy
of achieving economic growth. But as the sky darkened and
forests in Northern Bohemia started dying, impacts of power
plants operation on human health and environmental quality
became apparent. Hard data was difficult to obtain, but
every citizen of the country knew about critical environmen-
tal situation in Northern Bohemia.
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The government's strategy for rapid economic growth sup-
ported by cheap and abundant energy put the CEZ into the
position of the worst polluter in the country. In spite of
the fact that the power plants burned the low calorific, high
sulphur content coal, they were fitted with no desulphuriza-
tion equipment until recently.
Although action alternatives were known to technicians in
the CEZ who followed technological developments in neighbor-
ing countries in the west and often participated in interna-
tional scientific conferences, their knowledge could not be
put to much use due to the institutional regime of the coun-
try. The CEZ managers had no access to material resources to
construct the scrubbers and any request for significant
amount of investment funds had to be approved by the super-
vising government agency. Thus access to action resources
was severally constrained in the structure of role relation-
ships in which the CEZ was causing the pollution but could
not prevent it.
The structure of economic roles within the COMECON system
also required that when the decision to develop a technology
to curb sulphur dioxide emissions was finally made, a Soviet
design scrubber was adopted as a problem solution. This
decision had little technical merit but brought the Czecho-
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slovak government into conformity with norm expectations of
not seeking the technology in the West.
Consequently, the CEZ underwent a traumatic experience of
building the new Soviet design scrubber based on a technol-
ogy that was never tested in operation before. After the
embarrassing experience of wasting lots of money, good will,
and technological credit, the CEZ resolved to never again
experiment with untested Soviet technology.
At that time, the Czechoslovak government's inquiry into
economic performance brought about the dramatic transition
of the 1990's. The CEZ was facing a new situation. When the
state administered trade was abolished, the CEZ could sud-
denly acquire the technology from the west. Following the
price reforms, prices of most goods were determined by the
market even though energy prices were still set administra-
tively. Privatization and restructuring also affected the
CEZ significantly because the company was substantially
downsized when various parts of it were spun off as individ-
ual units.
The economic transition was also accompanied with politi-
cal democratization which brought public pressure on the
company for its environmental record. Soon, the CEZ came
under concentrated fire of all possible domestic and inter-
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national environmental groups as the number one polluter in
the country.
During this initial period of economic and political tran-
sition, the CEZ was in a hostile situation taking one blow
after another. As a result, when the new strict air pollution
law was passed, the CEZ did not contest it. Instead, it did
what it was good at. It drafted a comprehensive program of
power plant modernization that would clean up its pollution.
It anticipated that its effort for compliance with the new
air pollution law would bring it into favor of the Czechoslo-
vak Finance Ministry and would improve its public image.
The struggle of the CEZ to comply with the new law and fix
its image of the polluter brought problematic situation for
the Czechoslovak government. After all, the CEZ was still a
majority government owned utility. It was necessary to sup-
port the CEZ in its struggle with correcting past neglect
particularly when environmental benefits of the CEZ's mod-
ernization program were so high. Thus the Government's
strategy to help out the embattled utility was decided on.
The CEZ received a sovereign guarantee for a World Bank loan
- the only such a guarantee ever given by the Czechoslovak
government for a project based World Bank loan.
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Although the World Bank loan made it possible for the CEZ
to start up on its power plants modernization project, the
CEZ still had to find the right technological solution.
Because its past experiment with the Soviet scrubber which
employed regenerative technology did not work out, the CEZ
rejected not only the Soviet designed technology but also
any experimenting with untested but possibly ecologically
sounder desulphurization technologies.
The problem of finding the right technological solution
for power plant desulphurization became a case of a situa-
tion when state of technology did not permit action possi-
bilities. The CEZ had opportunity to make long term
investments in environmental control technology. The new
strict environmental law prescribed it to take action else
its power plants were shut. In its position of a state con-
trolled utility, it could possibly find investment funds for
the modernization. But the state of the art in desulphuriza-
tion technology proved constraining. The conventional fluid
gas desulphurization technology commercially available in
the market used high amounts of lime or limestone in its
operation while leaving substantive amounts of solid waste
as a residual of desulphurization.
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Thus the CEZ's acquiring the conventional fluid gas desul-
phurization technology created a number of problems for its
operations. The CEZ had to find a sufficient supply of lime
to feed the scrubbers in operation. It had to deal with crit-
icism from environmental advocates who charged it with
freezing unsatisfactory technology for a long time and with
shifting pollution from one type of media, air, to another
type of media, solid waste.
The problem of choosing technology for power plant modern-
ization was perceived differently by the workers and manag-
ers of the concerned power plants. They seemed to believe
that in the situation of job uncertainty and organizational
restructuring, sinking a large modernization investment in a
power plant would provide security to power plant operators
that their plant would not be closed down in a near future.
Since operating time for a scrubber is about fifteen years,
some of the scrubbers will outlast the power plants to which
they were attached.
The problematic situation of power plant modernization
looked differently to the technology suppliers. They saw a
unique action opportunity to sell technology which was
developed and operated conventionally abroad. They knew they
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could supply the scrubbers by a turn-key method with simul-
taneous provision of investment loan.
An alternative strategy to installing the end of pipe pol-
lution control equipment could have been in switching pro-
duction inputs, in this case imported black coal for
domestic brown coal. Burning higher quality coal would have
somewhat reduced emissions from smoke stacks. However, this
option was constrained by the Czechoslovak Government's pre-
dilection with improving economic performance and managing
economic and political transition of the country.
Although the institutional regime of the Czech Republic
opened to free market economy and international trade, the
energy sector was too sensitive both economically and polit-
ically to be left to market forces alone. Downsizing mining
activity or closing mines completely was seen by the govern-
ment as a potentially politically dangerous move that had to
be prevented by government policy. The CEZ found that though
the economic regime had changed to the extent that coal could
be purchased in free market domestically, rather than allo-
cated administratively, foreign imports were restricted by
government policy. In particular, purchases of high quality
Polish coal, which could have been burned in these power
plants, were limited by import quotas.
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A new need for dealing with action constraint arose from
vertical demonopolization of energy production of the coun-
try. The structure of roles in energy generation and energy
distribution changed so that one company, the CEZ, produced
electricity, and other companies, regional distribution
enterprises, were responsible for connecting and selling
energy to households. The CEZ had now to negotiate prices of
energy with the distribution enterprises which could effec-
tively bargain over price in their independent position.
Also, the amount of electricity sold by the CEZ depended on
ability of the distribution enterprises to connect house-
holds to electricity grid and servicing them effectively.
The CEZ was constrained on the demand side.
The regional energy distribution enterprises were put into
position of independence by the government decision to sepa-
rate out energy distribution from energy generation. They
soon started buying electricity not only from the CEZ, but
also from other smaller suppliers domestically or from for-
eign energy utilities abroad. The creation of competition in
energy supply strengthened bargaining position of the
regional distribution enterprises in bargaining electricity
prices.
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The efforts for restructuring the organization of energy
production and consumption in country also triggered inter-
nal disintegrative forces. These forces were exacerbated by
provisions of the privatization law which gave right to
independent candidates to submit privatization proposals. As
a consequence, the CEZ had to deal with power plants submit-
ting their own privatization proposals and asking for orga-
nizational autonomy from the CEZ. The fears from past
redistributive practices which allocated funds arbitrarily
and under political influence were overcome only with diffi-
culty.
The CEZ overcame the problem by devising a strategy of
raising money collectively for modernization of all the
power plants. This could be achieved more effectively in
common than by each power plant on its own. The argument for
collective action seemed to work by contrasting it with the
Polish experience where power plants gained independence,
but found it hard to get financial credit for their modern-
ization.
The power plant operators were also comforted that scarce
financial resource would not be allocated to completion of
the nuclear power plant in Temelin which would put them out
of job when started up. They realized that electricity
110
demand would not drop significantly and that their power
generating capacity would still be needed. The power plant
operators resolved to change their social orientation and to
cooperate with the CEZ in producing electricity as one orga-
nization. They found that decentralization and autonomy had
their own limitation and that they could achieve better
results through organized action. They also experienced that
when cooperation was voluntary rather than imposed and
coerced, they could live with it.
Even when the CEZ won the internal battle for integration
and organizational reorganization, it still had to face
angry public. Its ravaged public image needed correction.
Particularly citizens of Northern Bohemia had to be per-
suaded to trust the CEZ that it will clean up pollution from
its energy plants. Their impatience with the situation after
they gained political freedom in 1990 was potentially dan-
gerous to the CEZ.
The CEZ established office of public relations and devel-
oped public information programs that would provide better
information to the public. The citizens gained confidence
they could speak to representatives of the CEZ about their
situation and that their voice would be heard without going
on occupational strike. The CEZ found that the public would
gain trust in their desulphurization efforts as soon as con-
struction of the first scrubbers was contracted out.
Although the CEZ obtained the World Bank loan to start up
its plant modernization program, the total financial
requirements of the program by far exceeded the amount of the
loan. The CEZ had to find alternative ways of raising large
sums of money from commercial markets in order to finance the
modernization. It knew that the World Bank loan had improved
its credit worthiness, but that it still had to do better to
obtain the necessary funds.
In order to raise the necessary funds at acceptable inter-
est, the CEZ had to improve its business image. It invited an
internationally recognized financial auditing firm to pub-
licly testify that its accounts were in order and that infor-
mation presented in its annual report was correct. It
further invited Standard and Poor's rating agency to award
it investment credit. These steps helped the CEZ increase
transparency of its financial practices and obtain a high
ranking BBB- investment grade credit that improved its busi-
ness image.
Encouraged by its success, the CEZ also invited the Japa-
nese JBRI to scrutinize its financial condition. When it
received the A- credit rating from the Japanese, it discov-
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ered that Japanese banks consider them a low credit risk
because they treat majority government ownership similar to
state sovereign guarantee on loans. It realized that it was a
desirable business partner for Japanese banks.
Following the first success stories, the CEZ pursued fur-
ther steps in its financial strategy. It discovered that
funding the power plant modernization program would be
cheaper through raising general credit rather than through
seeking project specific loans. Building on this knowledge,
it issued successfully three emissions of bonds on domestic
capital market and the emission of Eurobonds.
The domestic banks that were approached by the CEZ to pro-
vide the funding for the modernization program found out
from the credit ratings and annual reports that the CEZ was a
good business partner to whom they could trust their money.
In a situation of widespread defaults on loans by the indus-
try, they were convinced that the CEZ could be lent the
money. The foreign banks also observed that the CEZ was a
reliable and desirable business partner when J.P. Morgan
Securities issued its Eurobonds. They were impressed that
the CEZ was the first East European industrial enterprise
that successfully introduced its bonds on European capital
market.
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Consequent to its successful steps in financial strategy,
the CEZ had become the most sophisticated issuer in the
domestic financial market. It set a benchmark with its long
term bond issue in the domestic market and played the role
usually taken by the government. But it also realized that it
reached limits of the domestic financial market which was
not large enough to satisfy its credit needs. Even when the
CEZ would be exposed to foreign exchange risks, it had to
reach out and borrow internationally.
In the meantime, the international financial institutions
faced stiff competition from each other in the syndicated
loans market. They had to reduce their interest on loans in
order to conduct business. The CEZ becoming aware of this
situation, changed its strategy and borrowed further funds
from commercial banks eager for business rather than issuing
more Eurobonds. It discovered that it could gain a signifi-
cant reward for this strategy when it arranged a multi cur-
rency revolving loan with Summitomo bank. By obtaining this
loan, the CEZ set another benchmark. When other industrial
enterprises heard that the loan was granted on such an unusu-
ally low interest rate of 25 points above LIBOR, they
required the same low interest from their financial institu-
tions.
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4.1.2. Organizational Learning in Power Plant Modernization
The power plants modernization case begins with the Czech-
oslovak government's learning to direct energy future of the
country in a centralized way. The government engages in
problem solving activity to set policies and establish
institutions that would meet the long term energy demands of
the country. This inquiry is part of the government's orien-
tation towards heavy industry which requires reliable energy
supply. As part of the long term strategy for the energy and
economic future of the country, the decision is made to build
the power plants and to orient the country towards energy
generation from coal.
Consequently, the CEZ and its predecessors engage in
learning to play the role of an energy utility within the
centralized system of economic management. Although action
alternatives are known to the utility technicians who travel
abroad to international conferences and exchange informa-
tion, their organizational role constrains them to a limited
course of action. Their assigned role within the larger
whole of the COMECON ultimately determines their choice of
technology for the first experimental scrubber. Financing of
the investment is provided as a matter of course by the
state. The role the utility and its staff learn to play is
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that of a subordinate in the hierarchically organized state
administration.
However, soon after the power plants are constructed, the
citizens of Northern Bohemia, the CEZ staff, and the govern-
ment officials learn that energy generation in coal-fired
power plants is associated with serious environmental dam-
age. They learn through this conditioning to expect that
energy generation from coal will be associated with environ-
mental costs in the future. Further, the CEZ is conditioned
into its subordinate role expecting that its decisions will
have to comply with the government's political line and that
a proposal for Soviet technology, whatever its quality, will
be easier to pass through.
However, after the CEZ fails in its attempt to bring the
Soviet designed scrubber into operating condition, its staff
learns through instrumental conditioning to associate Soviet
technology, or any experimentation with technological design
of a scrubber, with a punishment of a certain disaster. They
overlearn and become conditioned to avoid any such an action
in the future again.
When the political and economic transition of the 1990's
comes, the CEZ starts learning to navigate in a new situa-
tion. The CEZ typifies the new situation to the old by
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designing a comprehensive program of long term investments
in environmental protection. The CEZ staff is good in the
practice of long term comprehensive planning so that
approaching the problem in a comprehensive way is a familiar
task to them.
Further, the CEZ passes through a process of sensitization
when public pressure against its actions increases. With
public discontent threatening its coal power plants in
Northern Bohemia and its nuclear power plant in Temelin,
Southern Bohemia, the utility becomes highly sensitized to
public perception of its actions. As a response, the CEZ
learns gradually to improve its skill in public relations
and dealing with the public. A special department of public
relations is established and proactive educational programs
are launched.
All of the domestic actors, the NGO's, the government, and
the utility, learn extensively through imitation. The NGO's
create alliances with the greens in Austria and Germany to
conduct joint protest actions. They learn to organize in the
way their western counterparts do, and design adversial
pressure strategies in a similar manner.
Imitation plays a key role in restructuring of the energy
sector of the Czech Republic and privatizing the utility.
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Models of energy sector organization are searched for exten-
sively abroad and discussions are conducted about merits of
each particular model. In the end, centralized energy gener-
ation is temporarily accepted while the demand side is bro-
ken up to create competition.
The learning to navigate into a new situation also
involves habituation of the past conditioned responses. The
need for habituation is the most clearly visible in the cen-
trifugal tendencies unleashed by the organizational restruc-
turing of the utility. In the past period of centralized
planning, the organizational units of the CEZ learned to
associate collective action with the practice of redistribu-
tion of resources in the center based on political favorit-
ism. Because they expect a similar association in the
future, they demand their organizational autonomy from the
CEZ. Only slowly do they habituate this response and become
content with their organizational inclusion in the CEZ.
All the while, the utility is engaged in benchmarking
against other utilities. When it comes to choosing the tech-
nology for its power plants modernization program, the CEZ
has already learned what its counterparts in the world are
using and what conventionally produced technology is avail-
able for them to buy. Since they benchmark themselves
118
against the industry while at the same time remain risk
averse, they select to buy the best available conventional
technology on the market. In the discussion about merits of
buying a cheaper, second order technology from the west,
they clearly opt for getting the best available. The techno-
logical advance rather than cost seems to be the main deci-
sion criterion.
Most interestingly, the utility learns to apply aikido,
using the action energy in the direction it is going, in its
problem solving strategies. Its aikido strategy is best
apparent in the way the CEZ handles the new strict air pollu-
tion law. While most of the industry complains about its
strictness and looks for ways to avoid compliance, the CEZ
embraces it foolhardily. Although compliance with the law
will be very expensive, the CEZ can use this to its own
advantage. It uses the momentum of action to borrow as much
money as possible as fast as it can. While the government is
happy that its law is being implemented, the CEZ being a
state owned monopoly does not have to worry about the cost of
modernization. It will be passed on to consumers who
demanded the law in the first place.
The aikido strategy was learned and applied already sooner
even though not in such a clear fashion. During the discus-
119
sions on internal organization of the CEZ, the proponents of
decentralization pointed out possible dysfunctions of col-
lective action as they experienced them in the past. How-
ever, the CEZ management was able to turn the large size of
its organization to its advantage by drawing on its pool of
resources to obtain favorable credit rating. Only through
the feared collective action was the CEZ able to raise suffi-
cient funds for the large scale modernization.
The major problem encountered by the CEZ in relation to
the power plant modernization project certainly concerned
its financial strategy. By a process of trial and error the
CEZ step by step proceeded in improving its credit rating
image and finding new successful strategies of borrowing
money. When its strategy of issuing domestic bonds was suc-
cessful, the CEZ did not stop there by repeating only this
success. Instead, it explored further to expand into the
Eurobond market. When issuing Eurobonds was again success-
ful, the CEZ found even better deal in the syndicated loan
market.
In each particular step of the process, the CEZ was
rewarded by a success, but it kept going. It was learning to
finance its modernization in a better way rather than stick-
ing to a strategy that proved successful before. This
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approach can be seen as deutero loop learning, or learning to
learn, rather than as an instrumental single loop improve-
ments in performance. By this learning process, the CEZ
became a benchmark for the industry rather than benchmarking
itself against the others.
4.1.3. Efficient Coupling in Power Plant Modernization
The main coupling in this case arises between electricity
rates and reduced air emissions and may be called monopoly
coupling.
The highest environmental improvements of the coupling
derive from reducing release of emissions of sulphur diox-
ide. No substance is eliminated from production process, on
the contrary, limestone is added in the scrubbing of emis-
sions. No remediation of historical damage is associated
with this coupling and product quality - electricity gener-
ated - remains the same. No direct effect on occupational
health and safety is apparent.
Profitability of the company will be improved particularly
through an anticipated increase of product price. Compliance
with the air pollution law should make it possible for the
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CEZ to legitimize an increase of its energy rates so that a
return on investment in pollution control technology is
gained. Operating costs of energy generation somewhat
increase by adding pollution control technology although
some of the cost will be recovered by selling the side prod-
uct of gypsum cardboard. Although capital costs of the clean
up program are immense, their relative expense declines
through learning processes employed in raising the funds. It
also declines due to the cross-border impact of the environ-
mental improvements which motivate neighboring countries to
"bribe" the CEZ into compliance by offering financial
grants.
Production volume from the coal burning power plants some-
what declines due to plant closures. However, product volume
is higher than required by the Czech economy because some of
the electricity is exported abroad. These exports of product
to a green market (switzerland) are tied to diverting prof-
its of the transaction towards achieving environmental com-
pliance of the power plants.
Restructuring is relatively unaffected by the air emis-
sions control program.
Returns to regional economy come from reduced damage to
forests and buildings from acid rain and from improved human
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health. They are also derived from maintaining employment in
the power plants and contracting construction companies to
build the scrubbers.
The coupling in this case is attached from environment to
economy. Environmental improvements and compliance with the
air pollution law provide energy for increased company prof-
its in the future. This is possible because the coupling
occurs in a monopolistic organizational environment where
political legitimation of the investment is more important
than market prices. Time dimension of the coupling is long
term. Profits are expected in the future when energy prices
are adjusted to financial flows of the CEZ.
4.2. Pulp and Paper Plant Modernization
4.2.1. Conditions of Interaction in Pulp and Paper Plant Modernization
The SEPAP's story began when the Czechoslovak Government
decided to expand production of pulp and paper in Steti. At
that time, planning of the expansion was fully under control
of the central planners. The government of Czechoslovakia
provided money, technical assistance and supplied construc-
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tion materials and technology. The needs of the construction
project were planned for in the plan that designated suppli-
ers and construction companies to do the work. For the Czech-
oslovak Government, the expansion of the SEPAP provided a
solution to its need to boost up quickly production and pro-
vide employment for a large population in the region.
For the wider regional population and the town of Steti,
the construction of a factory with many stable job opportu-
nities satisfied their desire to find employment. The large
factory in the town provided the community with the means for
earning their livelihood. They welcomed the construction and
applied for jobs to work in the factory. The goal for the new
factory to expand and produce quickly was shared by all the
involved actors - workers, government, and enterprise manag-
ers.
When environmental situation in the Czech Republic started
to deteriorate, the Government and the SEPAP managers were
brought to face impact of the production of pulp and paper on
natural environment. The government passed new environmental
laws as a strategy of dealing with the situation. This action
created a new problematic situation for the SEPAP's manage-
ment who now had to respond to government's effort for regu-
lation. However, the management could negotiate their
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compliance with the state regulators and in many instances
was able to secure exceptions for effluent discharges. They
found that their production was more important than its
impacts on the natural environment.
Still, water pollution persisted given the performance
criteria specified in the law on clean water. Thus the manag-
ers resolved to draft a plan for modernization of the SEPAP
that would satisfy the government's desire for increased
production and at the same time, include in the plan a provi-
sion for construction of a water treatment plant. Their
strategy of presenting the government with an investment
expansion plan that would include both production and envi-
ronmental investments worked out. Together with a new Kamyr
boiler, the plant got a new water treatment plant.
At the same time, the SEPAP installed a regeneration
boiler that would burn lignin extracted from wood chips dur-
ing pulping process and a new bleaching plant. As a conse-
quence, use of chlorinated substances in production process
increased. However, the lignin removed during the bleaching
operation could not be regenerated in the recovery boiler
nor treated in a waste water treatment plant. Thus this step
of modernization combined with first measures for environ-
mental protection caused redefinition of the problematic
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situation. The main environmental problem no longer was
organic matter released into water but rather the presence
of chlorine in the waste stream that prevented treatment and
regeneration of the waste effluent. Elemental chlorine and
sodium hypochlorite became the main problematic substances
in the production process.
As the SEPAP got to be known as one of the largest dis-
chargers of AOX and COD to the Elbe River, the situation with
respect to SEPAP's environmental performance weighted them.
The social context shifted at this time. The enterprise
gained more freedom to retain profits and decide on its
investment needs. The government in its inquiry into improv-
ing chronically declining economic performance gave the
enterprise substantial freedoms compare with the past. The
structure of the role between the government and the enter-
prise changed. The enterprise was supposed to exercise
financial self-management while the government was supposed
to change its activity from direct control and assigning
plan targets to indirect controls through financial incen-
tives.
Thus the shift in the structure of roles between the gov-
ernment and the enterprise and the growing awareness of
environmental degradation led to a redefinition of the prob-
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lematic situation. The responsibility for pollution and for
initiative to improve the situation was shifted towards the
enterprise.
The enterprise managers accepted the challenge. They
designed a long term strategy of a step by step modernization
of their production process that would, in the end, elimi-
nate chlorine from their operations. At the same time, they
again used the action opportunity for combining environmen-
tal improvements with increasing production capacity.
Social orientation of the managers also contributed to the
forming of their action response. Because most of the manag-
ers grew up in the local community, they considered them-
selves responsible to their fellow citizens. The risk of
potential chlorine leak during transportation and handling
seeped into awareness of all citizens of Steti including
that of the managers. The managers' awareness of threat of
potential chlorine leak to the local community contributed
to their desire to eliminate chlorine from their operation.
The community realized that the managers cared about the
threat, but that they could not immediately eliminate it.
The community and the enterprise settled on a compromise
solution of trading jobs for potential threat to human
health.
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The SEPAP's managers, who found themselves in the problem-
atic situation that called for modernization of production
in SEPAP again, devised a long term strategic plan of action.
The strategy they developed, the step by step gradual
replacement of component parts of the production process
that would ultimately result in elimination of chlorine cre-
ated a new need for implementing the plan. The SEPAP managers
had to negotiate with technology suppliers in a situation
when their bargaining power was significantly constrained by
the economic regime of the country which did not allow the
enterprise to engage in a trade with the west directly. The
regime of the state administered trade and the structure of
roles in economic organization of the country required SEPAP
to arrange trade through designated state trading companies
that had access to foreign currency and license to interact
with the west.
The SEPAP's modernization project also created business
for domestic banks which were approached to help finance the
production expansion. The banks devised a strategy of
financing that would enable the SEPAP to acquire the techno-
logical equipment through long term leases guaranteed by the
domestic bank. Even later, when the economic regime changed
and trade with the west was opened up, the domestic banks
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provided the service of selling credit guarantees to enter-
prises borrowing money from foreign commercial banks. The
domestic banks found that even when their limited resources
and financial instability of the country did not allow them
to lend money on a long term credit with a low enough inter-
est, they could still get business by selling the loan guar-
antees.
The domestic banks' service of providing loan guarantees
and arranging leases to enterprises matched with the SEPAP's
strategy of going about implementation of their moderniza-
tion efforts within the institutional constraints of that
period of time through arranging for the leases. However,
the SEPAP made the experience that its limited bargaining
power often resulted in the technology supplier's bargaining
up prices and crossing out pieces of technology from the
"shopping list" supplied by the SEPAP.
In the meantime, the Czechoslovak government struggled
with its problem of improving economic performance of the
country. It feared that any decrease in standard of living
could lead to popular unrest and loss of power by the commu-
nist party.
The Soviet reform movement provided a window of opportu-
nity for the Czechoslovak Government to follow the lead. It
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devised a strategy of economic reform modeled on Gorbachev's
Soviet reforms of "perestroika." The Czechoslovak govern-
ment's strategy of economic reform followed the Soviet prin-
ciples of moving to full financial self-management of
enterprises and to pursuit of industrial democracy through
creation of worker's councils. However, the Czechoslovak
Government's reform proposal came late.
The long term problematic situation of declining economic
performance and suppression of political freedoms was
resolved by popular discontent culminating in political and
economic reforms of 1989. The public realized that it had the
power to effect change if it exercised voice. It also became
aware that this time, the Soviet Union would not intervene in
the Czechoslovak domestic affairs.
The radical change of 1989 started a transition to estab-
lishing new economic order, adopting new social institu-
tions, and changing the cast of the actors and their internal
organization. For one, the Czechoslovak Government dramati-
cally reorganized its internal structure. Old industrial
ministries were dissolved and other were created particu-
larly at the level of the Republics. In particular, Environ-
mental Ministries were created to lead government efforts
and design strategies for improving environmental quality.
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The creation of the Ministries of Environment was followed
by tightening of environmental regulations and writing new
environmental laws that limited actions of enterprises with
respect to using environment as a sink for pollution.
The economic transformation bought about a fundamental
change in the structure of enterprise and government roles.
These roles were specified in the new laws on private enter-
prise and on transformation of state property to private
property. It also brought creation of markets on both supply
and demand side.
The strategy of economic transformation adopted by the
Czechoslovak Government restructured the problematic situa-
tion faced by SEPAP. Supplies of materials and demand for
pulp and paper were no longer coordinated by the state plan-
ners, but instead regulated by the market. The SEPAP manage-
ment had to find customers for its products, reorganize and
privatize the enterprise and function in the new institu-
tional regime and structure of roles.
While SEPAP was restructuring its internal operations,
privatizing the company and functioning in its independent
role of a private enterprise, its modernization project
faced financial crisis. The government's strategy for
improving efficiency of economy and for its reorientation to
environmentally sounder light manufacturing and consumer
product industries resulted in withdrawing financial support
to private enterprises. No more environmental investment
grants were available to industry. Further, bankruptcy law
was passed freeing exit for firms that were not performing
well. When a party newspaper customer disappeared after the
newsprint paper machine was reconstructed at a great
expense, the company faced a serious financial crisis.
In responding to the company crisis, the management had to
take notice of the new actors who entered the situation. The
most relevant new actors on their horizon were western com-
mercial banks, development banks, strategic industry inves-
tors, and privatization investment funds. The entrance of
these actors into the situation provided a whole new set of
action opportunities for the enterprise managers.
While dealing with the internal reorganization, the SEPAP
management had to take into consideration the change in
enterprise control. The managers invited the new company
owners to a quasi-share holder meeting as soon as the situa-
tion permitted. In this way, they made sure that their plans
for enterprise development would not be blocked later by the
new company owners.
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However, even when the SEPAP management designed and con-
sistently pursued its modernization plan, it could not avoid
dealing with surprises that distracted them from their
course of action. When the community of Steti gained its
political voice, it learned that it could use the Environ-
mental Inspection Office to further their environmental pri-
orities. With the assistance of the Inspection, they forced
on the SEPAP managers action on cleaning odorous substances
that was not planned for and did not fit into the orderly
course of events. Instead of pursuing their step by step pro-
cess of technological modernization and machinery replace-
ment, they had to retrofit the old machinery with pipes to
capture odorous substances. Retrofitting the old technology
rather than bringing in a new one was seen as a lesson in bad
planning by the enterprise management.
To deal with the financial crisis, the management freed
the SEPAP of the burden of the newsprint production and the
associated financial obligations by creating a subsidiary
ROTO a.s. ROTO a.s. was formed as a joint venture with Leykam
Murztaler. By separating ROTO a.s. out as a separate enter-
prise, the attention of managers could be focused fully on
SEPAP. Also, SEPAP's annual reports cleaned up to actually
show profits so that image of the company improved.
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A major other step in building up the image and perfor-
mance of the company came with securing the modernization
loan from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment. In arranging the loan, the EBRD played its role of a
lead financing and risk reducing institution. When the EBRD
was willing to provide the loan, the other commercial finan-
cial institutions were willing to syndicate it.
However, in the process of obtaining the loan, the SEPAP's
modernization problem changed again. The SEPAP no longer
dealt with environmental problem defined as elimination of
chlorine from its production process. The EBRD's loan proce-
dures required the SEPAP to undertake environmental and
energy audit that brought up environmental problems that
were not part of the modernization plan. Thus, the manage-
ment became aware of the significance of a potential ground
water and soil contamination in closing loan transactions.
The significance of potential environmental liabilities to
investors was underestimated before.
The EBRD in its role of a catalyst of private funding and
a leader setting customary business practices in the trans-
action situation also helped attract a long term strategic
investor. The EBRD's provision of a loan signalled to the
industry that SEPAP's business plans were sound, that eco-
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nomic, financial, and environmental appraisals were com-
pleted to the satisfaction of the Bank and that the company
was a desirable investment opportunity and a reliable busi-
ness partner.
Finding out about the EBRD-SEPAP deal, the Swedish con-
glomerate AssiDoman became aware that it was all right to
invest in SEPAP. It quickly signed an agreement with the
SEPAP on long term technological cooperation and gradual
increase of investment in the company. The first investment
decision was made just a few days before the deal between the
SEPAP and the EBRD was closed. The SEPAP found that its image
projecting strategy worked and that its efforts to project
image of an upbeat profit making company could attract
financial and business investors.
However, the SEPAP also discovered that too much of a good
image might attract undesirable attention. Swedish AssiDoman
was not the only industry investor who was impressed by the
SEPAP's image of profitable company. Other investors heard
about it and stepped in.
When the Stratton Investment acquired a controlling block
of shares in the SEPAP, both SEPAP's managers and Swedish
investors were caught by surprise. The SEPAP's management
realized that they no longer exercised the same control over
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the future of the company as before and that the shareholders
of the company could prepare them surprises obstructing
their carefully designed long term company development
plans. Now that the government withdrew from direct supervi-
sion and control, the company owners were a factor exercis-
ing decisive influence on their business plans. They found
that too much publicity and attraction might not be good for
the company and its managers. They became aware that the
image of profitable, environmentally green company could
work for them as much as against them.
4.2.2. Organizational Learning in Pulp and Paper Plant Modernization
As in the other cases, the pulp and paper story begins
with the government's problem solving effort to start up
production as fast as possible while at the same time achiev-
ing its other goal of providing regional job opportunities.
The large centralized plant simplifies administrative provi-
sion of social services - housing, health care, and recre-
ation. Consequently, the regional population passes through
the first stage of conditioning to learn to associate the
plant with economic well being of the region.
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As industrial production in the plant continues and
expands, impacts of environmental pollution on surrounding
natural environment become apparent. At first, they are
ignored in the light of the economic benefits achieved and
the one sided orientation to economic growth. But slowly,
environmental pollution gets correlated with industrial pro-
duction in the region and all the actors initially involved -
the government, the workers, the community, and the enter-
prise management learn to expect this association.
However, during this first period of time, the actors
learn to respond by doing nothing about the pollution. This
strategy is rewarded by approval from the institutions of
government and industry administration and from the members
of the communist party monitoring activities in the plant.
The instrumentally conditioned strategy of doing nothing
remains in use even after the association of environmental
pollution with industrial production is learned.
Finally, when the first steps towards correction are
taken, the problem solving activity is conducted through
employment of aikido strategy. The enterprise managers uti-
lize the energy going in the direction of economic develop-
ment to devise a solution that proposes further expansion
and modernization of production while at the same time also
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includes some environmental investments. The shopping list
for modernization includes both items for expanding produc-
tion and purely environmental investments such as a water
treatment plant and a regeneration boiler. Once going
through the administrative approval process, the energy
required for passing items in one or both of the categories
is close to the same.
However, the modernization problem is reframed after the
initial problem solving steps are taken. As the water treat-
ment plant and regeneration boiler are installed, attention
is cleared for seeing other problems. Also, the existence of
the regeneration boiler, which is the first link in the chain
towards closing waste emitting processes, focuses attention
on the new priority problem - chlorine. When the waste treat-
ment plant and the regeneration boiler reduce releases of
organic matter, chlorine becomes much more visible as a
problem. It not only becomes more visible because the old
problem of organic waste is reduced, but also because the new
pieces of technology are not capable of treating chlorinated
waste.
While the first technological modernization proceeds, the
structural context shifts so that the enterprise learn a new
structural role in the centralized system of management.
138
Through practice, it improves its role performance of finan-
cially self-managed enterprise taking partially its own
decisions.
Since the aikido strategy in the first round of moderniza-
tion is rewarded with a success, the project proponents
learn to repeat the same strategy again. During the second
stage of modernization, a new aikido strategy is formed.
This strategy again combines production increases with envi-
ronmental improvements.
However, this time the modernization strategy requires a
significant amount of learning to chain the steps of techno-
logical improvement in the right order. Step by step, the
production process is overhauled to reduce and finally elim-
inate chlorine while at the same time increasing production
capacity. Key pieces of technology are acquired over a long
period of time in such a fashion that production may continue
while the improvements take progressively place.
During this period of enterprise operation in the central-
ized planning system, the community and the plant management
learn to live in a mutual accommodation. The community is
aware that the enterprise brings them jobs and that they need
to live with its dangers. The plant managers on the other
hand are part of the community. Most of them rose though the
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ranks and worked in the plant since their teens. The mutual
accommodation is rewarded by a peace in the town and expecta-
tions grow that nobody will challenge the status quo.
From the beginning, the project promoters are learning
through trial and error to finance the project. They dis-
cover that they could arrange acquisition of western tech-
nology through leases guaranteed by domestic banks. This
arrangement works best in the institutional environment of
centralized economic management. However, the same arrange-
ment is being used even after the political change while the
domestic banks are not yet able to provide long term credit
and their financial resources are limited.
The problem solving of financing through trial and error
resumes by exploring alternative sources of financing from
the EBRD and strategic investors after leasing is no longer
necessary. At that time, the institutional transition leads
to reframing of the problematic situation faced by the
SEPAP's management. Supplies of paper and demand for pulp is
no longer coordinated by the state planners. In order to jus-
tify the production expansion and elimination of chlorine
from production process, profit based reasons have to be
supplied and market for the new chlorine free product has to
be found. While modernization justification and methods of
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acquiring and financing the needed pieces of technology
change, the overall structure of the modernization plan
remains intact.
The modernization problem is also reframed by the entry of
new actors who exercise influence on the problem definition.
The most significant redefinition comes about with EBRD's
financing. The required environmental appraisals of the
SEPAP plant show environmental problems that were either
considered low priority or were not known at all. Since per-
spective of the development bank on needed environmental
improvements differs from that of the enterprise managers,
problem definition and priorities change.
However, the most dramatic interference with problem defi-
nition by a new actor arises when the local community com-
plains to the Environmental Inspection. The Inspection by
its order to clean up immediately odorous substances escap-
ing from the plant disrupts the long term plans of the
project designers. As a consequence, the plant managers are
forced to install an end of pipe technology on production
processes that they already plan to phase out thorough the
technological modernization.
The institutional transition leads to concept formation
learning. New concepts of marketing and financial management
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are introduced and learned. Also, concepts of new actors
entering the scene such as development banks, international
environmental groups, and foreign investors are formed and
learned in the process of interaction.
Close to the concept formation learning comes imitation
learning. Concepts and action strategies are not only formed
anew, but also imitated from those observed abroad. The most
striking imitation learning is seen in SEPAP's striving for
public image building. Annual reports on glossy paper are
published and freely distributed. Established accounting
firm is invited to inspect and verify accounts. Financial
results of the firm are proudly reported in all major newspa-
pers of the country to catch public attention. At the
entrance to the plant, the old worker's militia guard armed
with a gun is replaced by a young attractive women reception-
ists.
The investors learn to associate EBRD financing with thor-
ough appraisal process and with sound business plans for the
companies. They form expectations that EBRD financed
projects are sound and desirable investment. Thus the EBRD
loan with the SEPAP brings a heightened interest from for-
eign investors.
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In the end, the SEPAP learns that attracting too much
interest may not be in the best interest of the managers of a
company which is relatively small by industry standards.
Their image building drive suffers instrumental conditioning
punishment when their long term plans with Swedish indus-
trial partner are so suddenly interrupted by the surprise
acquisition from Stratton.
4.2.3. Efficient Coupling in Pulp and Paper Plant Modernization
The efficient coupling in the pulp and paper plant case
can be characterized as market coupling - entering new green
market while simultaneously eliminating chlorine from both
the product and the production process.
Environmental improvements come most significantly from
eliminating chlorine from production process with the conse-
quent closing release of chlorinated effluents into the
river. Product quality is also improved with elimination of
elementary chlorine from the product with future possibility
of introducing totally chlorine free paper. Occupational and
regional safety increases with reduced transportation and
handling of liquified chlorine.
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Regional impact of the environmental improvement is cross-
boundary since the River Elbe to which the SEPAP releases its
emissions flows through the neighboring Germany. Some reme-
diation of historical damage follows as a consequence of
EBRD's environmental appraisal which identified problems
with solid waste disposal and soil/ground water contamina-
tion.
Company profitability is improved through associated stra-
tegic business plan which is based on perceiving and
exploiting new opportunities that have opened up after the
economic transition. Product price should increase when ECF
and TCF pulp and paper is sold in foreign west European mar-
kets. Production volume will also increase when the company
successfully enters their targeted markets which require
chlorine free paper. Restructuring of the company is some-
what facilitated in that the project supported by the loan
from the EBRD gives the company a good image which attracts
strategic investors. Capital costs increase to cover price
of introducing the new technology. However, due to the tim-
ing of the capital expansion during the period of industry
downturn, capital expenses on purchases of new technology
are lower that during the upturn. Operating cost somewhat
decline because the new technology is more efficient so that
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lesser amount of production inputs is required and present
and future emission charges on the release of pollutants
decline.
The coupling is pursued in a highly competitive organiza-
tional environment. Market regulation and price setting pro-
vide the most important task focus for the project
proponents. During the final stages of the SEPAP moderniza-
tion project, no financial grants or government support are
available.
Regional economy returns are derived from preservation of
employment opportunities, generation of taxes, and creating
upstream business for domestic forest industry.
The coupling is attached in the direction form economy to
the environment. Energy for the project is supplied by the
perceived business opportunities that require satisfying
environmentally aware German market. the improvement of the
production process follows from the improvement of product
quality. No compliance with environmental laws is immedi-
ately required although future laws restricting emissions of
chlorinated substances are anticipated.
The coupling is achieved on an almost immediate time
dimension; the elimination of chlorine and expansion to now
markets are simultaneous in time.
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4.3. Aluminum Plant Modernization
4.3.1. Conditions of Interaction in Aluminum Plant Modernization
The establishment of ZSNP as a producer of aluminum in
Ziar was a result of the Slovak and Czechoslovak governments
policy of economic development. The governments faced the
problematic situation of regional underdevelopment in Cen-
tral Slovakia and of the necessity to function as a produc-
tion base within the larger economic system of COMECON. The
adopted strategy provided a solution to their problematic
situation as it was perceived at that time.
While during the cold war the company's primary role in
the centralized production system was to supply aluminum to
the defense industries, the company was later assigned a new
role of a civilian supplier when the embargo from the west
was lifted and the cold war tension somewhat declined.
As new production facilities were built over time, the
ZSNP expanded into new areas of operation. After it started
producing alumina in 1956, high and low pressure casting,
and finally manufacturing of the semifinished products were
added. In developing these organizational capabilities, the
ZSNP drew on traditional craft skills of local people who
built a tradition in metallurgical activity in the region.
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Shortly after the start of production, the ZSNP and the
community of Ziar noticed undesirable impacts of aluminum
production on environmental quality around the plant and on
worker's health in the plant. The management's task gradu-
ally changed to include concern not only for increasing pro-
duction but also for the growing adverse impact of this
production on surrounding natural environment and on workers
health. At the same time, the role of the community changed
from serving as a host to the plant which provided jobs,
housing, recreation after work, and regional economic growth
to that of receiving both positive gains from the plant and
adverse impacts of production.
The government officials and central planners also heard
about the adverse impacts of production on workers health
and surrounding environment when reports came in and the
ZSNP management started drafting plans for adding on pollu-
tion control equipment.
The central planners and the company management had to
implement the environmental protection measures through the
system of centralized planning and investment. As a first
strategy adopted to deal with the problematic situation,
primary emission control equipment was installed in the
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smelter to reduce amount of air pollution generated by the
plant.
At the same time as the first pieces of the pollution con-
trol equipment were installed, the company engineers
inquired into a new technological design of aluminum produc-
tion that would eliminate most of the adverse environmental
impacts of the production. They realized that the Soderberg
technology had inherent limits in terms of possibility of
adding environmental controls. Their strategy to this limi-
tation was to develop a technological solution that would
separate the process of baking the anodes from that of smelt-
ing aluminum.
The ZSNP management also responded to the situation by
appealing to the state administration to authorize recon-
struction of the smelter. They found that in the given struc-
ture of roles between the state and the enterprise and the
economic regimes within which they operated, any significant
action to modernize the smelter required involvement of
state authorities that allocated investment funds, assisted
with obtaining technology and included modernization of the
smelter in the state plan of technological investments. The
state administration when presented by the ZSNP with the
problem of modernizing the smelter approved the moderniza-
tion by a decree of the Czechoslovak government followed by a
similar decree passed by the Slovak Government.
The passing of the Government Decree on modernization of
production in Ziar sent a message to the ZSNP management that
the Government administration was serious about the project
and that the project was a legitimate problem. In the mean-
time, research efforts of ZSNP engineers brought first
fruits of success that further shifted the situation. A new
type of a smelting pot was designed and tested successfully.
When the ZSNP managers heard about the Government Decree
and about the test results of running the new smelting pot,
they were able to start drafting plans of the modernization
in the ZSNP. The strategy of modernization was specified in
enterprise development plans and submitted for approval to
the State Planning Committee, the Federal Ministry of Smelt-
ing and Heavy Engineering, and the Slovak Planning Commit-
tee.
However, as soon as the first plan of the enterprise mod-
ernization was submitted for approval, new information
became available which changed perception of the problem.
The ZSNP managing director was made aware that it would be
possible to acquire a know-how from foreign producers rather
than designing their own at home. As a result, he sent let-
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ters contacting all the major industry producers to tell
them about his search for technological know how and elicit-
ing proposals for cooperation. Most of the industry produc-
ers who received these letters responded with offers. When
the ZSNP managers heard back from these industry leaders
about their interest to conduct business with them, they
narrowed down the search and selected three out of the group
for a personal visit.
The approach to selecting technology changed again at the
beginning of the 1980's when news of high current smelting
pots came to the ZSNP. The old strategy of acquiring the
technology from one of the three previously selected indus-
trial leaders was discarded. Instead, the supplier of the
advanced technology, Norweigian Hydro aluminum (HAL), is
contacted and invited to submit a proposal for the techno-
logical modernization of the ZSNP.
The ZSNP's proposal got the HAL act. The company found
that the ZSNP was seriously interested in acquiring the
technology from them and started preparing an acceptable
proposal. It also helped the ZSNP convince the branch indus-
try headquarters that the modernization was urgent and that
the HAL could supply the right kind of technology.
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When the efforts of the ZSNP and the HAL representatives
succeeded in persuading the headquarters of the necessity to
proceed with modernization and when agreements on technology
transfer were signed between the HAL, and Polytechna Prague,
the task situation for the ZSNP management again shifted.
Now when the decision on technological design was made, the
ZSNP management had to focus on implementing the construc-
tion of the new smelter line. Since financing of the project
was secured by the Government's approval of the moderniza-
tion, it did not constitute any particular problem. But in
the situation of chronic shortages of supplies, the manage-
ment became mainly concerned about chasing the contractors
and the suppliers to deliver and meet their planned targets.
All the while, the Czechoslovak government inquired into
its concern with declining economic performance of the coun-
try. When the reforms of the 1980's came late, it was sur-
prised by a political development that prevented it from
managing the situation in the old way. The revolution of the
1989 dramatically changed the role of the government and
brought in a number of new actors while the old ones disap-
peared in history.
The Czechoslovak government coped with the unsettled situ-
ation by launching its efforts for transition to market
economy. The ZSNP along with other enterprises was desig-
nated for privatization and the state funding for the mod-
ernization of aluminum production in Ziar dried up.
The economic reforms of the 1990's presented the ZSNP man-
agers with radically new problematic situation which quickly
reached dimensions of a major crisis. The ZSNP management
learned that no more money from the state budget was avail-
able for the modernization and that they had to defend their
modernization proposal again before the public and the new
government who were reluctant to continue the construction.
Following the change in the state support for the modern-
ization of the ZSNP, both the Czechoslovak government and
the opposition environmental groups discovered that they
would not be able to brush the ZSNP modernization aside eas-
ily. The enterprise workers, totaling close to 8,000,
changed public perception of the importance of the issue
when they established a strike committee and threatened to
cease all supplies of aluminum to domestic customers. The
situation was also aggravated by growing Slovak nationalism
that threatened to split the country.
This demonstration of power and resolve of the ZSNP work-
ers led to a change in perception of the situation. Both the
government and the environmental groups realized that the
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enterprise once given autonomy from the government, might
not be so obedient as it once used to be. The change of roles
between the government and the enterprise and the reorgani-
zation of economic regime made it possible for the enter-
prise to seek outside sources of financial support and to
sell aluminum to customers of their choice. The enterprise
was no longer a captive producer.
In the end, the Czechoslovak Finance Ministry decided it
would be better to yield to the pressure and to provide state
credit guarantee for a loan that would enable the ZSNP to
bail out of its critical financial situation than to insist
on its policy of providing no support to industry.
The provision of state credit guarantee changed situation
for the domestic banks which were approached by the ZSNP to
provide credit. With the state credit guarantee, the ZSNP
was perceived as acceptable risk to whom money could be lent.
To deal with the new situation, the banks formed a consortium
that was able to put together 500 million crowns. Thus the
government averted the threat of a worker strike that could
have triggered a landslide of strikes similar to those para-
lyzing economic production in Poland. The domestic banks
found that they could do a good business with enterprises
when the National Property Fund bailed out the enterprise.
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These events changed situation for the workers in the ZSNP
who gained more power to force their demands. Soon they had
another opportunity to test it when the Slovak Premier
Meciar, whom they supported, was about to be forced out of
the government. Being aware of the critical importance of
continuing state support for their enterprise to bail them
out, they realized that they could scare the public out
again. Consequently, they formed a new strike committee to
go on a one hour strike in support of the Slovak Premier
Meciar.
The worker strike in the ZSNP changed political situation
for the Premier Meciar. He knew he could count on worker sup-
port in the Central Slovakia in his political strategy.
Organized labor entered into the situation on yet another
opportunity when the ZSNP management discussed potential
investment by Marc Rich @ Co. At that time, international
trade unions, the AFL-CIO and the British Trade Union Con-
gress, were occupied with workers strike in Ravenswood alu-
minum plant. They devised a strategy of following the
plant's presumed owner, Marc Rich, around the world and into
Eastern Europe. They hoped to exert pressure on Rich by warn-
ing against him all potential East European enterprises and
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appealed to their workers to stop any deal with Marc Rich @
Co.
This action of international trade unions frightened the
ZSNP management and its workers. Although they needed the
investment money, they decided on the end to withdraw from
negotiations with Marc Rich @ Co. and returned the first
installment on the promised investment. This decision put
them into a position of having to keep searching for another
suitable investor. As another strategy, they explored possi-
bility of securing the investment from the HAL who provided
the technological know-how for the modernization.
In the meantime, the ZSNP management was dealing not only
with the problem of financing the modernization and with the
general liberalization of political situation, but also with
a change in an ownership structure and organization of the
enterprise. The Slovak Privatization Ministry created to
privatize Slovak industry transformed the ZSNP into a joint
stock company and partly privatized it in the first wave of
privatization. The ZSNP management thus found itself in a
situation of having a new owner and reporting to stockhold-
ers, though the Ministry of Privatization remained the
majority owner.
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During the same time, the construction companies working
on the construction of the smelter grew increasingly dissat-
isfied with increasing indebtedness of the ZSNP on their
contracts. Although they needed the business of building the
smelter, they also needed to get paid for their work. When
the ZSNP stopped paying them, they responded by threatening
to demobilize and leave the site.
While the ZSNP was facing its deep financial crisis,
resorting in the last effort to reverting its operating
funds into continuation of the modernization program, a new
unexpected actor entered the situation.
The London based European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development noticed the situation in the ZSNP. It strove to
pursue its mandate of supporting economic development in the
Central and Eastern Europe in an environmentally sustainable
way. It was under the pressure of the public who demanded a
quick action on furthering the Central and Eastern European
transition. The public was concerned that the EBRD acted
slowly and did not execute enough projects in the period of
its existence. Under the pressure of this situation, the
EBRD contacted the ZSNP and offered assistance with financ-
ing the completion of the modernization project.
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The entry of the EBRD into the modernization project
called for some redefinition of the modernization project
design. The EBRD's operating procedures required the project
to go through thorough financial, economic, and environmen-
tal appraisals. Only facilities that could be profitably
operated in an environmentally sustainable way could remain.
Further, the new smelter had to be legally separated in order
to deal with potential environmental liabilities on the
site. Also, new problems of remediating the red mud pile and
closing the alumina plant were added.
Both the ZSNP and the EBRD were shaping the project under
a keen eye of international environmental groups. These
groups found themselves in a situation of trying to exercise
direct influence on developmental decision making by moni-
toring activities of international development banks and
corporations. They adopted strategy of reviewing the project
documentation in as much detail as it was publicly avail-
able, demanding disclosure of other information and writing
letters to the EBRD and ZSNP directors expressing their con-
cerns about the project.
This activity of international environmental groups put
the EBRD into the situation of having to reconsider the bal-
ance between private sector confidentiality and public
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accountability for money provided by a government sponsored
international development bank. Further, the complexity and
uncertainty of the project required a number of conditional
measures in cases certain courses of action needed to be pur-
sued later when further information from technical studies
become available. Also, the project profitability was open
to fluctuation in the international commodity market and to
market access to sell aluminum. This was coupled by the con-
troversial "dumping" of aluminum from countries of the
former Soviet Union that were overproducing and trying to
sell their output in the European Union market.
The European Union facing the situation of excessive
imports of aluminum that threatened domestic producers
started issuing import quota on aluminum from the former
Soviet Union. The EBRD project bankers had to take into
account the importance of market access for their project to
succeed. As a result, they negotiated a special agreement
with the European Union to guarantee market access for alu-
minum produced in the ZSNP.
As in the her cases, the project loan from the development
bank opened door to other investors and commercial banks who
entered the scene.
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4.3.2. Organizational Learning in Aluminum Plant Modernization
Many activities in the ZSNP case involve complex problem
solving. The establishment of the ZSNP is justified as a
solution to multiple government objectives. It is a solution
to the need to produce the strategically valuable metal
within the system of cooperation in COMECON. At the same
time, it offers opportunities to provide employment in eco-
nomically depressed region with traditional skills in metal-
lurgical activity.
Another major problem solving activity involves the mod-
ernization process. The first attempt for pollution control
takes the form of installing the end of pipe air control
equipment. However, because this approach is technologically
constrained and opportunities for improvement soon
exhausted, other aspects of the problem-setting are
explored. The problem solving activity moves in a direction
of searching for a new technological design.
At first, domestic technological design is sought by com-
pany engineers. They work in this direction to the point of
designing and constructing the first smelting pot, but then
the problem-setting gets changed. The problem of moderniza-
tion is reframed through the insight of the directing man-
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ager who becomes aware that a new technology could be
acquired from abroad rather than developed domestically.
However, even this way of exploration of the problem is mod-
ified in the process as new information becomes available.
A major shift in the technological problem solving comes
about when new high current technologies become available.
Because these technologies are superior to those considered
before, the management changes their strategy and sets out
to acquire the more advanced technology from the HAL.
The technological aspect of the modernization problem gets
reframed again when the ZSNP negotiates the loan with the
EBRD. During the loan negotiation, new facts become visible
that are incorporated into the problem solution. As part of
the appraisal process for the loan, a complete audit of envi-
ronmental pollution and compliance on the site is conducted.
This appraisal leads to increased visibility of other
sources of pollution which are not addressed by the new tech-
nology. In particular, restoration of historical damage on
the site, and of the red mud pile in particular, needs to be
included in the problem definition and a solution for this
broader view of the problem is sought.
Yet another complex problem solving process may be noticed
that interlocks with the modernization design. This process
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involves international labor unions who are trying to find
way of making absentee corporate owners responsible by chas-
ing them around the world. When they get frustrated during
their strike in the USA, they try to get even with Marc Rich
and Co. by appealing for solidarity with other trade unions
of aluminum producers and by chasing Marc Rich into Eastern
Europe.
Along with complex problem solving, simpler learning pro-
cesses may be observed. The workers and management of the
ZSNP progressively build skills in producing aluminum. They
improve its quality in production and add secondary semi-
final manufacturing processes. Through the modernization
requirements, the domestic banks improve their skills in
financing complex industrial project. They learn to build
consortia and fund the project within their limited means.
Observation learning is significant during the period of
searching for the technological concept of the modernization
project. During this process, the ZSNP engineers visit a
number of industrial plants of their competitors to learn
about their technology and operation practices.
Benchmarking is yet another type of observation learning
intensively used by the industry. Even in the times of the
central planning, when comparison on basis of economic effi-
ciency was impossible with advanced western competitors due
to the difference in economic regimes, the ZSNP engineers
were able to benchmark in terms of technical coefficients of
production. They knew their material intensity of produc-
tion, energy intensity of production, and measures of indus-
trial emissions. These technical coefficients served as a
basis for comparison with western producers and their tech-
nological processes. As a matter of practice, little compar-
ison was done in terms of market share or financial returns
on investment.
The NGO's in the case also learned through observation of
western NGO's. The formerly conservative, conservationist
Slovak environmental groups transformed after the political
liberalization into confrontational special interest pres-
sure groups. For example, the largest group of the Nature
Protectors formed a strategic alliance with the Greenpeace.
The Slovak NGO's learned from their western counterparts to
conduct campaigns against industrial development projects
and to stir up public awareness and influence public opin-
ion.
Both the NGO's pressure and the workers strike served as
learning stimuli for sensitizing the actors involved to
issues surrounding the modernization project. They learned
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consequently to respond effectively to any related ques-
tions.
The workers strike was also an instance of instrumental
learning. The workers were reinforced in their strategy when
in succeeded. It did not last long before they used it again
to support the Slovak premier.
Another type of simple association learning, classical
conditioning can be found throughout the cases. First, after
the initial period of development euphoria, the local commu-
nity, the plant managers, and even the government officials
learned to associate industrial development with environmen-
tal pollution. The large scale industrial plants built in
the initial zeal became to be known to produce significant
amounts of pollution, particularly as they were aging and
their capital equipment was getting obsolete.
Next, approval of the modernization project in the system
of centralized planning was associated with access to
sources of government financing through investment subsi-
dies. Behavioral expectations were learned by the plant man-
agers that the government would be providing the finance as
long as its approval of the modernization lasts.
Some of these conditioned responses and learned practices
of the centralized planning system had to be unlearned
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through habituation and forgetting after the political and
economic change of the 1990's. Old responses such as chasing
deliveries of supplies and government approval rather than
focusing on markets and clients had to be gradually elimi-
nated through habituation. However, the most significant
aspect of departing with the old concerned forgetting the
learned helplessness of the enterprise managers and workers.
After a long period of total dependence on government deci-
sion making and passive execution of hierarchically deter-
mined actions, the ZSNP had to show initiative to create its
own future. The ability to help themselves was a critical
step on a way to successful completion of the modernization
project.
The complex process of structuring the development loan
with the EBRD required from all the involved actors to learn
chaining the transaction in the right order. They had to find
the correct sequence of actions to pass through in order to
complete the deal. The negotiations involved a large number
of parties that all had to be brought along into the final
agreement. Step by step, the transaction was finally com-
pleted.
Throughout the project development period, the govern-
ment's inquiry into economic performance of the country
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occasionally resulted in structural economic and political
reforms. The most dramatic reforms took place in 1989
involving complete rejection of the old centralized system
of economic planning and political communist regime. For the
actors involved in designing the modernization projects,
these periods of change in the structural context lead to
learning to navigate in a new situation. The above instances
of habituation and forgetting all were prerequisite for a
successful learning to navigate in the new structural con-
text. The actors found themselves suddenly in a new situa-
tion in relation to their structural context. They had to
learn to place the novel in the context, orient themselves to
new situations, form new concepts, and interpret novelty by
typifying the situations.
4.3.3. Efficient Coupling in Aluminum Plant Modernization
The efficient coupling in this case can be characterized
as a managed coupling - a managed company restructuring with
multiple environmental improvements.
The environmental improvements on this project are many
although in contrast with the SEPAP case, no specific sub-
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stance is eliminated from the production process or environ-
mental qualities of the product improved. The closing down
of old smelters and ammonia plant dramatically reduces emis-
sions of dust, fluoride, and tars. The release of emissions
is reduced by closing down the old plants and building a new
one with a different technological process. By the same act,
occupational health and safety is improved because the new
plant has much better ventilation and emissions are con-
tained inside the closed production processes.
As a condition of the EBRD loan, historical damage is
being remediated. Particularly, the red mud pile is being
contained and insulated.The amount of money required for the
remediation comprises only a fraction of the cost of the
building of the new smelter. Further, it is tied to taxes
generated from the production that may be applied towards
environmental remediation if the Slovak Government agrees.
The environmental improvements on the ZSNP site have no
significant regional impacts. All of the pollution is of
local nature with the exception of some leaks into the Hron
River. The River Hron empties into international Danube
River.
Company profitability improves through complete restruc-
turing of the operations and the creation of the new subsid-
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iary SLOVALCO. Operating costs of SLOVALCO will decline
because the new smelter is more efficient. It uses less
energy and labor per unit of output thus saving on costs.
Capital costs of the modernization are large, covered only
partially by the loan from the EBRD. Product price remains
the same set at the level of international commodity market.
Increased financial returns are expected from selling the
larger production volume of aluminum if demand increases and
prices grow. Thus the economic improvement is significantly
contingent on expected upturn in demand for aluminum.
Organizational environment of this coupling appears semi-
competitive. The firm is in a competitive industry for sale
of its product, but it receives cheap inputs of captive labor
and publicly regulated electricity. The ZSNP is still major-
ity owned by the Slovak Privatization Fund and thus close to
government intervention and support should the company be in
trouble.
Returns to the regional economy come mainly from the pres-
ervation of employment opportunities and tax base genera-
tion. Some downstream aluminum processing can also be found.
The construction of the smelter will provide short term con-
tracts for local construction companies.
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The attachment of the coupling seems midway between econ-
omy and the environment. The economic returns make environ-
mental cleanup and compliance possible. On the other hand,
the necessary funding and the state sovereign guarantee pro-
vided by the Slovak Government are partially legitimized by
the significant environmental improvements expected to
result from the project.
The time dimension of the coupling is also medium term.
The company will have to repay its loan in seven years while
the scheduled environmental improvements will take place
immediately.
Chapter 5
CONCLUSIONS
The case analysis shows that the actors in the three
industrial modernization projects managed to improve envi-
ronmental performance in a climate of general economic
decline, overcame the learned helplessness they had been
trained to assume under the communist regime, and provided
themselves with a viable future, all by learning to achieve
efficient coupling in their modernization projects.
Although learning efficient coupling may superficially be
seen as a process of instrumental learning, in which means
and ends, methods and goals, are externally related to each
other, the process is complicated by problems of boundary
setting, self-referentiality and interaction effects.
In a simple version of the instrumental model there are
three actors - the enterprise, the development bank, and the
government. These actors pursue the task of achieving envi-
ronmental and economic benefits against the background of
each other or as three actors solving problems indepen-
dently. The outcome - achievement of economic and environ-
mental benefits - is clearly distinguishable from the
process of its achievement so that the actors can establish
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standards of achievement with well defined performance cri-
teria, i.e. the actors can evaluate the instrumental value
of their actions by measuring their contribution to achiev-
ing the outcome. Moreover, the contributions of actors to
environmental and economic benefits can be independently
determined.
Much as this simple model is appealing in its clarity, the
case analysis shows some significant complications.
Boundary Setting
For one, any specification of environmental and economic
benefits is contingent on spatial and temporal boundaries
set for the system under consideration. The perception of a
positive coupling between environmental and economic vari-
ables is sensitive to boundary setting for the system that
includes those variables. The scaling of activities over
time, space, and institutional regimes may dramatically
change the nature of the linkage. Economic benefits accruing
to a private firm may become losses for a regional economy
when possible hidden subsidies and environmental externali-
ties are included in consideration. Also, economic benefits
achieved at a given time may be coupled with short term envi-
ronmental benefits, but long term environmental costs. The
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specification of joint goals or mutual benefits is necessar-
ily situation bound.
For example, in the CEZ case, both the German and the Aus-
trian governments found it cheaper to spend money on clean-
ing up Czech power plants across the border rather than
continue suffering damage to their forests. This decision
could only be taken when the administrative distinction
between two countries was suspended and cost of pollution
was estimated across national boundaries, over the larger
geographic region.
Conditions of Interaction
At a higher level of complexity, the project outcomes of
efficient couplings are shaped in and emerge out of a field
of interaction of the major social actors each inquiring
into their own particular problematic situation. Whether or
not efficient couplings arise out of that field of interac-
tion, and what their nature is, depends on the conditions of
interaction that hold in a given modernization project and
on the processes by which the actors learn in and from a
project (Figure 5.1 on page 172).
The main conditions of interaction that appear to have
shaped the outcome are the following: the institutional
structural context
specific context
Figure 5.1: Learning Efficient Coupling
regime, the stage of centrality of green, technological
advance, cast of actors, problem ownership, problem atten-
tion, environmental complexity, technological complexity,
financial complexity, motivating forces, external pressures,
and organizational environment. These conditions of interac-
tion can be subdivided into causal conditions, specific con-
text and social structural context. Consequences of actions
taken by actors in a field of interaction, or shifts in the
environment external to that field, may cause changes in the
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specific structural context, or become causes of new prob-
lems, thus bringing about changes that affect the production
of efficient couplings.
The specific context represents the specific features and
relationships of the field of interaction involved in a
given interaction process. For example, the cast of actors
in the SEPAP case consisted of the EBRD, the SEPAP manage-
ment, AssiDoman, Stratton Investment, Czech Environmental
Inspection, local community of Steti, and domestic banks.
The structural context of the process discussed in the
three cases includes the institutional transformation in
Eastern and Central Europe and the rising centrality of
green, both of which affected worldwide climate of opinion
during the time period in which the modernization stories
were unfolding. These features of the larger context
affected market demand for product, technology, supply, and
public opinion, all of which, in turn, shaped governmental
policies of regulation and subsidy, which thereby influenced
the perceived meanings and measures of economic benefit, and
the conditions for achieving economic benefit, and ulti-
mately, the profitability of the firms themselves.
The simple model of instrumental achievement of efficient
coupling is further complicated by the degree to which vari-
173
ous institutional actors within the field of organizations -
for example firms, development banks, governments - actually
modified conditions essential to efficient coupling of eco-
nomic and environmental benefits constituting thus a self-
fulfilling prophecies.
For example, the problem of the ZSNP modernization gained
increased attention from managers and policy makers as a
result of the action of the ZSNP workers who went on strike
to win a loan guarantee from the Czechoslovak Ministry of
Finance arguing that the project was financially viable.
Increased attention to the ZSNP problem stimulated the
Czechoslovak Government and later the Slovak Government to
approve the modernization project and to provide the guaran-
tees for loans. When the loan guarantees were obtained, the
risk of the financial transactions was reduced to the point
that commercial banks found it profitable to loan money to
the ZSNP to support the continuation of its modernization
efforts. As a result of modification of conditions of inter-
action, the project became financially viable.
Similarly, the ownership of the problem was passed from
the national government during the period of centralized
planning to enterprise managers during the privatization
period and on to the EBRD when the ZSNP hit the bottom of its
financial crisis. The EBRD, while exercising dominant influ-
ence over the project, was able to secure long term contracts
for electricity from the Slovak energy utility and to nego-
tiate access rights for ZSNP produced aluminum to the man-
aged European market. Thus project bankers successfully
negotiated both prices of critical inputs and access to mar-
ket for the output, thereby making the modernization project
commercially profitable. They achieved this economic result
with the help of the Slovak Government and the European Union
who were impressed, among other things, by the promised
environmental benefits of the ZSNP modernization.
Self-Referentiality
The recognition of mutual effect introduces into the anal-
ysis a significant self-referentiality between the variables
of environment and economy as well as between the process of
interaction and the outcome. The reason for this self-refer-
entiality is found in the phenomenon of collapse between
environment and economy in the coupling mechanism that
occurs in all three researched instances - the market cou-
pling, the monopoly coupling, and the managed coupling.
We often find that one driver (for example, centrality of
green) propels two processes1 . Further, the processes are
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valued in terms of means/ends relationship because they
achieve two outcomes simultaneously. In such situations,
speaking of the environmental benefit already implies a ref-
erence to the economic benefit. Similarly, speaking of envi-
ronmental values driving the process already
reference to economic values
implies a
(Figure 5.2:).
GOVERNMENT
REGULATION
OF SUPPLY
EBRD CRITERIA
OF LENDING
MATCH
BETWEEN
ENVIRONMENT
AND
DEVELOPMENT
SHIFT IN SEPAP's
METHOD OF
PRODUCTION AND
MARKETING
Figure 5.2: Self-Referentiality in SEPAP's Case
1. This is similar to what engineering literature calls common-environment coupling. Common-environ-
ment coupling is a type of coupling in which two software modules access a common data area (page 94)
1. This is similar to what engineering literature calls common-environment coupling. Common-environ-
ment coupling is a type of coupling in which two software modules access a common data area (page 94)
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In the SEPAP case, for example, the rising centrality of
green in neighboring Germany led to the rise of green markets
for chlorine-free paper. At the same time, popular opinion
combined with the pressure campaigns of Greenpeace and other
NGO's resulted in the German Government's passing a law
restricting craft pulp production in Germany. Due to these
changes in public opinion and legislation, the market for
pulp changed on both the supply and demand side, in Germany.
Furthermore, green sentiments contributed to the ultimate
breakdown of the system of planned economy in Central and
Eastern Europe, as a consequence of which the institution of
administered trade was abolished and production enterprises
were privatized. As a consequence of these intermediate out-
comes, SEPAP found it profitable to reach out and sell its
product in Germany. In addition, this strategic business
orientation to entering a new green market was combined with
the expansion of production and the elimination of chlorine
from the production process. As a consequence of the context
shifts, the meaning of economic benefit was transformed in
such a way as to make green production profitable.
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Learning Effects
A wealth of learning episodes occurred during the project
design processes in our three cases. These shaped the out-
comes of the interactions and complicated the process by
inducing interaction effects. Thus, we need to ask "who
acts" in these stories and "who learns"? Are the cases best
understood as being about how firms learned to achieve effi-
cient coupling within the contexts of their organizational
fields? Or how multiple firms within those fields learned
individually, to enable the modernization projects to
achieve efficient coupling? And if the latter, whether the
learning in question was in the nature of a spewed out conse-
quence of the interaction of individual actors' learning, or
whether it represented a more concerted effort on the part of
institutions that shared overarching objectives?
Although there are different types of learning, each of
them belongs to an actor. For example, I found problem solv-
ing in the efforts of national governments when they first
established the three enterprises, and again in the efforts
of the enterprises when they struggled with the increasing
environmental pollution and the declining technological via-
bility of their plants. I also found problem reframing. The
problems first discovered were often reframed. For example,
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the ZSNP's decision to develop new aluminum smelting tech-
nology domestically was reframed by the insight of the
director that the technology could be acquired from abroad.
Next, I found skill acquisition such as the ZSNP's learn-
ing to produce aluminum, or the SEPAP's learning to function
in its new role of private enterprise. More, associative
learning was common in the form of classical conditioning
such as for example the town of Steti and the town of Ziar
learning to associate the operation of the plant with jobs
and the well being of the citizens.
Observation learning was apparent, for example, in the
visit of the engineers from ZSNP abroad when they searched
for the new technology or in the NGO's imitation of western
environmental groups after the transition.
Navigation into a new situation was faced by all the
enterprises and governments in the period of institutional
change when they were learning to perform new roles. The
enterprises, development banks and government agencies
passed through sensitization to environmental problems when
the newly acquired freedom led the public to express their
discontent. Also, habituation of old responses was common
such as when the enterprises no longer needed to chase short-
age of supplies or justify their operations in terms of
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social purpose. Further they had to learn new concepts such
as marketing or financial management. Commonly these new
enterprise roles were acquired by hiring experienced western
managers to perform them. Forgetting their trained helpless-
ness was key to developing a successful strategy on the part
of the enterprise managers during the period of transition.
The most significant process of learning which emerged
from this interaction seems to be the application of aikido -
a strategy that emphasizes blending of environmental actions
with the flow of economic development rather than confront-
ing the economic development with hard techniques such as
command-and-control regulation. The other important learning
process was the finding the correct chaining of steps in the
modernization strategy. Both of these processes are the best
exemplified in the SEPAP's case. However, the ability to
deutero learn is also important. This ability leads the CEZ
to the forefront of setting industry benchmarks rather than
adopting them.
Although learning in the above examples belongs to indi-
vidual actors, it needs to be determined whether the organi-
zations solved problems individually, as in the simple
instrumental model. It is possible that they rather acted in
concerted action through active collaboration. Alterna-
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tively, they could act through distributed action, each one
pursuing the goal independently without cooperation. But the
last alternative which is endorsed in this dissertation,
learning as interaction, views the actors as having differ-
ent goals, even though there is a significant overlap in
these goals. The set of actors is seen to interact in such a
way as to achieve the outcome through an "interaction
effect."
The learning observed in my cases is interactive. For one
thing, consequences of action by one actor lead to new prob-
lems or opportunities perceived by that actor, or by others.
For example, the government inquires into its problems of
furthering economic development and improving environmental
quality. As a solution to this problem, they establish the
industrial enterprises. When the ZSNP, the SEPAP, and the
CEZ start learning to deal with the impacts of their produc-
tion on the environment, they also press the government to
change some of the aspects of the institutional regime in
which they act. The government, in turn, becomes increas-
ingly aware of unintended consequences of its policies on
the environment, and inquires further into the ways of
changing its policies.
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When the economic regime changes, the industrial enter-
prise suddenly faces new opportunities which it learns to
utilize - the CEZ learns to seize the monopoly opportunity to
purchase the scrubbers, the SEPAP learns to utilize its open
access to green markets to eliminate chlorine, and the ZSNP
learns to utilize its regional significance to manage a con-
tinuation of its modernization.
Learning to achieve a goal may lead to clearing the screen
of attention and to consequent discovery of new problems
that were beyond the threshold of attention before. For
example, the SEPAP in its early steps of modernization
builds a water treatment plant and installs a regeneration
boiler. The acquisition of these pieces of pollution control
equipment reduces emissions of organic substances (lignin)
into the river. However, the success in reducing release of
organic effluents shifts attention to the continued release
of chlorinated substances that cannot be treated in the
water treatment plant or regenerated in the boiler.
The research findings summarized above support my argument
about the need for examining the processual, dynamic charac-
ter of the environment-development relationship and the
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importance of interaction, change, conflict, and organiza-
tional shaping of action in organizing thought about envi-
ronment and development.
The research also shows that although trade-offs will
always remain, there are still forms of development that
lead to mutual benefits. To some extent, these mutual bene-
fits are not "natural" but rather managed by actions of
actors who can reshape the conditions of interaction. This
reshaping may be a result of a long term evolution, of a
response to consequences of other actions, or of intentional
design'.
It is thus possible at the level of national or interna-
tional policy deliberately to create conditions favorable to
learning efficient coupling. This requires a movement to a
new, more sophisticated level of decision making in environ-
mental protection that will take into account the dynamic,
processual character of the environment and development
relationship. A step in this direction will be an introduc-
tion of voluntary industry standards for environmental man-
agement and building a regulatory system that works with the
flow of the market.
An important step in this direction seems to be the link-
ing of total quality management approaches of the 1980's to
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environmental management systems of the 1990's. At the time
of completing this thesis, representatives of 60 governments
of the world and of the private sector are negotiating volun-
tary standards for environmental management systems that
will be codified by the International Standard Organization
for the use of industry and regulatory government agencies.
These standards, known as ISO 14000, represent the new
direction towards integrating sustainable development prin-
ciples into the free market system and towards avoiding non-
tariff barriers and regulatory impediments to trade.
After the momentum towards global markets and interna-
tional trade agreements has prompted a broad cross-section
of companies to adopt international consensus standards on
Quality Management (ISO 9000), the opportunity created by
these drivers coupled with greening of global markets and
growing awareness of cross-border pollution impacts now
exits to adopt similar standards for environmental quality.
As these standards are being adopted, the state environmen-
tal agencies will face a new challenge, but also a great
opportunity - to work as partners with companies using these
new standards to achieve more effectively our environmental
protection goals. The new ISO 14000 standards on Environmen-
tal Management Systems are an important step in linking
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environmental policy to private sector attempts to learn to
achieve efficient coupling.
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Appendix A:
DESCRIPTIVE CASES OF ORGANIZATIONAL
INQUIRY INTO ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOP-
MENT
A.1 The Czechoslovak Government's Inquiry into Environment
and Development
A.1.1.Government Inquiry into Economic Performance
The modern economic history of the Czech and Slovak eco-
nomic reforms can be drawn from after the World War II
period. In 1945, Czechoslovakia was the only country in the
Soviet sphere of influence that was able to base its social-
ization efforts on a democratic system. The Czechoslovak
socialization took a very specific course. It was conducted
under the patronage of a democratic president who enjoyed a
nationwide authority and under a pluralist government of one
communist, two socialist, and two bourgeois parties.
Although key industries were nationalized, private sector
still played an important role in all areas of the economy.
That transitory period was seen later as the expression of an
European road to socialism which combined political democ-
racy with economic democracy.
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Economically, this system was a market economy in which
both state and private enterprise were run by professionally
competent managers who were guided by market criteria while
at the same time respecting political and social priorities
of a central, indicative plan. This way of organizing econ-
omy was first applied during the first two year plan of eco-
nomic revival (1947-48), and it remained valid until a short
time after the Communist party seized full and uncontrolled
power, both economic and political, in February 1948.
After the communist takeover, it took some time before the
Soviet model of centralized planning was adopted. The first
five-year plan (1949-53) drafted by the communist planners
was created with priorities in the production of consumer
goods and with balanced trade relations both with the East
and with the traditional Western markets. Although the five-
year plan already signified a centralization of decision-
making processes, in its initial stages it was based on so-
called counter planning by which each enterprise reacted to
the directives received from their superior organs. Economic
units still had a considerable measure of authority and
independence. They were broadly applying intraenterprise
management methods which had been successfully used for a
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number of years by the Bata enterprises (a Czechoslovak ver-
sion of Fordism).
This first economic model was based on a conviction that
the conditions of an industrially advanced and democratic
European country did not permit an application of the Soviet
command model and that it was impossible to transplant an
alien system, created for entirely different purposes, to a
dissimilar situation. In this respect, the economic practice
corresponded with the theory of a democratic road to social-
ism.
The idea of a specific Czechoslovak road to socialism suf-
fered its first blow in the summer of 1947 when Stalin forced
Czechoslovakia to withdraw from Marshall Plan negotiations.
The second blow came when the Cominform criticized the
French and Italian Communist parties for their attempt at
achieving socialism by democratic methods. The final blow
came in the summer of 1948 in the Cominform resolution on
Yugoslavia.
The Soviet model of socialism came to Czechoslovakia in
1950 and 1951. In February 1950, the targets of the five-year
plan were substantially increased for the first time (so
called mobilization of production) and priorities were
shifted from consumer goods to investment goods. The follow-
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ing year, under the impact of the Korean War and deteriorat-
ing world situation, the Soviet Union forced Czechoslovakia
not only sharply to step up the pace of growth of its heavy
industry (from 70 percent of the original version to 133 per-
cent in the final version), but also to change the industry's
structure in favor of metallurgy and heavy machinery (arma-
ments industry and investment goods). Along with these
structural changes essentially reconverting to war economy,
the Soviet command economic system was imposed in Czechoslo-
vakia. Thus Czechoslovakia became a steel power without own-
ing any iron ore.
The main objective of the Stalinist strategy of economic
development was to achieve industrialization with great
stress on heavy industry in the shortest time possible. The
Soviet planners found that the required high growth rates,
which in practice meant high investment ratios and high
growth rates in employment, could not be achieved by market
forces. Also, the labor force available for implementation
of the ambitious industrialization plans did not have the
required skills. In a situation of shortage of specialists
and of experienced managers, it seemed reasonable to use the
scarce resources of managerial talents primarily in the cen-
ter and to manage enterprises by orders. In this way, the
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Soviet planners succeeded in combining their goals of eco-
nomic development with Marx' belief that the economy of the
future state would be run as a marketless economy.
The planning system in the centralized economy fulfilled
most functions which the market mechanism fulfills in a mar-
ket economy. The state economic plan coordinated the eco-
nomic activity of enterprises of different sectors of
economy, handled the distribution of producer and consumer
goods and concerned itself with equilibrium in the macro-
and microsphere. Also, its role was to ensure price stabil-
ity, full employment and proper wage differentials.
All important macroeconomic decisions were made by the
central planners and incorporated into the plans. The plan-
ners determined the targets for the distribution of national
income between consumption and accumulation as well as for
the distribution of the consumption fund into personal and
collective consumption, and for the distribution of invest-
ment funds between productive and non- productive spheres,
and between sectors of the economy. The growth rate of
incomes of individual socioeconomic groups and of incomes in
individual sectors of the economy, as well as the distribu-
tion of collective consumption were planned. The rate of
growth of the economy and the growth rate of individual sec-
tors were to a great degree determined.
Production targets for the whole economy were disaggre-
gated through the channels of management down to enter-
prises. Thus microeconomic decisions rested also in the
hands of central authorities. The plan of an enterprise in
terms of the size of output, profit, productivity and other
indicators corresponded to the plan of the supervisory
authority. Each enterprise had a certain role in the struc-
ture of the national economy. It was required to produce cer-
tain products and not others. The system had no role for
competition.
Technological innovation was also planned. Research and
development was put into the hands of centralized research
and development institutes under the rationale that in a
socialist country there was no room for technological
secrecy. Enterprises were assigned targets for development
of technology.
In order to be able to produce the assigned targets,
enterprises, when they were established, got fixed assets,
which were the property of the state, and working capital. If
the planners believed that new capital was needed, it was
allocated to enterprises. Producer goods were also allocated
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to enterprises. The planners also determined the size of the
work force and wages to be paid and they helped enterprises
to get the needed labor.
To make sure that the demand for inputs resulting from the
planned size of production was in balance with the available
or possible supply, the plan had to go through material bal-
ancing. The system of balancing as a method of planning also
included financial balancing and manpower balancing. Pro-
ducer goods were allocated to enterprises in the sense that a
supplier was assigned to them. Thus the horizontal links
between supplier and buyer were determined from above.
Foreign trade was also planned. Imports were the point of
departure in planning. Their purpose was to overcome bottle-
necks in the economy, ensure new technology which was of
great importance to the objectives of the plan but could not
be produced at home for lack of know-how, and goods which
could not be produced at home for geographical reasons.
Exports were primarily intended as repayments for imports.
Domestic enterprises were not allowed to trade directly with
foreign firms. This activity was reserved for special enter-
prises, so called foreign trade corporations, which were
managed by the ministry of foreign trade.
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Prices were not result of a market but were set up admin-
istratively, usually at the level of production costs plus
some small profit. When new prices were set, their level was
planned with the objective of clearing the market. But once
they were set, they remained stable for a long time regard-
less of change in supply and demand. There were three inde-
pendent price circuits: wholesale prices, retail prices, and
foreign trade prices. Wholesale prices performed more of an
accounting function; they were used primarily as a yardstick
of plan fulfillment. Rarely were they used to influence the
decision making of enterprises about choices of inputs.
Bank credit was planned and extended for certain purposes.
The interest rate was also set by planners. It was not viewed
as a price for the use of credit and it influenced very lit-
tle the extension of credit or investment decisions.
Physical planning and management was of a paramount impor-
tance much greater than financial management. Material bal-
ancing was one important element of physical planning. Other
parts of physical planning lied in the assignment of targets
in physical units, setting norms of labor intensity and
determining technical coefficients of production.
The centralized system of economic management was intended
to focus attention of enterprises fully on their productive
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function. Domestic production in the state sector as well as
in the cooperative sector was separated from consumption and
from foreign markets. Signals from foreign markets and from
consumers had no direct effect on production. This effect
was achieved by separation of different price circuits.
Wholesale prices were separated from retail prices in the
sense that the former could rise without affecting the
later. The separation of wholesale and retail prices made
the separation of production from consumption possible
because the fulfillment of plan targets was measured in con-
stant wholesale prices. Because this was so, the only thing
enterprises were to be concerned with was the fulfillment of
the plan. Consumer's preferences did not affect their well
being. On the other hand, this arrangement shielded consum-
ers from effects of inflation.
The separation of domestic prices from foreign market
prices followed aims similar to those of the separation of
wholesale and retail prices. It also sheltered domestic pro-
ducers from world market pressure, including imported infla-
tion. Domestic producers sold their products earmarked for
foreign markets to foreign trade corporations at domestic
prices. Possible losses in foreign trade exchange were
financed from a special budgetary fund and possible profits
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were channelled back into this fund. Imported products were
then sold to domestic producers at prices equivalent to
domestic prices.
The system of centralized economic management was comple-
mented with hierarchical industrial structure which facili-
tated the handling down of assignments and the control of
their implementation by the center. This organizational
structure in the form of a pyramid was called production eco-
nomic units in the Czechoslovak case. It meant that industry
was divided into many branches and enterprises were associ-
ated in production economic units within their particular
industrial branch. One or more branches were managed by a
ministry in all their important activities through its sec-
toral and functional departments. The ministry passed its
orders on to the directorate of enterprise association, the
production economic unit headquarters, who then transmitted
them to individual enterprises.
The system of centralized management had some obvious
advantages. Firstly, it had the advantage of a quick mobili-
zation of resources for certain priority projects. Secondly,
being a supply (resource) constrained system, it had a ten-
dency to full employment of resources, including human ones.
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Lastly, the system was arranged in such a way that open
inflation could easily be held within defined limits.
But the disadvantages of the system of the centralized
management were more numerous. In brief, the system was
inefficient, inflexible, hampered innovation, generated
shortages and lead to frequent market disequilibria. Since
in the socialist system demand was insatiable, the only con-
straint on increase in production was supply of resources.
Therefore, the economic system was a resource constrained
system.
Some of the disadvantages of the economic system were con-
nected with the predicament of the central planners known
well in the Western literature on scientific management. The
planners needed to poses a full knowledge of the needs and
opportunities of the economy and of productive capacity of
the enterprises in order to predetermine the plan. This very
requirement made their planning inflexible for adaptation to
sudden shocks and surprises.
Further, the central planners needed to be able to enforce
the planned targets. The setting of targets was not a one
sided process, but a process of bargaining between enter-
prise managers and the planners. The enterprise managers
were interested in being given soft targets in order to
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buffer themselves against fluctuations in productivity and
uncertainty created by shortages. They also bargained for an
allocation of maximum material inputs and labor. To this
end, they tried to understate the output capacity of their
enterprises and conceal their reserves.
The central planners knowing these tactics and driven by
ambitious plans, resorted to a simple rule - they tried to
impose on the enterprise taut plans by increasing the tar-
gets by a certain percentage each year above the level
achieved in the previous year. The managers responded by
abusing quantitative indicators of success which measured
fulfillment of the plan. Managers tended to utilize all the
loopholes possible in the system in order to fulfill the plan
regardless of social cost and quality of products. Further,
the logic of the system of the performance indicators was
that their number constantly grew. Their large number
impeded the initiative of enterprises with negative conse-
quences for innovation.
Centralization of decisions about investment activities,
especially the financing of investment projects from the
state budget had necessarily to be a source of waste.
Resources were not allocated on the basis of price fluctua-
tion and profit expectations, but on the basis of the plan.
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The enterprises were obliged to surrender the so-called
remainder of profit to the state budget, and the same was
true about the amortization fund. The central planners dis-
tributed funds for investment according to the objectives of
the plan and not according to performance. In practice,
enterprises that produced large profit might not have been
allocated funds for investment while those that did not make
profit might have received investment funds. More, the cen-
tral distribution of investment was governed very little by
efficiency criteria and was much influenced by political
considerations. Enterprises did not have to repay the funds
or even pay interest on them. The funds represented budget-
ary grants.
Czechoslovak reform economists made a particular contribu-
tion to the theory of centralized economic management. They
began to differentiate between extensive and intensive eco-
nomic growth. They argued that extensive growth was based on
two sources: expansion of capital, and expansion of the
labor force. Extensive growth was typical of industrializa-
tion not only in the nineteenth but also in the twentieth
century. However, they stressed, development during postin-
dustrialization took place through intensive economic growth
based on more effective utilization of capital and the labor
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force, and particularly on the application of scientific and
technological progress, on higher qualifications for produc-
ers, and on a better organization of production and
exchange. The reformists argued that it was characteristic
for the COMECON countries that their economic growth was of a
manifestly extensive nature and that they were incapable of
fully utilizing the intensive elements of growth.
As the shortcomings of the centralized system of economic
management were becoming apparent, they gradually created
need for a reform. Three general types of reform were possi-
ble and tried out in various socialist countries. The first
type of economic reform, that of improving the system of cen-
tralized planning, was based on the belief that the nonmar-
ket, command economic system was essentially good and that
there was no reason to change it. It should only be improved
by overcoming centralization and otherwise adjusting the
directive plan targets.
The second type of economic reform was an attempt to com-
bine centralization and decentralization. Instead of relying
exclusively on central decision-making, the reformers argued
that central decision-making would only apply to macroeco-
nomic problems. An obligatory central plan would remain, but
the directives through which it was implemented would gradu-
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ally be replaced by instruments of economic regulation. Both
long term fiscal instruments and immediate price instruments
were to be used to stimulate enterprise behavior in a desired
direction.
The third type of economic reform proceeded from the
assumption that the nonmarket economic system was essen-
tially bad. Partial reforms and improvements were considered
not enough, and the only way to an effective economic devel-
opment was believed to be a transformation of the system. The
alternative would be a system based on a synthesis of plan
and market in which the plan would be supplemented by the
market. The plan would not be a directive plan, but an indic-
ative one, foreseeing future structural changes and steering
economic units toward desired social aims.
In Czechoslovakia, some relaxation of the centralist drive
came only with the change of Soviet policy after the death of
Stalin in the summer 1953. Consequently, improvements were
sought within the framework of the command system to repair
excesses of the first five-year plan. But in the second half
of the 1950's there occurred the first substantial increase
of capital-input ratio signaling declining efficiency of the
national economy.
201
In order to counteract this trend, the first economic
reform was launched in 1958 and 1959. The reform was based on
three principles: (i) a strengthening of long-term (fifteen-
year) and medium term (five-year) plans at the expense of
short-term (one- year) plans; (ii) partial decentralization
(primarily in the investment area) from the ministries to
production economic units; (iii) steering the material
interests of the producers to the formation and acceptance
of optimum plans instead of quantitative overfilling of low
plans.
Simultaneously, industry was being organized into so
called production economic units. This strategy represented
an attempt to amalgamate enterprises into larger bodies and
possibly to entrust strong enterprises with an organiza-
tional and directing role within the framework of their
branches. The effort at combining the interests of the
enterprises with effective investment was an attempt to stop
the growth of the incremental capital-output ratio. The
effort at combining the material interest of the enterprises
with the creation of optimal plans was an attempt to elimi-
nate disproportions from the central plan, to make its tar-
gets more realistic, and to prevent further deepening of the
imbalance. The emphasis on long-term plans and their stabil-
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ity was to create a favorable situation for long-term inter-
ests of the enterprises prevailing over their immediate
interests so that the enterprises would create conditions
for a future effective production.
Although the principles of the reform seem essentially
rational and logical, the reform met dismal failure in three
years. The reason for the failure was not only that the prin-
ciples could not work in the otherwise intact command sys-
tem, but that there were also three outside forces at work.
Firstly, enterprises were forced to change their production
programs abruptly several times when orders for the foreign
trade with other socialist countries changed. The Soviet
Union several times unexpectedly changed its economic con-
cept of priorities and China annulled its original orders
after the Sino-Soviet split. These two events totally dis-
rupted the assumption that long-term plans and production
programs would be stable and optimal.
Second factor inhibiting success of the reform was politi-
cal. In the last sweep of Stalinism, the Czechoslovak gov-
ernment determined to exercise political purges to secure
loyalty of citizens. Thousands of people lost their jobs and
many enterprises lost their qualified managers. The authors
of the subsequent reforms learned that the economic system
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could not be reformed without a reform of the political sys-
tem.
The last factor undermining the reform was the unrealistic
nature of the plan for 1961-65. The third five-year plan was
derived from a fifteen-year prognosis. The new broad wave of
investment required for its achievement was quite beyond the
capabilities of the Czechoslovak economy. As soon as the
first difficulties of the reform began to appear, caused by
the changes in external economic relations, by unrealistic
investments, and by adverse weather conditions, the power
center reacted not only by canceling the third five-year
plan but also by a return to the centralistic methods of man-
agement of the early 1950's. But the failure of the Czecho-
slovak reform of the second type, which ended in the economic
crisis of 1963-64, pushed the reform thinking one step fur-
ther.
Following their negative experience with the second type
of the economic reform, the Czechoslovak reform economists
started to work on the third type of a reform which ulti-
mately lead to the events of the Prague Spring in 1968. The
proposal of the 1964-1968 reform was originally the work of a
group of economists and theoreticians who gathered around
the Economic Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sci-
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ence. The leader and spokesman for the group of reformers was
Ota Sik who was a member of both the Central Committee of the
Communist Party and its economic commission.
The reform proposal of the group of economists led by Pro-
fessor Sik was based on the following fifteen principles (in
Sulecky 1972):
. The plan as an external mechanism of the functioning
of economy must be supplemented by a restoration of
the market as an internal, self-regulating mechanism
of the functioning of a modern socialist economy.
. In the future, the plan should determine only the
basic macroeconomic development on the basis of an
analysis of developing trends of technology, produc-
tion, economic requirements, and over- all social
needs.
. The enterprises must be granted a measure of autonomy
which will enable them to react to the changes of pro-
duction conditions and of the market; therefore, they
must not be subject to limitations in the form of
directive plan targets.
. The plan directives will be replaced by economic regu-
lation. The central planning organ shall optimize
economic proportions, manage and regulate the redistri-
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bution of enterprise incomes, regulate credits,
interest, taxes, depreciation, and so forth, through
legal norms which will be identical for all enter-
prises. Equal rights shall be applied to unequal
subjects. The rules of the game must be stable and
long-range so that the enterprises may be guided by
them in deciding on their own future.
. The ministries lose their raison d'etre as directing
bodies. The specialized ministries should be abolished
because their functions will be taken over by enter-
prise associations.
. The relationships between the enterprises and organs
of state lose their nature of subordination and superi-
ority. They will be delineated by a law which will
stipulate the rights and responsibilities of both
sides and will grant the enterprises a right to act in
their own interest and to undertake any steps which
are not in conflict with the law.
- Foreign trade will be tied to production. The concept
of the monopoly in foreign trade will be revised, and
foreign business transactions will be decentralized to
the enterprise associations or to the enterprises.
- The enterprise associations will not replace the minis-
tries in the sense that they would become superior
organs to the member enterprises. It is, rather, a mat-
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ter of associating for the purpose of achieving or
promoting the economic goals of a group of enter-
prises. Membership should not be obligatory; the
enterprise should have the right to choose its part-
ners, to enter the association, or to leave it,
according to its own interests and needs.
. There should be, in principle, three kinds of prices:
fixed prices, set and controlled by the center, of
basic raw materials, foods and products; limited
prices; and free prices, which will emerge from supply-
and-demand relations or from an agreement between the
supplier and the customer.
- The criterion of enterprises' activity is not the ful-
fillment of plan targets but the size of their gross
income, the use of which will be determined by the
enterprises themselves.
. In order to restore completion, even with the high
degree of monopolization of domestic production, the
entire economy must be gradually confronted with world
markets. A transition to convertible currency is a
long-range assumption.
. A prerequisite of reform is a change in the level of
wholesale prices which must objectivize price rela-
tions both among the branches and within them.
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. Introduction of levies on basic funds and restoration
of the active role of interest rates is to emphasize
the role of capital in creating values and to make
rational economic calculation possible.
- The level of wages and salaries will depend on the
gross income of the enterprise. The state guarantees
only the minimum basic wages.
- The complex criterion of the effectiveness of economic
management should prevent the growth of productivity
of present labor being paralyzed by a decline of the
productivity of capital.
This proposal of economic reform formulated first in 1964
called for a new system of the functioning of economy. How-
ever, the party leaders, though they agreed formally with
the principles of the reform, in practice insisted that they
were merely going to make the old system work more perfect.
This conflicting interpretation resulted in a slow progress
of the reforms because the political leadership was not
willing to give up their economic power and tried to preserve
as many elements of the old command system as possible.
The principles of the reform proposal were deformed by
innumerable compromises in 1965-67. The specialized minis-
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tries were not abolished; the associating of enterprises in
trusts was obligatory; although directive targets were abol-
ished, they survived in the form of orientation targets
which were in fact obligatory; gross income was understood
in practice not as a criterion of enterprise management but
as a directive target; the relationship between the enter-
prises and organs of state was not one of equality; enter-
prises did obtain a number of rights but without any legal
guarantees. Branch directorates which had taken over to some
extent the job of branch ministries in imposing targets on
enterprises in many cases did not change their behavior
after the reform was legally introduced. The productive eco-
nomic units also used their power to tighten their monopoly
position. The hierarchical subordination also continued
between the branch directorates and the branch ministry
which had various instruments available to influence the
directorate. One of the leverages was that it appointed,
dismissed and evaluated the performance of the general man-
ager.
In 1966, a resolution of the Central Committee was adopted
on the so called accelerated introduction of the economic
reform which in practice represented a victory for the
reformers. The resolution of the Central Committee to accel-
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erate the reform was put into legislation by the Order in
Council. The Order in Council limited the assignment of out-
put targets to 'unavoidable' cases. Exception from this rule
were foreign trade and central investment, where binding
targets could be set for enterprises. The reform put the max-
imization of gross income in the center of the regulation
system. This indicator was to be the main incentive in the
sense that wage growth and bonuses depended on it. It was
also to serve as a guide to decision making and the basis for
taxation. The enterprises were not to be assigned targets
for the fulfillment of gross income. The authorities regu-
lated its growth and distribution by indirect methods, pri-
marily by taxation.
In determining taxation, the reformers were determined to
terminate the old practice of rewarding poorly performing
enterprises at the expense of those performing well. They
replaced the old progressive taxation with a flat tax of 18
per cent on gross income. The purpose of the taxation was no
longer to mitigate income differences and instead was sup-
posed to become an instrument of efficiency. Taxes were to
show enterprises to what extent their performance was effi-
cient and to exert pressure on enterprises to increase the
efficiency of their operations.
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The resolution of the Central Committee made it clear that
planning remained the main coordinating mechanism though its
role was limited primarily to macroeconomic sphere. It
determined the most important macroeconomic proportions, the
direction of economic growth, including the distribution of
investments between sectors of the economy and important
investment projects. It also had to take care of the interna-
tional division of labor and technical development. Finally,
the plan determined the economic regulators and their appli-
cation. Two kinds of economic regulators were specified in a
law: long-term (in substance fiscal) taken preferably from
the five-year plan, and short-term (monetary, prices, etc).
Price reform could proceed only slowly due to great short-
ages and monopolization. The main objective was to let mar-
ket forces play a role in the formation of prices and
consequently in the decision making of enterprises. But the
level of consumer prices was to be maintained the same. As a
result of the Resolution, the wholesale prices were recon-
structed effective January 1, 1967. Profit was added to the
production costs in accordance with the two channel price
type which meant a percentage of the capital employed (6 per-
cent) and a percentage of the wage bill used (25 percent). A
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grouping of price had already been introduced in 1966. It
consisted of three categories: fixed, limited, and free.
Further, the Resolution granted enterprises a considerable
measure of autonomy from the central organs. The enterprises
could determine the product mix, how to produce and where to
buy inputs, and they also obtained much greater freedom in
determining wages and employment. However, decentralization
was backed not by law but merely by the benevolence of those
in power. As a result, enterprises obtained their own
resources and wanted to start doing business, but they were
afraid to act because the authorities might change their
mind and punish them later. It was becoming clear to everyone
involved that the economic reform could not be achieved
without simultaneous political reform.
The second stage of the Czechoslovak economic reform in
1968 went beyond a narrow reform of the economic mechanism.
It grew instead into a new concept of socialism combining the
market economy, run according to a plan, with political and
economic democracy. Two new elements were added to the
reform proposal of 1964: the concept of structured socialist
ownership; and the concept of self-administration and work-
ers' councils. These concepts were believed to have solved
the contradiction between economic efficiency and ideologi-
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cal principles of socialism. However, these concepts were
never allowed to achieve a concrete form. The invasion of
armies of the five Warsaw Pact countries interrupted the
reform of the Prague Spring.
In 1969, the new political leadership started to dismantle
the reform from 1966-1969 and returned to the old, central-
ized form of management. Although the economy improved for a
while, by the end of 1970's it started declining again . This
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fact called for a new reform that has been slowly taking
place throughout the 1980's. The main push for the reform
came from the outside when the Soviet leader, Michael Gor-
bachev launched his reform. The Czechoslovak leadership
promptly followed Gorgachev's initiatives. In 1987, the Cen-
tral Committee and the government published documents called
"Principles for the Restructuring the economic mechanism in
the CSSR" and "Concretization of the principles for the
restructuring of economic mechanism in the CSSR." The objec-
tive of these reforms was the same as before - to put the
country on the path to the intensive type of economic growth,
help to accelerate the restructuring of the economy, inten-
sify the process of innovations and modernize the industry.
As before, the reform promised to increase autonomy of the
enterprises by reducing the number of assigned output tar-
gets. It called for improvements in the drafting of state
plans, in their handling down to enterprises and in the posi-
tion of enterprise. Again, the reform called for a diminish-
ing role of physical planning. Financial flows and value
instruments were no longer to play a passive role in the
sense that they simply adjust to set physical targets and
proportions. Further, the decisive criterion for the inclu-
sion of tasks in the state plans and plans of organizations
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were to be economic efficiency. On the level of organiza-
tion, the criterion would be profit. The central planners
were supposed to rely more on indirect methods so that prof-
its would result in importance.
The new incentive system was changed against the old in
that wage-bill growth was linked to a net indicator,
adjusted net output instead of a gross indicator. The ratio-
nale for this change was to strengthen the pressure on enter-
prise to reduce material costs.
Investment decision and financing also underwent some
changes in order to deal with the tendency to overinvest and
to achieve low return on investment. Two categories for
investment in fixed assets were introduced.
The first category comprised centralized investment
projects which were included in the national plan. These
investment projects which had a claim for preferential
treatment had to be approved by the central government.
Until 1986, these investment projects were financed from the
construction fund which every production economic unit and
enterprise had or directly from the state budget in case of
unproductive investments, certain important investments in
the field of science and technology, and exports. The second
investment category, centralized investments required only
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the approval of the republics governments. These projects
were financed from the enterprise development fund.
The two funds were capitalized differently. The construc-
tion fund was assigned to enterprises on basis of estimated
costs of investment projects. The development fund was
formed on the basis of a normative set by the authorities.
Bank credit was also available for both categories of
investments. However, provision of bank credit was not con-
sidered automatic. Projects promising better returns could
be provided with more credit. For projects oriented to mod-
ernization of existing capacities, the interest could be
lower than average. Differentiation in the interest rate was
also used to accelerate the construction work.
However, in spite of all these reform efforts, the correc-
tion needed a more radical measures. The interventions of
1980's did not speed up the slow progress in technology. It
appears that the central planners relied too heavily on set-
ting incentives at a time when innovations should have
resulted from grappling with problems arising in the process
of production. The two level prices and giving enterprises
more leeway in decision making about drafting plans, wages,
incentives and investment were not a sufficiently strong
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stimulus in the face of the many factors which discouraged
enterprises from innovating.
Also, the putting stress on enterprise self-financing to
induce enterprises behave efficiently was in principle cor-
rect. However, it could not work under the current condi-
tions - enterprises were assigned targets which they had no
right to reject even if they could do something else more
efficiently and the tax burden was too high to leave suffi-
cient profit at enterprise disposal. The perceived need to
use market forces and to dismantle the high concentration of
industry provided ground for the radical change in the
1990's.
The Reform of the 1990's
The economic reform of the 1990 followed immediately after
the fall of the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia. The
reform went over the radical propositions of the 1968 to a
complete restoration of capitalist market economy. In 1990,
a radical transition and austerity plan was passed by the
Czechoslovak parliament. Preparatory laws and government
decrees were laid down during that year. In January 1991, the
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full complete set of transition policies came into effect.
The main policy measures were:
. restrictive monetary and fiscal policies (macroeco-
nomic stabilization);
. privatization and restructuring program;
- liberalization of prices combined with limited price
controls;
- internal convertibility with a sharp devaluation of
the currency and import protection through import
surcharges;
- foreign trade was open to all enterprises with the
exception of trade in armaments and pharmaceutical
products.
However, a new tax law enabling free enterprise was not
passed until January 1993.
The Privatization Process
Prior to 1989, Czechoslovakia recognized four principal
types of economic enterprises: state enterprises, coopera-
tives, foreign trade enterprises, and municipal enterprises.
Commercial relations were regulated by three different legal
regimes. The Civil Code governed the relations between pri-
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vate individuals and enterprises. The Economic Code regu-
lated interactions among enterprises. The International
Trade Code governed relationships arising in the context of
international trade.
After the collapse of the communist regime in 1989, a
wholesale reform of the legal framework of economic activity
has been accomplished within a period of less than two years.
The Economic Code was first amended in April 1990, and subse-
quently superseded as of January 1992 by the new Commercial
Code. In addition, a special Law on State Enterprise which
transformed the rules governing the operation of state
enterprises was passed in April 1990. Another law, the Law on
Private Business of April 18, 1990, abolished the old system
of permits, established an individual right to perform pri-
vate economic activities without any limitation on the num-
ber of employees, and set up a system of registration of
individual business enterprises.
The following is a list of the more important laws con-
cerning property rights, forms of business organizations,
and privatization in Czechoslovakia:
- Act No. 103/1990 Amendments to the Economic Code, Act
No. 98/1988, which amended Act No. 109/1964;
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. Act No. 104/1990 On Joint Stock Companies;
- Act No. 104/1990 On Private Business;
- Act No. 111/1990 On State Enterprises;
- Act No. 112/1990 On Enterprises with Foreign Capital
Participation, amending Act No. 173/1988;
- Act No. 113/1990 On Economic Relations with Foreign
Countries, amending Act No. 42/1980;
- Act No. 298/1990 On Regulations of Property Relations
of Religious Orders and Congregations and the Archdio-
cese of Olomouc;
- Act No. 403/1990 Mitigation of Property Related
Injustices;
- Act No. 427/1990 About the Transfer of State Property
and Some Goods to Other Legal and Physical Persons;
- Act No. 458/1990 Amendment of Act No. 403/1990;
. Act No. 528/1990 The Foreign Exchange Act;
- Act No. 87/19910n Out-of-Court Rehabilitations
- Act No. 92/19910n Conditions and terms Governing the
Transfer of State Property to Other Persons;
- Act No. 229/1991 On Regulation of Ownership of Land
and Other Agricultural Property;
- Act No. 328/1991 On Bankruptcy and Settlement;
e Act No. 455/1991 The Entrepreneurial Act;
- Act No. 513/1991 The Commercial Code;
- Act No. 42/19920n Regulation of Property Relations in
Cooperatives;
- Act No. 248/1992 On Investment Corporation and Invest-
ment Fund.
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In contrast to Hungary and Poland in which considerable
autonomy was conferred on state enterprises earlier, the
Czechoslovak state preserved its centralized commanding role
over the enterprises until the revolution of 1989. After the
Soviet invasion of 1968, reforms of economic activity were
stopped and the state reasserted its administrative power
over the economic activity.
The communist state enterprise was headed by the managing
director. The director could be nominated by the founding
organ (usually the sectoral ministry) or elected by the
worker's council. But even in the later case, the government
retained the right to approve or reject the choice of the
council. The ministry also approved the compensation of all
employees, including top management, and retained the right
to influence current production decisions.
The 1990 Law on State Enterprises changed the legal struc-
ture of the state enterprises to adapt them to the new eco-
nomic environment. Two forms of enterprises were recognized:
* Basic State Enterprise, which is involved in commer-
cial activity. The basic enterprise is run by the
mangers who are nominated by the founding organ and
the Supervisory Council.
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e Public Interest Enterprise which is involved in the
provision of public-oriented services. These enter-
prises have no supervisory councils, and their
founding agencies are directly involved in the running
of the enterprise.
A State Enterprise becomes a legal person acting in its
own name, bearing full responsibility for its activities.
The activity and operation of the state enterprise can only
be limited or interfered with in the manner stipulated by
law. State enterprises do not have ownership rights in the
objects and property entrusted to them at the time of their
foundation; these objects remain the property of the state.
The manager who is appointed and may be dismissed by the
founding organ, poses power larger than those in a tradi-
tional corporation. The manager not only runs the day-to-day
operations of the state enterprise, but also, after consult-
ing with the supervisory council, approves accounting state-
ments and distributes available profits.
The Supervisory Council is primarily an advisory body,
with no direct powers. It is authorized to review the
accounting statements and the distribution of profits, to
discuss the major issues concerning the development of the
state enterprise and to recommend the dismissal of the man-
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ager. The founding organ determines the number of members of
the Council, of whom half are appointed by the founding organ
and half elected by the employees.
Until December 31, 1990, the founding organ could trans-
form the state enterprise into a joint-stock company trans-
ferring to it all property entrusted to the state
enterprise. After that date, all transformations of state
enterprises into commercial company form are were connected
with the privatization process.
All organized business activities other than state enter-
prises became governed by the Commercial Code. The code rec-
ognizes six types of legal entities organized for the
purpose of engaging in entrepreneurial activity: individual
private entrepreneurship, cooperative activity, general com-
mercial company, limited partnership; limited-liability com-
panies; joint-stock companies. All commercial companies must
be listed in the Commercial Register.
Most state enterprises are transformed into a joint-stock
company during the privatization. A joint-stock company is a
company with limited liability whose shares can be publicly
traded. A joint-stock company may issue both registered and
bearer shares, both of which are freely transferable. Dif-
ferent classes of stock may also be issued, but preferred
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stock can make up no more than one-half of the capital stock.
The company can also issue employee stock certificates.
These shares, the value of which cannot exceed 5 per cent of
basic capitalization, are restricted, and can be transferred
only among employees and retired employees of the company.
The Code provides for a mandatory employee bonus plan, spec-
ifying that the employees must share in the distribution of
profits, but no size of the bonus is specified.
The General Meeting of shareholders is the highest organ
of the company. It must have a quorum of shareholders with at
least 30 per cent of company's capitalization. A joint-stock
company is required to have a Board of Directors, at least
three members of which must be elected by the General Meeting
or the Supervisory Board. The Directors manage the company
and act in its name. The joint stock company must also have a
Supervisory Board comprised of at least three members.
Supervisory Board members are elected by the General Meet-
ing, but in all joint stock companies with more than fifty
employees at least one-third of the Supervisory Board must
be elected by an assembly of company employees.
The new Commercial Code changed regulations concerning
foreign investment. It repealed the old joint venture law
which contained a number of restrictive provisions. Under
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the Code, foreign persons may engage in business activity on
the Czechoslovak territory under the same conditions and to
the same extent as Czechoslovak citizens. However, one sig-
nificant restriction on foreign investment states that when
a foreign investor wishes to purchase the assets or shares of
a state-owned enterprise the purchase must be incorporated
into the privatization plan for the enterprise and approved
by the ministry.
The reform of the structure of ownership and of industrial
organization was pursued through the privatization process.
Rapid privatization of economy was one of the most important
components of Czechoslovakia's economic reform program. The
Czechoslovak strategy was to change the ownership structure
as quickly as possible, leaving most restructuring to the
new private owners.
The privatization process had three principal elements:
restitution to original owners, a small-scale privatization
program and large-scale privatization. The main organs of
government involved in regulating the Czechoslovak privati-
zation process were the Czech and Slovak Privatization Min-
istries, the Federal Finance Ministry, and the Federal and
Republics Funds of National Property.
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The Czechoslovak large privatization was established in
April 1991 through Act No. 92 "On Conditions and terms Gov-
erning the Transfer of State Property to Other Persons." The
process of large privatization proceeded through decentrali-
zation in the proposal of privatization plans. The right to
propose a privatization project choosing any of the number
of possible methods was given to anyone. Most of these plans
(projects) came from managers or prospective buyers. In con-
trast, the final approval was organized through relatively
centralized procedure. Founding ministries played an inter-
mediary role formally submitting all projects proposed to
them, along with their own recommendations or comments, to
one of the Republics Privatization Ministries or the Federal
Finance Ministry in cases when enterprises were founded by
federal ministries.
A.1.2. Government Inquiry into Environmental Performance
The emphasis on large-scale investment in heavy industry
from the 1950s onwards largely contributed to the increasing
seriousness of environmental degradation in Czechoslovakia.
The official party line maintained that under socialism peo-
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ple and environment were cared for and therefore there was no
need for concern. Natural laws as well as organization of
society could be transformed for human use.
Between 1948 and 1960, the drive for rapid industrial
growth was accompanied by little of attempt to address envi-
ronmental problems. The slow down of economic growth after
1960 brought also first warning signs of increasing environ-
mental degradation though only of a local character at
first.
As a response, the government of the Czech Republic estab-
lished a National Council for the Environment in 1971. This
Council was formed to serve as an advisory, coordinatory and
policy developing body of the Government of the Czech Repub-
lic in the area of environmental protection. However, along
with its publication activity the council also kept recom-
mending to the Government to grant widespread exceptions
from environmental laws.
The period from 1970 to 1990 was characterized by attempts
for maintaining economic growth while keeping political sta-
bility by provision of acceptable standard of living. This
policy of maintaining acceptable standard of living for the
population was conducted at the expense of delayed capital
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investment for modernizing production processes and of over
exploitation of natural resources.
The major sources of the deterioration during this time
were an excessive and inconsiderate extraction of natural
resources, extensive pollution emissions and failure to
observe ecological laws. These problems were compounded by
inefficiency of the economy, its material intensity, aging
technological equipment used in production and production of
manufactured goods with little respect for ecological conse-
quences.
Air pollution in Czechoslovakia resulted primarily from
industrial activities and reliance on low-quality domestic
brown coal as the main source of energy. For example, brown
coal accounted for 78.3 percent of the energy used in thermal
electricity plants. Because industry was often intermixed
with housing, air pollution in residential areas was also
high. The area around Most in northwest Bohemia became noto-
rious for heavy smog resulting in poor health of the popula-
tion. Death and morbidity rates in the region of north
Bohemia were among this highest in the country. The Human
Rights Group Charter 77 published a statement in 1983 sug-
gesting that pollution in northwest Bohemia has reached cat-
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astrophic dimensions and was responsible for an increase in
social problems and despair in the region.
Water pollution was also becoming a serious problem in the
country suffering from a shortage of water. Lack of clean
water was cited as not only affecting human health, but also
inhibiting industrial expansion. The situation was exacer-
bated by the geographical position of Czechoslovakia on top
of watersheds with a net outflow of water from the country.
Also, industrial enterprises were frequently given exemp-
tions from existing water legislation. It was estimated that
some 2,300 exemptions permitting enterprises to release
untreated effluents were granted between 1957 and 1970. The
water pollution problem was complicated by ineffective oper-
ation and inadequate maintenance of water treatment plants.
Because Czechoslovakia pursued a policy of autarchy in
food production, heavy application of fertilizers in agri-
culture was required. This was due to the lack of agricultur-
ally productive land in general, and to soil erosion, strip
mining, and diminished agricultural productivity from air
pollution in particular. The excessive use of fertilizers
further exacerbated the existing water pollution and also
lead to contamination of soil. The most serious consequence,
however, was contamination of foodstuffs by heavy metals.
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Another area of concern for environmentalists was damage
done to forests. According to 1983 data, 20-30 percent of
Czechoslovak trees were believed to be seriously damaged.
Deforestation was most serious in Northern Bohemia due to
the heavy air pollution from local sources and from trans-
boundary transfers from sources in Germany and Poland.
By the early 1980s, there was increasing public concern in
Czechoslovakia about public health and environment. Although
full extent of the ecological disruption was not revealed
during the early part of the decade, it was admitted by 1986
that at least 30 percent of the population in the Czech
Republic and 16 percent in the Slovak Republic suffered con-
stantly as a result of high concentrations of air pollut-
ants.
Policy response to the growing environmental pollution was
slow and ineffective. Initially, environmental protection
was seen as referring to the conservation of nature and wise
use of scarce resources rather than to dealing with indus-
trial pollution. Later, the concept of environmental protec-
tion included such areas as health, housing, recreation, and
urban planning.
The principle of care for, and improvement of, the envi-
ronment was incorporated into Article 15 of the Czechoslovak
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Constitution from 1960. This Article provided for the state
care for the environment and protection of natural heritage.
However, the Constitution did not specify basic principles
of environmental policy and the need for sustainable devel-
opment of society.
The general environmental laws were passed fairly early -
the State Protection of Nature Act no.40/1956, and the Act On
the Health of the Population of 1966. These general laws were
supplemented by three special laws. The Air Protection Act
(no.35/1967), water (no.138/1973 and no.130/1974), and for-
ests (1977) . By the late 1980s, the state administration
felt that the previous laws and their ineffective methods of
imposing fines needed correction. In 1986, new Acts in both
Czech and Slovak Republics were passed regarding stiffer
fines for offenses breaking state nature conservancy acts
and decrees.
A new orientation in environmental policy stressing pollu-
tion prevention rather than restoration and liability was
codified in a set of new acts from 1988. These acts, one con-
cerning state enterprises (no. 88), another related to the
agricultural cooperative system (no. 90) and the third to
the non-agricultural cooperative system (no. 94), each con-
tained specific references to the environment. In future,
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every state enterprise was supposed to take into consider-
ation any harmful influences that their individual produc-
tion units might have on people's health. The fourth Act
which placed environmental controls on private enterprises
was passed in 1990 (no.105) . These laws on enterprises made a
significant change in policy orientation by emphasizing the
use of less wasteful technology and placing stress on the
creation of an effective environmental control system for
which management would be directly responsible.
Still, the laws of the 1970s and 1980s tended to be very
general and failed to be implemented. In addition, they
often were contradicted or overruled by other regulations
and goals. The fines imposed on polluters were too low to
motivate enterprises to invest in pollution control equip-
ment. Most importantly, the economic plans emphasized rapid
industrial production at the detriment of environmental pro-
tection. This priority was reflected in the incentive system
of the enterprises which provided bonuses almost exclusively
for fulfillment or overfulfillment of production targets.
The importance placed on completing large scale construction
projects in the shortest time possible undermined concern
for their environmental impact. Lastly, attention to envi-
ronmental projects was missing from the five-year plans
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which had to allocate investment funds, technology and sup-
plies to the enterprises and communities.
The economic priorities were also reflected in the organi-
zational hierarchy of state administration. The economic
ministries enjoyed more influence into the policy making
process in a situation when public participation was almost
non-existent. Responsibility for environmental protection
was fragmented among various ministries distributed on the
so called gestor principle. According to this principle, the
industrial sector ministry was also responsible for monitor-
ing pollution and protecting environment in areas of its
activity. Needless to say, this organizational principle led
to a conflict of interest between regulation and production
with disastrous consequences for the environment.
In 1980's, environment fell to the competence of the Min-
istry of Health, Forestry and Water, Ministry of Agriculture
and Food, and Ministry of Industry at the federal level. Var-
ious ministries at the republics level also participated in
administering environmental legislation. In 1983, the State
Commission for Scientific and Technological Development and
Investment (SKVTRI) was established to provide technical
information on technical development to planners and to set
standards and norms. Air pollution was monitored by the
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State Technical Inspectorate while water pollution was
watched by the Hydrometeoroligical Institute. Local enforce-
ment of environmental standards was in responsibility of
National Committees. In 1988, a special unit was formed
within the Ministry of Interior to manage all Czech environ-
mental protection.
Despite of the problem of fragmented information concern-
ing the extent of environmental damage and the low priority
assigned to environmental problems by the country decision-
makers, it was becoming apparent that something had to be
done. The obvious cost of pollution, wasteful use of natural
resources, and damage to health of population called for a
response. Thus Czechoslovakia's sixth five-year plan, 1976-
80 was the first to include a chapter dealing with the envi-
ronment. During 1984-85, the State Commission for Scientific
and Technological Development and Investments, the State
Planning Commission, and the Czechoslovak Academy of Sci-
ences worked together to produce a long term environmental
plan for the period from 1986 to 2000. According to this long
range plan, the country needed to invest a total of 100,000
million Kcs on environmental protection by the year 2000.
The Government intended to stop the increase in pollution
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during 1986-90, and to start improving the quality of the
environment during 1990-95.
The state program of environmental investments was
designed to eliminate all the major sources of pollution in
the country. In the period of 1986-1990, the Czechoslovak
government planned to invest 17,600 million Kcs on environ-
mental constructions and supplies. The aim was to remove the
main sources of air, water and soil pollution. When the pro-
gram was approved in 1986, it contained 145 individual con-
struction projects out of which 65 percent was for water
protection, 25 percent was for air protection and 10 percent
for waste management. These projects mainly covered large
water treatment plants, fluid gas desulphurization units,
and waste disposal facilities.
However, the state program of environmental investments
lagged behind its deadlines. Due to poor preparation and
lack of supplies of equipment and material, the environmen-
tal projects were falling behind schedule. The report of the
State Planning Committee from 1989 found that only 25 per-
cent of the planned work on environmental projects was com-
pleted.
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With the removal of restrictions on the press and public
debate after the fall of communism in Czechoslovakia, new
information has been made public concerning the extent and
seriousness of the country's environmental problems. Old
problems were joined by new ones such as discovery of exten-
sive damage done by Soviet troops on their military bases.
The public also learned openly for the first time about prob-
lems with heavy metals, radioactive and bacterial contamina-
tion of the food and water supply, the extent and
consequences of air and water pollution throughout the coun-
try, the damage created to the country's forests, and the
impact of these problems on human health and life expect-
ancy.
A proliferation of environmental groups and green move-
ments arose with the political liberalization in late 1989
and early 1990. Among the most important of these were the
Green Alternative, and the Green Circle which also associ-
ated a number of environmental groups from the late commu-
nist period such as Brontosaurus, the Ecology Section of the
Czechoslovak Biological Society under the Czechoslovak Acad-
emy of Sciences, the Czech and Slovak Union of Nature Conser-
vationists, and the Ecological Society. In a typically
European way, several of these organizations united to form
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the Czechoslovak Green Party in 1989 which in turn joined
with the Slovak Green Party in February 1990. However, since
the Green Party received only slightly over 3 percent of the
vote in June 1990 elections, it did not seat any representa-
tives in the Federal Assembly. The Slovak Green Party was
more successful in that elections - six seats in the Slovak
National Council were won for the Slovak Green Party.
Many of the other political parties also emphasized envi-
ronmental concerns. The first democratic government took
immediately a number of steps to deal with pressing environ-
mental concerns. Among these steps, new environmental laws
were written and state environmental administration reorga-
nized.
The Ministry of the Environment of the Czech Republic was
established on December 19, 1989 by Czech National Council
Act No. 173/1989 S.B. and founded on January 1, 1990 as the
central state administrative body and highest inspection
body in environmental matters. A counterpart Slovak Council
for the Environment was established in Slovakia and was
later renamed the Slovak Ministry of the Environment after
the Czech-Slovak split in December 1992. A Federal Committee
for the Environment was established in June 1990 to coordi-
nate cooperation between state institutions, legislative
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organs, and interest groups. The Committee was to have
supra-ministerial position in order to emphasize and trans-
mit the importance of environmental issues into the activity
of the all state administration. One of the goals of the cre-
ation of the new Ministries was to concentrate the scat-
tered, nonintegral and often contradictory jurisdiction of
various central authorities dealing with the environment in
a single body. Another goal was to form the state protection
of the environment on the new understanding of the comple-
mentary relationship between market mechanisms and the
State's role in providing environmental protection. This new
relationship was described in a recent State Environmental
Policy Document (MECR 1995):
Market mechanisms can only function
effectively in those instances wherein
ownership relations may be defined and/
or negative external effects ignored.
Ownership relations in some components
of the environment, such as protection
of the soil, water reservoirs, etc., can
be easily defined and preservation in
these areas is provided under the pro-
tection of ownership. The role of the
State in these areas is to develop the
respective legal and institutional
framework to facilitate such protective
arrangements. On the other hand, the
State has a primary obligation to pro-
tect those components of the environment
where ownership relations are difficult
to define and/or those cases where
external negative effects are produced
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which affect the public good. Therefore,
State participation in the protection of
the environment is essential where the
components of the environment represent
common goods which cannot be owned and/
or where it is impossible to exclude the
use of these goods (namely, the air, the
climate, significant water courses and
ecosystems) and where international com-
mitments must be observed. The State is
responsible for determining the optimal
functioning of market mechanisms through
normative and economic instruments and
may also initiate the introduction of
new mechanisms (e.g. tradeable emission
permits).
The task of state governments is to for-
mulate environmental policies that coor-
dinate progress in individual areas and
attain the most effective solutions for
the respective problems at hand. In most
environmental policy programs, the pri-
ority problems have been identified as
the endangerment of global biosphere
systems (climate change, depletion of
the ozone layer, air and water pollu-
tion, deforestation), the reduction of
biological diversity (the unnatural
extinction of species, the degradation
or loss of ecosystems and biotopes, the
reduction of the genetic fund), the deg-
radation of natural resources (the loss
of arable land and reduced soil fertil-
ity, the lack of potable water, the
exploitation of non-renewable resources)
and those areas which represent a direct
threat to human health (hazardous physi-
cal, chemical and biological factors).
Within the framework of the solution of
priority problems, state environmental
policy programs define objectives in
terms priority, content and timeliness
and suggest those instruments which are
most appropriate for achieving these
goals.
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The role of the Government in the implementation of its
environmental policy was determined to consist of the fol-
lowing responsibilities:
- Amending the existing legal provisions and drafting
new legislation so as to establish new normative, eco-
nomic, informational and institutional instruments for
environmental protection.
- Direct channelling of financial flows (the State bud-
get, the State Environment Fund and the National
Property Fund).
- Indirect channelling of financial flows (the private
sector) .
- Guaranteeing international commitments and obligations.
In the first phase of their formation, the Ministries were
mainly concerned with the creation of the strongest possible
position, based primarily on firm legislation. Between 1990
- 1995, 14 new acts of law, numerous amendments and dozens of
other legal provisions were adopted and enacted to establish
a system of normative, economic, institutional and informa-
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tional instruments to protect the environment in the Czech
Republic.
- Act No. 17/1992 S.B. on environment protection, pro-
vides the basic notions and principles related to the
protection of the environment.
- Obligations relating to EIA are provided in the Act of
the Czech National Council No. 244/1992 S.B. regarding
environmental impact assessments.
- Act of the Czech National Council No. 282/1992 S.B.
regarding the responsibilities of the Czech Environmen-
tal Inspection and its jurisdiction in the protection
of forest areas, to a large degree unifies the control
activities in the sphere of the environment.
- Act of the Czech National Council No. 388/1991 S.B.
regarding the State Environment Fund, unifies State
funding of environmental protection.
- The protection of air is provided in Act No. 309/1991
S.B. regarding the protection of the air from pollut-
ants (amended by Act No. 211/1994 S.B.), in the follow-
up Act No. 389/1991 S.B. regarding obligations for
State administration of air protection and provisions
for air pollution charges (amended by Act No. 212/1994
S.B.) and in other legal provisions.
- The protection of the Earth's ozone layer is governed
by the recent Act No. 86/1995 S.B.
- The protection of water and the provisions related to
water management are provided in Act No. 138/1973 S.B.
and follow-up provisions.
- The geological and mining spheres are governed by Act
No. 44/1988 S.B. on the protection and use of mineral
wealth, by Act No. 61/1988 S.B. on mining activities,
explosives and the State Mining Administration, and by
Act No. 62/1988 S.B. on geological undertakings and
the Czech Geological Office.
- Soil protection is governed by Act No. 334/1992 S.B.
regarding the protection of the agricultural soil fund.
- Nature protection is governed by Act No. 114/1992 S.B.
on nature and landscape protection and the follow-up
provisions.
- The protection of the forest and the principles of for-
est management are provided under Act No. 61/1977 S.B.
(amended by Act No. 229/1991 S.B.) on forest manage-
ment and the State administration of forests.
- The present legal norms regarding waste management pro-
ceed from Act No. 238/1991 S.B. on waste management
and the follow-up provisions.
The Slovak Republic retained some of the federal laws of
the former Czechoslovak Republic and complemented them with
their own laws. The major environmental laws adopted by the
Government of the Slovak Republic are as follows:
- Act No. 17/1992 S.B. on environmental protection;
- Act of the Slovak National Council No. 134/1992 on
state administration of environmental protection;
- Act of the Slovak National Council No. 128/1991 on
242
landscape protection;
* Act of the Slovak National Council No. 311/1992 on the
State Environmental Fund;
* Act No. 218/1992 S.B. on air protection;
- Act of the Slovak National Council No. 238/1993 on
water protection;
- Act of the Slovak National Council No. 183/1993 on for-
est management;
* Act of the Slovak National Council No. 255/1993 on
waste management;
A system of economic instruments was primarily based on
the use of charges. The system of charges includes charges
for the discharge of waste waters into surface waters,
charges for releasing harmful substances into the air,
charges for waste disposal, charges for the requisition of
agricultural land and charges for the withdrawal of ground
water. Revenue collected from these charges (with the excep-
tion of Rate I charges for waste disposal which are paid to
municipalities) is allocated to the State Environment Fund
which, in turn, uses this revenue to provide soft-loans and
grants to finance environmental improvements for municipali-
ties and small and medium-sized enterprises.
In addition, the system of economic instruments also
includes tax relief for products and activities which meet
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environmentally-friendly criteria and allocations from the
State budget. Tax relief for these environmentally-friendly
products and activities includes: reduced VAT taxes, tempo-
rary relief from income taxes, relief from real-estate tax,
temporary relief from road taxes, differentiation of single
emissions.
The implementation of the State environmental policy
yielded many positive results. Between 1990 and 1994, those
processes and policies which had caused environmental dete-
rioration were discontinued and as a result significant
improvements were recorded in the quality of major compo-
nents of the environment (namely in air and surface water
quality). Notwithstanding these accomplishments, certain
problems, such as further reduction of air/water pollution,
waste management, remediation of previously damaged areas
and nature protection, were still eminent and required imme-
diate action by the State. Thus the Ministry of the Environ-
ment of the Czech Republic felt compelled to draft a new
State Environmental Policy Document which was approved by
the Government of the Czech Republic on August 23, 1995. The
reasons which support the implementation and enforcement of
the new policy document are as follows (MECR 1995):
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. The speed and degree to which the transition to a mar-
ket economy has produced positive results. The process
of economic transformation has contributed, by the
removal of the centrally controlled economy, to the
renewal of market relations, the restructuring of the
industrial sector towards production processes which
are less demanding on energy and natural resources and
improvements in the state of the environment. However,
some of the side benefits from the transition process
which contributed to improved environmental quality
have been exhausted and an urgent necessity has arisen
to update existing mechanisms and develop new instru-
ments to continue the positive results attained during
the transition process and to address new needs which
were impossible to anticipate in the early 1990s.
- The necessity to develop an adequate legal and institu-
tional framework for applying civil law to protect
those components of the environment whose character is
appropriate for such legal action. The completion of
the privatization process creates the basic conditions
for the broad implementation of civil law approaches
to the protection of the environment.
- The need to increase the efficiency of environmental
protection policies and to incorporate economic princi-
ples in these policies. The primary objective between
1990 and 1994 was to terminate as quickly as possible
those policies which lead to further deterioration of
the environment and to immediately introduce policies
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which would lead to improvements. Therefore, policy
instruments were implemented based on how quickly they
would become effective. However in some instances
(such as water protection and waste management), this
approach had the unintentional effect of creating pol-
icy instruments which were not optimally efficient.
- The necessity to implement economic policies which
will induce changes in production and consumption pat-
terns and encourage desirable behavior towards the
environment. In conjunction with the environmental pol-
icies of the developed countries, emphasis will
gradually be shifted from normative to economic and
informational instruments which will contribute
towards changes in production and consumption patterns.
- The necessity to inform the private and financial sec-
tors of current and future environmental policies so
as to create a stable investment climate. Information
relating to the environmental intents and priorities
of the State is of fundamental importance to domestic
and foreign investors, entrepreneurs and financiers.
- The need to support entrepreneurial activities in the
environmental protection area and the introduction of
environmentally friendly technologies. In the devel-
oped countries, the development and trade of
equipment, technologies and services for environmental
protection has surged over the last decade. It has
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been estimated that, on a world scale, the market for
such equipment and technologies (especially air and
water protection and waste management) will reach the
value of approximately USD 250 billion in 1995.
To facilitate the Czech Republic's accession to inter-
national organizations and harmonize the CR's legal
system with developed countries. Environmental prob-
lems are increasingly becoming central issues for the
international community and they frequently receive
priority on the agendas of international organizations
both within and outside of the UN system. This trend
is reflected in the activities of international bodies
such as the UNEP and the UNCSD. Practically all devel-
oped countries have formulated their environmental
policy in the form of a government policy document as
evidenced by the European Union's ongoing formulation
of environmental action programs (which has completed
its fifth program). The evaluation of a state's envi-
ronmental policy, legal norms and environmental
standards is a critical element for consideration in
the admission process to international organizations
(especially with regard to the admission procedures of
the OECD and the European Union).
. To comply and respond to new developments and recommen-
dations stemming from important international
activities and events. The Czech Republic supports
both global and regional commitments made at numerous
international environmental conferences and is
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actively involved in offering ongoing support and fol-
low-up to these commitments. The most important of
these conferences for the CR were the UN Conference
held in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro, the 1993 ministerial
conference "Environment for Europe" held in Lucerne,
the 1994 ministerial conference "Environment and
Health for Europe" held in Helsinki and the 1995 minis-
terial conference "Sustainable Production and
Consumption" held in Oslo. In addition, an important
contribution made by the Czech Republic to this pro-
cess was the sponsorship of the 1991 ministerial
conference, held in Dobris and the 1995 symposium "Eco-
nomic Instruments for Sustainable Development" held in
Pruhonice near Prague.
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Figure A.5: Concentrations of SO 2 in the CR by District 1989-1993
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Figure A.6: Concentrations of NOx in the CR by District 1989-1993
Figure A.7: Concentrations of Particulates in the CR by District 1989-1993
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A.2. The Pulp Production Modernization Case
Figure A.12: SEPAP Plant in Steti
The pulp production, located next to the town of Steti,
Northern Bohemia, grew out of an old cardboard producing
factory. The production facilities are about 50 kilometers
from Prague along the bank of the Elbe River. The site occu-
pies an area of 132 hectares and consists of 252 buildings.
The covered area is 277,996 square meters, with a total floor
area of approximately 445,000 square meters.
The pulp in Steti is produced by SEPAP (the North Bohemian
Paper Works) enterprise, the largest integrated paper mill
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in the Czech Republic. SEPAP is the only producer of kraft
pulp and the largest paper manufacturer in the Czech Repub-
lic. The work force of SEPAP Steti totals approximately
2,400 full-time staff working 52 weeks per year on a three
shift, eight hour per day basis.
A kraft batch cooking started in Steti at the end of
1950's. Bisulphite cooking was put in operation in 1963
(both closed down and demolished between 1991-2). Along with
pulp production, paper manufacturing proceeded as well.
Three paper machines were added between 1954-1957 to make
test liner, bleached wrapping paper, and unbleached wrapping
paper. Another paper machine, producing newsprint, was con-
structed in 1963. A paper sacks plant started production in
1966.
The second stage of SEPAP complex modernization took place
between 1973 and 1975. The enterprise was enhanced of a new
Kamyr continuous pulp plant, pulp bleaching plant, recovery
boiler (closed down and demolished), water treatment plant,
and the fifth paper machine producing sack paper.
The third stage of the enterprise modernization started in
1985. At that time, SEPAP was one of the largest discharges
of AOX and COD to the Elbe River. For example, the AOX-load-
ing from SEPAP was higher than that from the eight largest
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chemical and pharmaceutical plants and paper mills that were
monitored in the Elbe River basis. As a response to this
unfavorable situation, a long term plan was designed for
capacity increase and a step-by- step pulp and bleaching
plants modernization from which the main air and water pol-
lution load was coming.
The Kamyr pulp production process basically consists of
the "cooking" of wood chips at 170 degrees Celsius and 12
bar (a) with "white liquor" (a solution of sodium hydroxide
and sodium sulphite) in a continuous reactor in order to sep-
arate the cellulose fibers in the wood from the unwanted lig-
nin. The products of the reaction are washed with water in a
three stage process to produce washed pulp and "black
liquor", which is treated in the recovery section. Part of
the pulp is then bleached in the pulp bleaching plant for use
in production of white paper. Because lignin removed by
bleaching cannot be treated in the recovery section, bleach-
ing of Kamyr pulp (kappa number of 40-45) imposes a great
demand on the waste water treatment plant. Also, it requires
high consumption of bleaching chemicals. Among them, elemen-
tal chlorine and sodium hypochlorite are highly harmful sub-
stances when discharged into water but difficult to remove
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in a biological waste treatment plant (SEPAP is equipped
with only the secondary treatment).
Further, transportation and storage of gas-chlorine used
in bleaching processes poses a significant health and safety
risk. Gas-chlorine is highly poisonous gas which, if acci-
dentally released, could be fatal not only to workers in the
plant, but also to the population of the town of Steti. Gas-
chlorine is transported in railway cars from a chemical
plant about 40 km distant and hard piped from the rail car
directly to the appropriate points in production processes.
Emergency plans for evacuation of the town were prepared in
case of accident.
Thus the main goals of the modernization program were
reduction of the load of pollutants released from the plants
and elimination of chlorine from production processes.
Figure A.13: below shows actions towards environmental pro-
tection in SEPAP Steti.
During 1991, the obsolete and environmentally non-compati-
ble NA-bisulphite cooking plant and conventional batch cook-
ing plant were taken out of operation. A new washing and
screening plant for bleached kraft was installed. At the
same time, the bleaching plant modernization started by
replacing the first two bleaching stages and introducing
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. shutting the Na-Bisulphite cooking 1991-1992
. shutting the old kraft batch cooking 1991-1992
- new washing and screening plant 1991
- new kraft cooking plant (Super Batch) 1993
. first phase of bleach plant modernization 1991
. reconstruction of the bleaching chemical plant 1994
- production of ECF-bleached pulp 1994
- new bleaching plant, TCF-bleaching 1995
. odorous gas handling system 1993
Figure A.13: Actions Toward Environmental Protection in SEPAP
oxygen and peroxide into the alkaline extraction process.
This step reduced demand on use of elementary chlorine by
50%.
The initial contracts for modernization were concluded
before the political change in 1989 started. At that time,
SEPAP was limited by the constraints of the old centrally
planed system that did not allow it to engage in direct trade
with western countries. All trade had to be handled through
state international trade organizations. For this reason,
SEPAP found it very difficult to obtain resources to pur-
chase equipment abroad and to negotiate with the suppliers.
The first supplies of machinery were arranged as long term
leases with option to purchase the equipment at the end of
the leasing period. The leasing continued even after the
261
economic change in 1989 primarily because it was difficult
to obtain long term loans from domestic banks. However, the
banks were willing to provide guarantees for the leases.
By the time the initial steps in the modernization program
were implemented, the socio-economic context shifted outside
the enterprise. The former Czechoslovakia launched on the
transition process. New laws were written, economic situa-
tion changed, and political processes turned turbulent.
Environmental issues became politicized suddenly occupying
top of government priority list.
As a result of the heightened public awareness, the SEPAP
riding on the new wave of interest in environmental issues
was able to obtain state grants for its environmental
projects. Between 1990-1992, the State Environmental Fund
and the Special Government Program for Cleaning Air Pollu-
tion in priority regions of the country allocated grants to
SEPAP. The former granted 47.7 million KC for odorous gas
handling system and 300 million KC for water treatment
plant. The later allocated 15 million KC for bleach plant
modernization.
But, the heightened interest in environmental issues
brought about by political liberalization also turned public
eye on the SEPAP plants. The local community found its voice
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to speak up against local environmental issues caused by
SEPAP. They were particularly concerned about dust, risk of
transporting gas- chlorine, and foul odors escaping from the
plant and the sludge field (hydrogen sulphite, mercaptan)
that invaded their community's air. After receiving com-
plaints from the surrounding community, the State Environ-
mental Inspection ordered SEPAP to control the odors
escaping from the plant. The project to control odors
received high priority and was quickly implemented at the
cost of 250 million KC. But some managers saw this project as
an end-of pipe solution which burdened the firm financially
while bringing little profit back.
Following the lesson with the project for controlling foul
odors, the management was determined to pursue environmental
improvements in parallel with production increases through
technological modernization. But further progress of modern-
ization depended on how quickly the firm could pay off the
1.2 billion KC on loans from the previous modernization
projects and secure new financing. It was also determined by
the physical design of the plants and machinery that allowed
some solutions while prevented others.
A particularly burdensome heritage of the past planning in
the way of modernization was a reconstruction of the news-
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print machine planned and contracted out shortly before the
political change. The machine, reconstructed at the expense
of 2 billion KC, was to supply guaranteed home market of
official party newspaper publishers. However, when the
machine was being reconstructed in 1991 and supplies of
paper were discontinued for four months, foreign exporters
quickly seized their opportunity to sign long term supply
contracts with domestic customers. When SEPAP put the recon-
structed machine back in operation, the former monopolist
producer could only sell enough newsprint to use 50% of its
capacity. Further, the new Czechoslovak Government was not
able to provide financing for the reconstruction ordered by
the old administration. The SEPAP had to pay all the con-
tracts from its own pocket.
The SEPAP went into privatization in the first wave of
coupon privatization in 1992 and majority of its shares were
picked up in the first round of bidding by the four invest-
ment funds. On July 1, 1992, SEPAP introduced organizational
changes which incorporated its five divisions as subsidiar-
ies. The SEPAP Holding controlled SEPAP Steti, Bela pod Bez-
dezem, Ceska Kamenice, Jablonec nad Nisou and Zatec.
Following the reorganization, each subsidiary operated as an
independent legal and economic unit. SEPAP Steti, the larg-
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est subsidiary in the group, was 77.3% owned by the SEPAP
Holding. These shares were not publicly traded. The remain-
ing 22.7% of the company was held by Technopol, a Slovak for-
eign trade firm, which agreed to swap Steti's debt for equity
in the firm. Shares issued to Technopol were publicly
traded.
Instead of waiting until early 1993 when shares were to be
allocated in exchange for investment points, Mr. Sabatka,
SEPAP's CEO, obtained approval from the National Property
Fund to appoint the heads of the investment funds to SEPAP's
board of directors. Consequently, the first quasi-sharehold-
ers meeting could take place as early as in August 1992. Thus
the shareholders were allowed to look at SEPAP's deals from
the outset as well as review strategic decisions and ques-
tion what the management did. Sabatka felt it was important
to establish a relationship with the major shareowners
straightway and to have a decision-making body in place to
negotiate with potential investors and joint venture part-
ners.
In order to free SEPAP Steti of the burden of the news-
print production and the associated financial obligations, a
subsidiary of SEPAP Steti, ROTO a.s. was formed as a joint
venture with Austrian paper company Leykam Murztaler just
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two months after the first official session of the board of
directors in October 1992. Under the agreement, Leykam would
provide technological know-how and sales and marketing
expertise. The SEPAP's directors hoped that the venture
would help SEPAP reach its newsprint capacity of 100,000
tons per year.
To support its restructuring and privatization program,
SEPAP received technical assistance from the European Commu-
nity within the PHARE program. The company devised strategy
to focus its core business on production of kraft pulp, sack
paper and sacks, lineboard, and newsprint and to make its
operations more efficient. A key rationalization measure
devised was reduction in personnel, streamlining the organi-
zational structure of the company and selling off the four
subsidiaries that were not in its core business.
In line with its overall restructuring and recapitaliza-
tion effort, the company started to strengthen management in
1994. In this context, two full-time top western managers
were recruited. Mr. Rolf Norman, Vice President, Marketing
and Production (Swedish) has over 25 years of managerial
experience in pulp and paper. Mr. Mel Racinsky, Vice Presi-
dent, Finance (Canada) has 19 years of banking experience
with the Royal Bank of Canada. These two managers joined Mr.
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Tomas Sabatka, the General Manager, who has over 20 years
experience. He progressed from a trainee in Steti to his cur-
rent position.
The company also hoped to find a strategic joint venture
partner to invest money and transfer technology. However, a
partner was difficult to come by when the company was in debt
and turning little profit. Western competitors seemed more
interested in exporting from their domestic markets than
investing in a local producer. The Scandinavian paper mills
could not lay off their own workers for political reasons,
even when they faced production overcapacity. There was pro-
duction oversupply in the market and prices were falling in
Europe.
Throughout the company reorganization and in spite of
financially difficult situation, SEPAP continued investing
in its modernization project (Figure A.14:Figure A.15:Figure
A.16:Figure A.17:). In 1991, it started building a new kraft
cooking plant (SuperBatch) supplied by Sunds Defibrator.
SuperBatch cooking is a modern displacement cooking method
capable of extending the cooking to very low kappa numbers.
Kappa number 12 was the design basis for SEPAP's plant. The
new plant would increase production capacity to 150,000 t/
year of pulp while facilitate a significant reduction of the
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bleaching chemical consumption followed by less chlorinated
organic compounds discharged from bleaching. The SuperBatch
plant was put in operation in March 1993.
The next step in the modernization process anticipated
construction of Oxygen Delignification plant, and completion
of bleaching plant modernization. This step would enable
SEPAP to eliminate the use of elementary chlorine from its
pulping operations and transfer to elementary chlorine free
(ECF) production of paper.
Oxygen delignification was developed to be the most cost
effective tool to decrease pollution associated with chemi-
cal pulp bleaching. Because oxygen delignification would
make it possible to reach very low kappa number prior to
bleaching, the bleaching process may substitute less effec-
tive but environmentally sound oxygen, hydrogen peroxide
and/or ozone for more effective but environmentally harmful
chlorine gas. Also, roughly 40-50% of the lignin remaining
after the cooking process is removed in the oxygen stage. By
counter current washing, the dissolved lignin is brought
back to the recovery boiler. Consequently, the amount of
organic materials discharged from the subsequent bleaching
process can be decreased by the same extent. Thus the con-
sumption of chlorine chemicals and discharge of chlorinated
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organic substances would be decreased by oxygen delignifica-
tion. The environmental features of introducing this tech-
nology are as follows:
. 60 percent reduction in COD;
- 70 percent reduction in color;
* 40-80 percent reduction in AOX;
The completion of the project required further 350 million
crowns for oxygen delignification and 400 million crowns for
the peroxide stage. SEPAP's own resources were drained out
by the previous capital investments. By 1994, SEPAP had
invested 790 million for capital expenditures from its own
resources. Washing line, cooking plant, and one part of
bleaching line were finished and on stream. Chlorine dioxide
plant was being upgraded and expected to start up in August
1994 so that production of elementary chlorine free (ECF)
pulp could begin. To finalize the project and to gain maximal
environmental benefits, two hydrogen peroxide stages in the
bleaching plant and the oxygen delignification plant had to
be built. This last step would enable SEPAP to produce
totally chlorine free paper (TCF).
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In 1994, financing for the last step of modernization was
unavailable from domestic sources. Grant money no longer
went to industrial enterprises; only municipalities were
eligible. Domestic banks provided only short term loans with
a high interest and no grace period. Also, the amount of loan
exceeded available resources of domestic banks. But even
foreign financing was difficult to obtain because the Czech
government was refusing to issue sovereign guarantees com-
monly required by foreign banks. Foreign commercial banks
were reluctant to finance a 100% Czech company in such a dif-
ficult industry.
Under normal circumstances, companies in pulp and paper
business accumulate substantial cash reserves during upturn
which they use in downturn either for covering their losses
or for investing into new technology in order to be prepared
for the next upturn. However, the SEPAP entered the downturn
drained by the former central planning system of its finan-
cial reserves.
Finally, the SEPAP contacted the EBRD in London to provide
the loan of 58.89 million ECU which was signed on July 25,
1995. The loan proved important not only to the SEPAP, but
also to the EBRD for whom it was the largest private sector
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loan ever made in the Czech Republic. The loan had the fol-
lowing objectives:
. to improve environment and increase competitiveness by
investing in state of the art technology for totally
chlorine free pulp production;
- to increase capacity of pulp and paper production;
- to modernize production facilities;
e to improve quality of paper production;
- to encourage commercial bank participation in a purely
Czech project through syndication.
The loan was made for maximum of 7.5 years with one year
grace period.
Shortly before the loan with the EBRD was signed (on July
20, 1995), AssiDoman, the Swedish conglomerate and one of
the world's top ten paper manufacturers, acquired 22.7%
stake in SEPAP Steti for undisclosed amount. This stake was
formerly held by Technopol Bratislava. AssiDoman also
pledged to invest between 1 and 2 billion crowns in the SEPAP
plant by the end of the year. It also signed undisclosed
agreement on technological cooperation and transfer of know-
how.
On August 31, 1995, SEPAP Holding merged with SEPAP Steti
as planned before. SEPAP took over the property and payables
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of Sepap Steti. AssiDoman also increased its stake over the
summer to 34% as pledged.
Consequent to the loan, environmental developments at
Steti will be closely monitored by the EBRD whose require-
ments for environmental monitoring include:
- submission to the Bank of the detailed work plan for
proposed soil and ground water investigation, for
review and proposal;
. presentation to the Bank of the final report on soil
and ground water investigation, and reporting on
related consultations with the authorities;
e annual reporting to the Bank on environmental issues
associated with the plant, and notification in case of
emergencies with significant environmental impact or
effect on worker's health and safety;
- annual updates on any use of bleaching chemicals;
e reporting to the Bank on public interaction.
Throughout the restructuring and modernization process,
SEPAP actively promoted public information by means of regu-
lar publication of environmental results and discussions of
environmental issues and technical updates in the local
newspaper (SITO). SEPAP's public relations manager attends
all town of Steti meetings in his capacity as a town council-
lor. Financial transparency and accountability was increased
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by inviting a reputable international auditor, Arthur Ander-
sen Consulting, to review company's accounts and financial
results and by making them publicly available in the com-
pany's annual report.
Securing wood supplies, the main production input, also
represents a significant area of interaction with the out-
side of the company. The supply of sustainably grown and har-
vested wood is critical not only to meeting the policy
requirements of the EBRD, but also to satisfying client
demands, given that Steti is targeting an ecologically aware
export market.
The logs supplied to Steti are purchased from regional
Czech forest consortia, including public and private owners,
and from wood trading companies. These suppliers operate
under licensing and control by the Forest Authorities. For-
est ownership in the Czech Republic is subject to a national
Forest Management Plan, based on sustainability principles,
dating back to the nineteenth century and revised on a ten-
year basis by the Ministry of the Agriculture. Implementa-
tion of the plan is enforced by the Ministry of the Environ-
ment via inspections.
The company long term development plans were shaken when
Stratton Investments, a US investor, launched a carefully
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stage-managed raid on the Czech industry. Stratton bought
large stakes in eight Czech companies in a $140 million deal
with Harvard Investment Fund, the majority owner of SEPAP.
The two investment companies became majority share holders
of SEPAP effectively preventing AssiDoman from completing
its long term strategic plans of increasing investment and
control in SEPAP. At that time, there was no obligation on
shareholders in Czech companies to disclose their interests.
This enabled the deal to be done silently over the preceding
few months. Nomura Equity Research was quoted as observing
that the Stratton move was "less like an injection of manage-
ment expertise into the Czech industrial sector than an
attempt to make AssiDoman pay a fuller price for its intended
acquisition of SEPAP."
A.2.1. Environment Development Interaction in Pulp Plant Mod-
ernization
The chlorine free technology is the latest equipment
available on the market and represents the "greenest" solu-
tion available in pulp and paper production. The following
values of COD and AOX are volumes produced by different
stages of production process (Table A.1: on page 279). Vol-
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umes at the end of pipe (River Elbe) are lower because they
are treated in waste treatment plant whose efficiency is 55%
for COD and 23% for AOX.
Phase of the project COD AOX(tly) (tly)
Phase A - the situation before the 7000-8000 800
project
Kamyr digester; chlorine bleaching
100 thousand tons of pulp per year
Phase B - the current situation 3500-4000 400
Super Batch cooking plant, chlorine
bleaching 100 thousand tons of pulp
per year
Phase C - financed by CROCO 2300 140
Super Batch cooking plant, oxygen
delignification, ECF bleaching 140
thousand tons of pulp per year
Phase D - the final step 2300 10
Super Batch cooking plant, oxygen
delignification, TCF bleaching 140
thousand tons of pulp per year
Table A.1: Volumes of Pollutants Discharged from Production Processes in SEPAP
by Stages of Modernization
Further environmental benefits of the project are due to
environmental audit required as a condition to financing
from the EBRD. The audit looked particularly at non compli-
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ance issues, potential liabilities associated with current
or past site use, energy utilization, and wood supply for
pulp and paper production. The audit found
- non compliance issues existed in the areas of air emis-
sions; waste water discharges to the River Elbe,
including industrial effluent and storm water runoff,
and waste management;
- there was a potential liability arising from existing
subsurface contamination and activities of third par-
ties operating on site;
* municipal waste was disposed at the facility landfill;
- energy utilization and inefficiency at SEPAP consti-
tuted a major share of production costs and
represented an area with significant environmental
impact, primarily from air emissions, similarly to
most pulp and paper production facilities;
. wood supply: the supply of sustainably grown and har-
vested wood is critical not only to meeting the policy
requirements of the Bank, but also to satisfying cli-
ent demands, considering the SEPAP was targeting an
ecologically aware export market.
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Consequent to the environmental audit, an Environmental
Management Plan was devised that will address the above
issues.
Demand for TCF pulp (totally chlorine free) originated in
Germany in 1989 in response to active campaigning by Green-
peace to eliminate use of chlorine and chlorine compounds in
bleaching. The issue was supported by integrated sulphite
paper producers in Germany and Austria. Sulphite pulp pro-
ducers find it relatively inexpensive to eliminate chlorine
and chlorine dioxide in bleaching and replace this with
hydrogen peroxide to produce pulp of acceptable brightness.
Bleached kraft (i.e. sulphate) pulp producers have
responded by dramatically reducing use of elemental chlorine
and substituting chlorine dioxide to produce ECF (elemental
chlorine free) pulp in quality comparable in strength and
brightness to standard grades. Today, the production of TCF
is a result of market demand and legislation and pertains
primarily to German speaking Europe and partially to Nordic
countries. The TCF issue is less significant in other coun-
tries where ECF process is generally considered as suffi-
cient in its capability to protect the environment.
By 1993, ECF pulp became a standard in Western Europe (77%
of total bleached pulp sales). The TCF pulp represented 13%
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of bleached pulp sales in Europe, but in Germany it counted
for 22.5%, in Austria 35%, in Switzerland 33%. Today it is
practically impossible to sell chlorine bleached pulp in
Germany. Many producers in Germany, Switzerland, and Austria
demand only TCF pulp for their use (particularly tissue pro-
ducers and some printing paper producers). Moreover, sul-
phate pulp is not produced in Germany because of public
opposition to foul odors accompanying all sulphate pulp pro-
duction. The craft pulp producers in the former East Germany
were also closed down after the unification. Thus Germany
offers a unique opportunity of being the biggest pulp and
paper market in Europe, but where no sulphate pulp is pro-
duced. It is also a market of demanding and environmentally
aware consumers. Switching to ECF and TCF pulp and paper pro-
vides SEPAP a unique opportunity to introduce new product on
German market and increase production capacity at the same
time. SEPAP will also improve quality of its products and
increase portion of higher value added products. SEPAP's
competitive advantage lies in its geographical proximity
which reduces transportation costs to market, and in lower
labor and wood costs. The improved quality is necessary to
compete successfully in key export markets: Germany, Italy,
France, and Benelux. The response to the environmental issue
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(production of TCF and ECF pulp) is instrumental to entering
the German market with pulp, as the German market requires
this type of pulp. Totally chlorine free technology is the
latest equipment available on the market and represents the
"greenest" solution available in pulp and paper production.
By reducing bleaching cost by half, the technology also rep-
resents substantial cost savings. Both pulp and paper mar-
kets are cyclical. The last industry cycle bottomed out in
1993 and prices for pulp and paper have been rising since
early 1994. The company believes that investing in increas-
ing production capacity in the time of recession saves the
company large sums of money because suppliers and construc-
tion companies facing decline in demand reduce their prices.
The SEPAP's modernization falls partly into such a slump
demand. Also, devaluation of Swedish currency reduced pay-
ments to those Swedish suppliers of machinery who already
signed their contracts.
SEPAP has little competition domestically. It is the only
Czech producer of sulphate softwood pulp. Two other compa-
nies are suppliers of pulp to the Czech Republic - Biocel
Paskov and SCP Ruzomberok, Slovakia. Neither of them is a
serious competitor. Biocel produces sulphite pulp which com-
petes with sulphate paper only on the margin; Rozumberok
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produces hardwood sulphate pulp which has shorter fiber than
softwood and thus also cannot substitute for Steti's prod-
uct. The only other producer of pulp is JIP which uses all of
its sulphite pulp in its own paper production.
In the domestic market, the key customers of SEPAP are
cement works buying paper sacks. Demand for this product is
expected to grow due to increased construction and renova-
tion activity and consequent higher retail sales of cement.
In the long term, however, the demand may turn into a decline
once the peak years of renovation work are over.
Within its industry, Steti is very cost competitive. Dis-
tribution costs, labor and wood are the main components in
which Steti has an advantage in the supply of bleached soft-
wood kraft pulp. Steti's pulp production lines have a total
capacity of 350,000 t/a which will be raised to 390,000. With
its current size Steti belongs to the medium-sized pulp
mills, the most modern pulp mills in Europe have a capacity
of 500,000 t/a.
In all its production lines, Steti's competitive advantage
lies primarily in lower labor costs, strategic location, its
integration with pulp production as well as favorable wood
costs. Labor costs in Steti are only one tenth or even less
of those in the Western European paper industry. At current
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exchange rates, Steti's wood costs are comparable with those
of Austrian mills, but lower than those of Scandinavian
mills and not far higher than the wood costs of the low-cost
North American producers. By investing into TCF technology,
Steti will become after Scandinavian companies one of the
first companies in the world producing TCF, directly compet-
ing with the best pulp companies.
Current major cost disadvantage of Steti lies in energy
costs. Purchased power prices are higher than in Scandinavia
though lower that in other Western European countries.
Energy consumption in Steti is very high in comparison with
other European producers. The EBRD is currently exploring
assistance to Steti in this area. Improving energy effi-
ciency would bring further environmental and economic bene-
fits.
Modernization of Steti is expected to have important
employment impact. SEPAP is the sole employer in city of
Steti and a major one in the whole region. The project will
have an impact on almost 2,700 current employees.
The Czech Republic will also derive economic benefit from
strengthened export abilities of the country (almost 2% of
country's export) and support of economic growth. Due to the
size of Steti, the project will have a substantial multi-
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plier effect on regional economy. The positive economic ben-
efit is somewhat reduced by undervalued Czech currency
together with net inflow of foreign currency. The calcula-
tion of the economic rate of return was not performed because
the company does not benefit from any subsidies. The ERR
would be higher than the IIR, essentially influenced by the
amount of taxes paid by the company. The Internal Rate of
Return was positive. Sensitivity analyses showed that the
IRR would decline slightly if CSK appreciated.
A.3. The Power Plants Modernization Case
Czech Republic power demand is serviced by electric util-
ity Czech Energy Enterprises (CEZ) which dominates the coun-
try. CEZ supplies all the households and most of industry in
the Czech Republic. A small fraction of capacity is derived
from industries generating their own power, with any surplus
being sold into the grid. CEZ capacity totals about 10,235 MW
out of the country's total capacity of 13,826 MW. Of this,
about 7,257 MW is generated by fossil fuels, 1,218 MW by
hydro and 1,760 MW by nuclear. The power system is heavily
dependent on coal. Primarily, brown coal of low calorific
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Figure A.18: Power Plants in Northern Bohemia
value and high sulphur content is used. This coal burned
without desulphurization equipment results in high emissions
of sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, and fly ash.
The main coal power plants are concentrated in the North
Bohemia region and include Melnik II, III, Pocerady I, II,
Prunerov I, II, Tusimice I, II, Ledvice I,II, and Tisova I,II
(Table A.2: on page 288).
The predecessor of the Czech Energy Enterprises (CEZ), the
Czechoslovak Energy Enterprises, was first established in
1945. At that time, it managed seven energy enterprises. In
the early 1950's, the CEZ was dismantled when its role was
taken over by the state administration. The energy enter-
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Table A.2: Coal Fired Power Plants Operated by CEZ (by 12/31/1994)
Power plant fuel capacity MW year
commissioned
Tisova I brown coal 2x50,2x55, 1x12 1959-1960
Tisova II brown coal 1x100 1961
Prunerov I brown coal 4x110 1967-1968
Prunerov II brown coal 5x210 1981-1982
Tusimice I brown coal 2x110 1963-1964
Tusimice I brown coal 4x200 1974-1975
Pocerady I brown coal 3x200 1970-1971
Pocerady II brown coal 2x200 1977
Ledvice I brown coal 1x200 1967
Ledvice II brown coal 3x110 1966-1969
Melnik II brown coal 4x110 1971
Melnik III brown coal 1x5OO 1981
Chvaletice brown coal 4x200 1977-1978
Dvur Kralove brown coal 1x6,3/1x12 1955,1963
Porici black coal 3x55 1957-1958
Nachod brown coal 1x5/1x12 1950,1969
Hodonin lignite 1x55/2x50 1954-1958
Detmarovice black coal 4x200 1975-1976
total 7,257
prises were then managed by the department called the Main
Administration of Power Plants. This organization was part
of the Ministry of Energy between 1954-1958. From 1952 to
1956, power generation was managed through six "energy
trusts" - Praha, Most, Hradec Kralove, Brno, Ostrava, and
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Bratislava. In 1956, the Energy Trusts were replaced by
three Main Administrations - Praha, Ostrava, and Bratislava.
Another special administrative unit, the Czechoslovak State
Energy Dispatching Center, was established in 1956 to ensure
efficient utilization of power and to equalize load in the
power transmission system. From 1956, the top administrative
unit in power production was the Central Energy Administra-
tion.
The new history of the CEZ began on July 1, 1965, when
part of the Central Energy Administration was joined with
the Czechoslovak State Energy Dispatching Center to form the
Czechoslovak Energy Enterprises. The CEZ grew into a large
state owned vertically integrated monopoly organization
employing almost 58,000 people.
With the establishment of the Czechoslovak federal system
of government, the Czechoslovak Energy Enterprises were
divided into two national companies - the Czech Energy
Enterprises (CEZ) and the Slovak Energy Enterprises (SEP).
This division came into force from January 1, 1969.
Another transition awaited CEZ after the economic and
political reforms of 1989. In 1990, the power distribution
utilities (REAS) were separated out from the CEZ to form
autonomous state owned enterprises in order to reduce monop-
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oly power of the CEZ. Eight independent power distribution
companies were formed as follows:
. Prague Power Works
. Middle-Bohemian Power Works
- South-Bohemian Power Works
- West-Bohemian Power Works
e North-Bohemian Power Works
. East-Bohemian Power Works
- South-Moravian Power Works
- North-Moravian Power Works
The CEZ was further restructured by the decision of the
Economic Advisory Council of the Government of the Czech
Republic from April 14, 1992. The state privatization
project divided the CEZ into three separate organizations:
the CEZ, a.s. (49,181 million KC), ENERGOVOD, a.s. (346 mil-
lion KC), and ORGREZ, a.s. (98 million KC). Consequently,
the CEZ was transformed into a joint-stock company 100%
state owned but able to plan raising capital through partial
privatization. The company submitted a plan to the govern-
ment proposing that 30% of its shares be included in the
first wave of the voucher privatization taking place between
the end of May and 9 June, 1992. The plan was approved by the
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government and the shares sold to the public. The National
Property Fund kept 71% ownership after the first wave of
privatization and then reduced it to 67% in the second wave.
The economic ministry decided to give the state the 67%
golden share until an energy policy is devised for the Czech
Republic later on. The management at CEZ hoped that the early
sell-off would help to secure bank loans for its program to
raise money for environmental improvements and moderniza-
tion.
Further restructuring proceeded on basis of individual
privatization projects which spun off the following enter-
prises from the CEZ: Heat Enterprises Prague (4,225,473
thousand KC), Power Plant Opatovice (1,170,419 thousand KC),
South Moravian Energy Enterprises (926,439 KC), Ostrava-
Karvina Energy Enterprises (2,743,583 thousand KC), Teplice
Machine Works (235,791 thousand KC), Energy Machine Works
Brno (152,156 thousand KC), Energy Machine Works Velke
Mezirici (96,890 thousand KC), Energy Shops Pardubice
(46,339 thousand KC), Energy Construction Liberec (145,183
thousand KC). These restructurings and privatizations were
lead by the logic of focusing the CEZ on its core business of
electricity generation, transmission, and sale. The new com-
panies spun off were mostly in the business of heat genera-
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tion or power plant maintenance. At the end of the
restructuring, number of CEZ's employees dropped from 58
thousand to 17 thousand.
Internally, the CEZ was struggling with disintegrating
forces unleashed by the political and economic changes. Anx-
iety caused by the past practice of gathering financial
resources in the center and redistributing them according to
political influence and personal favoritism drove individual
organizational units of the CEZ to demand autonomy. They
were particularly concerned that financial means required
for modernization of their individual power plants would
instead be diverted to completion of the nuclear power plant
in Temelin. The expense of this project (about 40% of CEZ
capital expenditure plan) would mean that they would subsi-
dize construction of a plant that would make them ultimately
obsolescent, perhaps out of job.
At the peak of the controversy, union members at the
Northwest Electric Works protested to the Czech prime minis-
ter Vaclav Klaus about the way the CEZ was being privatized.
They demanded that the supply monopoly is broken up into five
smaller, competing companies as outlined in their privatiza-
tion proposal which would have made their unit independent
from CEZ.
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The senior management of the CEZ disagreed with immediate
vertical disintegration that would lead to the establishment
of several independent electricity generating companies and
a national grid company. They viewed such efforts as "unwise
and irresponsible", unless supported by a regulatory body
ensuring reliability of supply. If disintegration went
ahead, CEZ's ability to raise the legally required $2 bil-
lion for pollution control equipment to its coal-fired power
plants would be dissipitated amongst several small compa-
nies. Disintegrated enterprises, they argued, operating in a
competitive market with consumption levels falling "would
provoke 'dumping prices', not facilitating large ecology
project investment, nor power station rehabilitation and,
above that, resulting incorrect price-signals could be sent
to consumers." They also pointed out that CEZ already had "a
painful lack of proficient, capable, well-trained, market-
oriented managers even in the existing structure." A disin-
tegrated industry would only exacerbate the problem.
During this period of organizational restructuring and
privatization, the CEZ came under intensive pressure from
the public who just found political freedom to express their
concerns. Public discontent with the CEZ focused primarily
on air pollution in Northern Bohemia and its environmental
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and public health consequences. This issue was closely
linked with looking for alternatives to energy generation in
thermal power plants. It appeared that the only viable long
term option for the country was in direction of nuclear power
generation. However, this solution also attracted many vocal
opponents.
Due to the heritage of past planning, most of the large
thermal power plants operated by the CEZ were concentrated
on a relatively small area in Northern Bohemia. The power
sector relied heavily on these coal-fired power plants burn-
ing low-quality high- sulphur lignite which was mined in the
region. They represented the largest polluter in the country
in regard to S02 and dust (fly-ash and particulate matter).
The extensive use of lignite during the past 40 years
resulted in a large environmental damage which was particu-
larly serious in Northern Bohemia region where large parts
of the forests have died and health of the population was
declining. During incidents of air inversions, which were
exacerbated by poor ventilation due to surrounding moun-
tains, local people frustrated with the situation gathered
and threatened to occupy the power plants and close them down
by force.
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While the population of Northern Bohemia was expressing
their frustration with air pollution caused by the CEZ oper-
ated plants, South Bohemian population supported by interna-
tional and domestic radical environmental groups engaged the
CEZ in a protracted conflict over completion of the nuclear
power plant in Temelin. The issue of the nuclear power plant
gained on salience when the neighboring Austria took steps
to protest completion of the Temelin plant in various inter-
national fora claiming that the plant, built according to
Soviet design, was inherently unsafe even if it were
equipped with modern Western control instrumentation.
During the period of political turbulence of 1991, the
Czechoslovak Federal Committee for the Environment passed a
new Air Pollution Law #309/91. This law was followed by a
Resolution of the Federal Committee for the Environment from
June 23, 1992 which specified strict standards on sulphur
dioxide (SO2), nitride oxides (NOx), particulate matter, and
carbon monoxide (CO) for stationary sources of emissions
with thermal energy output above 5 MW. These strict stan-
dards applied to new sources of emissions. For the existing
sources of emissions, the law provided for a scale up period
of 7 years within which all the major sources of air pollu-
tion would, be required to comply. Consequently, departments
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of the Czech Environment Inspection issued specific permits
and schedules for individual sources within which they had
to comply. The latest date specified by the law for coming to
compliance was given as December 31, 1998.
The standards adopted in the new law were intended to
bring the country up and harmonize it with practices in the
European Union to whose membership the Czech and Slovak
Republics aspired. Needless to say, none of the CEZ's power
plants was equipped with pollution control device that would
be in compliance with requirements of the new law.
In the past, the CEZ made one costly experiment with a
prototype of a Soviet designed flue gas desulphurization
unit to clean air emissions from its power plant. The Soviet
technology was never tested in operation before, but the CEZ
did not have the freedom to choose technological designs at
that time. The political decision of the supervising agency
prevailed so that the CEZ had to tie itself to the Soviet
supplier. Unfortunately, the Soviet supplier never managed
to put the scrubber into proper operating condition. Build-
ings were constructed, equipment purchased, but the scrubber
never worked. The CEZ wasted 1,500 million KC on this ill
fated experiment.
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After this disturbing experience, the CEZ decided against
further experimentation. Fortunately, opportunity opened to
work with established industry contractors with a sufficient
experience and a record of past successful constructions.
Also, the CEZ sought to improve its battered image of the
worst polluter in the Czech Republic who was ignorant of
environmental and health damage imposed by its operations.
When the new air pollution law was passed, the CEZ did not
contest it. Instead, it defined its problem as a need to com-
ply with the regulation and to improve its public image. It
embarked on an unprecedented long term program of cleaning
air emissions from its power plant whose cost was estimated
at 36,600 million KC (about $13 billion). The goal of the
program was to reduce emissions of S02 by 90%, emissions of
fly ash by 80% and emissions of NOx by almost 50% by the year
2000. The plan contained eight components:
- Completion of the nuclear power plant in Temelin which
will gradually substitute capacity to decommission
some coal fired blocks and reduce utilization of the
others;
. construction of flue gas desulphurization to reduce
air emissions of sulphur dioxide in large and medium
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coal fired blocks; between year 1994 and 2000, 29 coal
fired blocks will be equipped with scrubbers at the
cost of 27,000 million KC.
- Replacement of five existing boilers with new fluid-
ized bed boilers in power plants that combine power
and heat generation;
- Improvement of coal quality in combination with burn-
ing natural gas in two power plants;
. Retirement of old coal fired blocks;
- Implementation of primary measures to reduce emissions
of nitrogen oxides;
- Repair or replacement of existing electrostatic
filters;
- Increasing energy efficiency.
A key feature of the CEZ's environmental management plan
became the decision to equip all remaining power plants with
flue gas desulphurization units (scrubbers). But some ana-
lysts were uncomfortable with attaching new scrubbers to
some of the aging power plants. They believed that while the
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scrubbers would last 15 years, some of the power plants had
shorter operating time. They saw this incompatibility in
operating time for the scrubber versus that of the plant as
an attempt of the plant managers to sink in capital invest-
ment that would prevent closing the plant early in the
future. Czech language owns a special phrase for this behav-
ioral strategy - "construction of monuments" (staveni pom-
niku).
Technological capacity also proved constraining on this
program. Scrubbers are an end of pipe technology which
reduces emissions of sulphur dioxide to the air, but it cre-
ates a significant amount of solid waste instead. Alterna-
tive technological solution, fluidized bed combustion is
available only for small and medium size boilers. Switching
to an alternative supply of fuel such as low sulphur black
coal would also be a potential solution. However, most local
coal supplied to power plants is and will remain high sulphur
content brown coal in the near future. Although power plants
are no longer obliged to buy coal from a specific domestic
supplier, government policy puts a quota on imports of for-
eign coal in order to support employment in domestic mines.
Some attempts have been made in industry to design regen-
erative scrubbing processes. In such a process, a chemically
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active substance returns into the scrubbing process after
contact with sulphur dioxide. This is in contrast to non-
regenerative processes in which chemically active substance
leaves scrubbing process as a waste or as a secondary mate-
rial to be used in other production processes.
One of the better known regenerating processes is based on
scrubbing sulphur dioxide with liquid containing Manganese
Oxide (MgO). This process leads to combination of MgSO3 *6H20.
This substance is dried up, and broken by heat treatment on
two substances MgO and a gas containing S02. This gas may
further be processed to produce sulfuric acid (H2S0 4 ). The
other component, MgO returns to the scrubbing process. The
advantage of this technological method is that it produces
little waste at the end. It also achieves high efficiency up
to 90%. However, the ill-fated experiment with the Soviet
scrubber was based on this technological method. After its
costly mistake, the CEZ decided to adopt more conventional
technologies proven to work.
The most broadly used approaches measured by installed
capacity are non-regenerative. These processes employing
calcium are either wet, semi-dry or dry. All scrubbers the
CEZ will build are either wet or semi-dry. In the wet pro-
cesses, sulphur dioxide is captured in liquid. In semi-dry
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processes, chemically active substance is injected in liquid
form into a stream of hot emission gases. When this liquid
evaporates, the product of the reaction leaves in a solid
state.
The wet scrubbing processes are relatively effective and
inexpensive. Most world installed capacity (80%) is based on
wet scrubbing. Wet scrubbing comes in three forms:
i) calcium-sludge
Sulphur dioxide is scrubbed with dissolved calcium.
Resulting sludge, containing CaSO4 *H20, CaSO3 *1/2H2 0, CaSO 3,
and CaO, is partially dried up and stored in a landfill. The
drawback of this approach is that its product is not chemi-
cally stable and it takes up a lot of disposal space.
ii) lime - qvpsum
This approach is similar to the above, but the removal of
sulphur dioxide proceeds in two stages. First sulphur diox-
301
ide is scrubbed with dissolved lime to produce dihydrite
calcium sulphite (CaSO 3 *1/2 H2 0). This solution, mixed with
sulfuric acid (H2 S0 4 ), is oxidized in a reactor to produce
dihydrite calcium sulphate (CaSO4 *2 H20).
iii) limestone - gypsum
This method is the most widespread. Sulphur dioxide is
scrubbed with dissolved limestone. This reaction produces
sulphite which is oxidated to produce sulphate. Heat treat-
ing of this substance in calcining kiln produces so called
power-gypsum which can be used in construction industry or
as a stabilizer for disposal of ash.
The main drawback of the scrubbing technology is in that
it is an end-of-pipe solution which leaves substantial
amount of waste from a production process. A boiler of a
200MW block burning brown coal produces about 1 050 000 Nm 3!
h of gases with concentration of sulphur dioxide of about
6,500 mg/Nm3 . With 95% scrubbing efficiency, about 6,480 kg
of sulphur is captured per hour. To remove this sulphur diox-
ide, 9 t/h of limestone is used which leaves 15 t/h of gyp-
sum. It has been estimated that about 1.7 million tons of
power gypsum will be produced in 1999 when all the scrubbers
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have been built. According to estimates, the Czech market is
able to absorb about 750,000 tons of power-gypsum.
Since the life-time of a scrubber is at least fifteen
years, the current investment program in fact freezes con-
ventional, but environmentally not quite satisfactory tech-
nology for a long time.
As any other Czech and Slovak company during the time of
transition, the CEZ struggled to secure financing for its
environmental program. The financial needs of this program
were enormous estimated at $2 billion. But the CEZ was too
important to be left without any government help. As much as
the Czech government insisted on its policy of not providing
sovereign guarantees for loans to industrial enterprises, it
did provide the guarantee to the CEZ. With this guarantee,
the CEZ was able to secure first financing from the World
Bank in 1992, the Environment and Power Improvement Loan of
$246 million.
The Environment and Power Improvement loan was the largest
environmental loan ever given by the World Bank at that time.
It was signed between the World Bank, Czechoslovak Federal
Ministry of Industry and the CEZ. The loan was granted with a
ten year repayment period, following a grace period of five
years at a rate of interest described as half those usual in
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Czechoslovakia. The size of the World Bank's loan reflected
the Bank's concern over air pollution from electricity pro-
duction in former Czechoslovakia and Northern Bohemia in
particular. According to a senior World Bank economist for
the region, "on per capita basis, pollution in Czechoslova-
kia was the highest in Europe, and pollution in Northern
Bohemia was 10 times the average in the country."
The loan consisted of five related elements: the installa-
tion of a flue gas desulphurization unit at the Prunerov II
power plant; the retrofitting with new electrostatic precip-
itators for effective control of dust at selected power
plants, efficiency improvement programs at selected plants;
a program to upgrade the transmission system including
interconnection with UCPTE network, technical assistance in
the implementation of accounting practices and financial and
information management to bring them up to international
standards.
The World Bank loan provided an important step for
increasing financial credibility of the firm. It was also
connected with technical assistance for further planning.
But the CEZ needed more money while further government guar-
antees were not available. In this situation, the CEZ
adopted an innovative strategy of financing. It decided to
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increase transparency of its financing practices and build
corporate image by inviting an international auditing firm,
Anderson Consulting, to review its financial report. Fur-
ther, it invited Standard & Poor's rating agency to be
granted BBB- investment grade credit. Another credit rating,
A-, was awarded to CEZ by the Japanese agency JBRI. CEZ thus
became the only Eastern Europe's company with an investment
grade debt rating.
The effort for financial transparency paid off. On the
strength of the credit rating and with the World Bank loan in
reserve, CEZ became a fore-runner in using domestic and for-
eign credit sources to help finance its $2 billion desulphu-
rization project.
Pursuing its innovative financial strategy, CEZ was able
to issue successfully three emissions of bonds on domestic
capital market and one emission of Eurobonds. The first
emission, a 2.3 billion KC ($79.3 million) medium term
domestic bond issue, was released in June 1993. The crown
valued obligations carried a five year maturity on a fixed
rate of 16.5% compounded annually. This issue was followed
by the second 4 billion CK issue in January 1994 with a sta-
ble interest rate of 14 3/8% annually. The second issue will
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mature in 2001. Ceska Sporitelna lead-managed both issues
with other Czech banks also participating.
The success on the domestic financial front was followed
by a successful placing of five year bonds on foreign capital
market. The emission of $150 million US in Eurobonds was
facilitated by the American investment bank J.P. Morgan
Securities Ltd. The bonds were priced at a slight discount to
their face value at 99.78 with interest set at 110 basis
points over the rate paid on US treasury bonds. The Euro-
bonds, which carry interest of 8.875%, set the stage for
other large East European companies looking to finance their
modernization projects. The CEZ thus became the first East
European industrial enterprise that successfully introduced
its bonds on European capital market.
The third domestic issue set a new course taking over the
government's traditional role in providing a debt benchmark.
CEZ, taking advantage of its favorable market position,
issued a 4 billion KC ($154 million) tranche of 10-year bonds
in May 1995. The issue was lead managed by Dutch group ABN-
AMRO, Czech savings bank Ceska Sporitelna, CS First Boston
and Zivnostenska Banka. A host of other banks were involved:
Agrobanka, Obchodni Banka, Komercni Banka, U.S. Citibank,
Germany's Commerzbank and the Netherlands' ING Bank. The
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third issue doubled the maturity dates of other Czech issues
and could mark a significant step forward for Czech compa-
nies seeking long-term domestic capital.
Market analysts observed that unlike the case of most
Western countries, where state issues set standard, CEZ
bond, with a coupon of 11.3%, would be the benchmark since
the government had not issued a bond with a maturity longer
that five years. "CEZ is the most sophisticated issuer on
this market and is really fulfilling the role that treasur-
ies should be doing," an analyst was quoted saying. CEZ on
its part would prefer to raise all its capital on domestic
market to avoid currency exchange risks, but it had to reach
abroad again because domestic capital markets were not large
enough for its needs.
A stiff competition from the syndicated loans market,
where borrowers can achieve significantly cheaper funding
than in the eurobond market, led CEZ to seek a loan from
western commercial banks. The reward for this change was
significant when CEZ arranged a $100 million three year syn-
dicated multi-currency revolving loan at 25 basis points
over Libor. CEZ's issue of Eurobonds from December 1994
would have swapped into US dollars at Libor plus 70 basis
points.
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In 1995, competition among Western banks to provide credit
to large Czech firms drove down financing costs for monopo-
lies such as CEZ while squeezing margins for Western banks.
The loan to CEZ started the spiral. The winning lead
arranger, Summitomo (Japan) beat some 30 other banks with
its bid of 25 basis points over Libor, the lowest rate
afforded to a Czech company since the fall of communism. Sum-
mitomo underbid European and American banks because Japanese
institutions view companies like CEZ as quasi- sovereign
debt; they see state majority ownership as a government
guarantee. This reasoning led Summitomo to insist on only
two financial covenants: the CEZ's debt must not rise above
50% of capital, and that the government maintain majority
control of the company during the life of the credit.
The CEZ-Summitomo deal set another benchmark to which
other companies adhered or tested. CEZ was the first Czech
company, including banks, which has obtained such a type of
loan. Consequent loans to large Czech companies were achiev-
ing spread of 25 basis points or even lower. Both domestic
banks as well as utilities enjoyed the lower cost of capital.
The continuing high cost of finance in the neighboring Hun-
gary, the region's rival as fast track reformer, could be
seen when telecoms operator Matav took out a $300 million
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syndicated loan with spreads of 160 and 150 points over Libor
in July 1995.
The strategy of seeking financing through raising funds
directly on capital markets rather than through project spe-
cific loans made financing of the environmental program
cheaper than it would have been otherwise. The CEZ was in a
better position to follow the strategy of financing its cap-
ital expenditures through general credit because it pre-
served association of the power plants. Had the power plants
have gained their independence, such as was the case in
Poland, raising money for modernization and environmental
improvements would have been much more difficult. The indi-
vidual plants pose a higher credit risk than a pool of them
associated in one organization.
A.3.1. Environment Development Interaction in Power Plant Mod-
ernization
The most significant environmental benefits will be
reached in reducing air pollution (Figure A.19:). Emissions
of sulphur dioxide should decrease 90% by the year 2000.
Within the program for retirement of the oldest coal-fired
plants, 12 heating blocks with total energy output of 1235 MW
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Figure A.19: Projected Emissions from CEZ Power Plants
were closed down. Another output of 2,230 MW is planned for
closure by January 1999. These power generating blocks were
found too obsolete to be modernized efficiently.
The main assumption in the proposed program of retiring
the oldest coal-fired power plant capacity is that the
planned completion of new capacity from the Temelin nuclear
power plant will be sufficient to supply energy demand of the
country. Energy demand dropped somewhat with decreased
industrial productivity during the period of transition.
However, energy demand may increase if energy efficiency is
not encouraged.
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The key condition determining environmental and economic
benefits of an energy utility lies in energy prices and
rates. Energy efficiency is promoted when prices of elec-
tricity are set at least at the level of actual production
cost. Increased prices of energy also lead to higher returns
to the CEZ and make its operations more profitable.
The CEZ's environmental program does not mostly lead to
increased financial returns. It makes it possible for the
CEZ to operate in compliance with environmental regulations
and avoid closing down its power plants or investing in
building new expensive plants. From the perspective of the
firm, the joint benefits would be achieved if electricity
prices were increased or more electricity was sold or pro-
duction costs were reduced in relation with reduced emis-
sions of pollutants. In a way, this relationship is
political for a monopoly energy producer like the CEZ which
is 67% owned by the state and which supplies about 80% of the
country's energy needs.
From the broader perspective of Czech economy, the expense
of the pollution control program would have to be balanced
against external cost to the country of pollution. This cost
is not internalized adequately at present even though pollu-
tion charges are levied on units of emissions. For example,
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Table A.3: compares emissions charges with costs of lime and
limestone used in flue gas desulphurization units. It is
apparent that costs of operating the scrubbers (limestone
being the main input) by far exceed the current emission
charges the CEZ pays. The cost to the economy of damaging
forests and human health is not reflected adequately in pol-
lution charges and consequently in balance sheets of an
individual firm unless legal directive forces the firm into
compliance.
Table A.3: Emission Charges vs. Limestone Costs (mill. KC)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Fly-ash 37 57 49 66 49 42 28 27
SO 2  223 430 407 436 292 192 93 91
NOX 24 46 46 59 59 56 48 44
CO 3 6 6 8 8 9 8 8
total 287 539 508 569 408 299 177 171
lime and 0 5 59 235 525 707 806 780
lime-
stone
Also, until recently, costs of coal and labor, which are
the main production input, were set administratively. Mines
belonged under the same administrative unit as energy utili-
ties and power plants. The state planners were biased
towards developing mines and cross-subsidizing them from the
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other production units and from the state budget. Mines were
significant not only in the planned system's overreliance on
heavy industry, but also politically as a power base of the
workers and the communist party.
Along with subsidizing heavily operating costs of mines
and wages of miners, prices of coal were kept low in order to
support industry and households. Coal belonged to the cate-
gory of "essential goods" that were priced low so that they
could be available to everyone.
The future coal mine restructuring is potentially trouble-
some issue for the government due to its impact on employ-
ment. Coal production has fallen a quarter since 1989 and is
expected to drop another quarter by 2005. Additional mine
closures will require government policy coordination and
assistance including price support. But with gradually lib-
eralizing costs of coal as the main production input, power
plants would incur higher production cost that would better
reflect true costs of producing electricity. Also, power
plants are allowed to purchase higher quality coal from
alternative sources with liberalization.
However, an increase in energy rates is politically very
difficult. CEZ has to operate with incentives to meet both
environmental and financial standards set by the government.
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The government, as both majority shareholder and regulator,
may find it hard to make unpopular tariff decisions or avoid
the temptation to intervene in company investment and man-
agement.
The government has to balance its political goals against
profitability of an individual firm. Development strategy of
a country dictates that energy be cheap in order that indus-
trial competitiveness is maintained. Also, the Czech govern-
ment is sensitive to potential inflationary effects and
social fallout of higher residential energy prices.
At the time of soaring prices, Czech households and indus-
try would not appreciate yet another price hike. In December
1990 and May 1991, industry was subjected to increases of 53
percent and 80 percent, respectively, and in October 1991
households had to swallow a 70 percent increase in domestic
tariffs. In 1994, officials at CEZ were disappointed with a
Czech government decision to raise household electricity
prices only 12%, an increase just over the rate of inflation
currently running at 10%. CEZ wanted an increase of 35%. So
far, the Czech government has not established a schedule for
full energy price liberalization and hardly will do so
before elections scheduled for 1996.
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Ministry of Finance, which can change regulated energy
prices, released a statement on September 6, 1995 that said
discussions about increases were taking place between Minis-
try of Finance and Ministry of Industry and Trade, but the
government's position of gradual price increases in residen-
tial charges still applied. Each year, commercial electric-
ity customers cross-subsidize domestic consumers who pay
less than half the price charged to the commercial consum-
ers. This practice, among other results, discourages foreign
investment in building power stations because an investment
will not earn adequate returns due to the low price of
energy.
In the meantime, households are rapidly converting to
energy heating which appears economically viable at present
low power prices. Unfortunately, this spontaneous rapid con-
version to electricity heating in households will make later
increase in power rates politically very difficult. In a
country poor on energy sources like the Czech Republic,
using electricity for heating is seen as "luxury" by some
government officials.
As much as the CEZ will remain a dominant monopoly pro-
ducer of power in the Czech Republic, its ability to sell the
power is constrained by the capacity of the distribution
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utilities to connect individual households and sell elec-
tricity. At present, the capacity of the low voltage grids is
insufficient so that potential customers have to be turned
down by the utilities. Also, some limited competition exists
through imports of electricity from abroad. Foreign utili-
ties are expected to be bidders in privatizations of
regional distributors. CEZ strongly opposes allowing foreign
investors, especially German utilities, into the distribu-
tors fearing that in the long term they could push for
imports of electricity as a means of circumventing CEZ's
virtual monopoly of supply.
CEZ has to negotiate prices of electricity with these
power distribution utilities and share profits with them. So
far, long term contracts with these distribution utilities
have not been signed yet. In September 1995, the government
imposed a price agreement on CEZ and the electricity dis-
tributors that gave the distributors an additional three
percentage points of electricity price revenues. CEZ was
reported to be infuriated by the imposition of the price-
sharing agreement which will cut an estimated 1.5 billion KC
($56 million) from its 1995 revenues and 800 million KC from
pre-tax profits.
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Thus the market will not regulate CEZ's economic perfor-
mance in a near future. The main influence will be exerted by
state regulatory agency as soon as it is established some-
time in 1996. In the meantime, the State Property Fund as the
main shareholder has the power to replace managers and
influence behavior of the enterprise. Although some limited
competition will be created on the marketing side by the
existence of the independent distribution utilities, CEZ's
economic performance and its environmental responsibility
will be greatly affected by political and administrative
processes which will determine the relationship of these
two.
The joint benefits in this case are not exhausted by the
position of the CEZ. Due to the extent of the air pollution
and its transboundary impacts, the neighboring countries -
Austria and Germany - can gain by investing into reducing
pollution across their borders.
Austria, on its part, established an East-Eco Fund, a pro-
gram to improve environmental conditions in Austria's neigh-
bors, which will ultimately improve the Austrian
environment. The fund has contributed about $70 million to
81 projects since its launch in 1991, including projects
approved for 1995. The fund receives its money from the Aus-
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trian national budget. According to the Austrian Embassy in
Prague, in 1991 Czechoslovakia exported 55 tons of sulphur
emissions to Austria while Austria only sent 2 tons of sul-
phur emissions across the border to Czechoslovakia.
For example, the Austrian government and a consortium of
foreign banks have assisted in financing a 3.4 MW hydroelec-
tric plant in the Czech Republic. Austrian banks Creditan-
stalt and Girocredit, along with French bank Credit
Lyonnais, lent CEZ $6.6 million for the project while the
Austrian East Eco Fund contributed an additional $1 million.
The rest of the cost was covered by CEZ from its cash
reserves. Completion of the project will enable shutting
down a nearby coal power plant which pollutes air.
According to the CEZ, though Austrian companies were the
main technical supplier, no direct link between the awarding
of contracts and the granting of loans and contributions
existed.
Germany, on its part, awarded to the Czech Government a
grant of $14.8 million towards the installation of desulphu-
rization equipment at coal fired power plants in the north
Bohemian town of Prunerov. This city, near the borders of
Germany and Poland, contains Czech largest complex of coal-
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burning power generators, nine units in close proximity to
each other.
Germany donated the money to the first phase of the
project - the conversion of five generators - because some of
its territory is affected by Prunerov's emissions. The
grant, which represents about one-fourth of the overall cost
of the program, will became a loan if Germany is dissatisfied
with the results. The second phase of the project of reducing
emissions in Prunerov will partially be funded from the
World Bank loan.
A German company, Gottfried Bischoff, GmbH., won a compet-
itive bidding process to supply the desulphurization equip-
ment for the first phase. Senior managers at CEZ selected
Bishoff from among nine foreign companies that submitted
bids for the project three months before the German govern-
ment contributed its 23.5 million DM grant.
In both rounds of bidding for the supplier of the desul-
phurization equipment, the World Bank is empowered to
approve bid selection. The second round was won by a consor-
tium of companies consisting of Mitsubishi Corp., Mitsubishi
Heavy Industries Ltd., and ZVU Hradec Kralove.
In December 1994, Germany donated further grant of DM8
million for the modernization of Tisova lignite plant. This
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grant was part of a larger package of DM40 million given in
an agreement signed by Czech Ministry of Trade and Industry,
Czech Environment Ministry and German Environment Ministry.
Electricity exports provide yet another means of achieving
joint environmental and economic benefits. Electricity
exports will provide means for financing desulphurization at
Pocerady power plant. CEZ will provide drawing rights on
100MW, equal to annual supply of 650 GWh, of electricity from
the Pocerady plant to Switzerland in the next 10 years. The
contract obliges CEZ to use most of the proceeds to fit des-
ulphurization equipment at the Pocerady coal-power plant by
1996 starting with Pocerady's Units 3 and 4 (400 MW). Plans
include retro-fitting of desulphurization plant to reduce
sulphur dioxide emissions, low nitrogen oxides technology,
and electrofilters to control fly-ash. The contract also
includes a possibility to interrupt electricity supplies
under the occurrence of inversion situations in the Czech
Republic.
Switzerland's largest regional electricity company, Nor-
dostschweizerischen Kraftwerke (NOK), decided to go ahead on
the deal to import coal generated electricity from the Czech
Republic despite negative domestic publicity on the issue.
NOK argued that this deal will lead to a drastic reduction in
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emissions and that it has the right to inspect progress at
the plant which has to be brought up to standards acceptable
to the Swiss.
The last area of joint benefits has been achieved in uti-
lizing waste from power generation. Conventional scrubbers
leave significant amounts of power gypsum for further dis-
posal. A joint venture of CEZ and Knauf (Germany) was formed
to manufacture cardboard out of gypsum. The production was
started at CEZ's power plant in Pocerady in November 1994.
Besides gypsum cardboard production, gypsum can be used as
cement admixture. Knauf manufactures 100% more of gypsum
cardboard currently than had been originally estimated. CEZ
plans to set up other joint ventures to use the material with
RVE Pro-Minerali (Germany) and British Gypsum (UK).
A.4. The Aluminum Production Modernization Case
The production of primary aluminum in central Slovakia
started on 29 August 1953, the Soderberg anode paste produc-
tion used in the aluminum smelting process in 1954, and the
aluminum oxide (alumina) production in 1956. In 1968, a
foundry for sand mold high and low pressure casting was built
Figure A.20: Old Smelter in ZSNP
and, in 1970, manufacturing semi- finished aluminum products
began, such as door and window frames for the building indus-
try, venetian blinds, cladding, panel, tubes and aluminum
wire and cables.
The aluminum production was located next to a town of Ziar
nad Hronom, in the Central Slovakia. The region of Ziar nad
Hronom was a center of traditional metallurgical activity.
In the past, mining and metallurgical treatment of gold,
silver and copper ores bloomed here. However, after the
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local deposits of the ores were mined out and consequently
metallurgical activity ceased, a new stimulus was needed.
In 1951, the Czechoslovak Ministry of Industry established
the ZSNP (The Slovak National Uprising Works) as an inte-
grated aluminum producer. It was designed as a key feature of
the planned economy with a strategic intent to supply alumi-
num to defense industries. The former Soviet block planners
pursued self-reliance in production of this strategic metal
because they faced export embargo from the West. Also, geo-
graphical dispersion of production facilities to reduce
strategic vulnerability of production in case of military
strike was important; the production site was relatively
distant from the Western European border.
Along with its strategic goal to supply military industry,
the complex was built as a regional economic development
project to bring industrial activity into a region with lit-
tle job opportunities. The ZSNP has become the largest
employer in the Ziar region with almost 8000 employees, its
own housing development, and a medical center. It also gave
rise to the town of Ziar nad Hronom. As a consequence of alu-
minum production and of a need to concentrate population,
the Town of Ziar nad Hronom was built on a locality of a
small village called Svaty Kriz nad Hronom. Unfortunately
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for Ziar, the town was located in a direction of prevalent
wind currents blowing away from the ZSNP.
Shortly after the start, impacts of aluminum production on
environmental quality around the plant and on worker's
health in the plant became apparent. As a consequence, vari-
ous measures for correction were pursued by the Czechoslovak
governments and the ZSNP management.
At the end of 1960's, an entire village closest to the
ZSNP was relocated by a government decision due to the health
risks to the inhabitants of the village. The valley of Ziar
nad Hronom was classified as one of the most polluted local-
ities in Slovakia and assigned a special managment regime.
On government direction, children in Ziar valley received
free milk in schools and were sent regularly away on school
trips to a clean natural environment (called school in
nature) . Further, all farm crops from the affected area in
Ziar valley were redistributed to other parts of Slovakia
while the Ziar valley was supplied with crops from the unaf-
fected areas.
Also, different ways to add on air pollution abatement
equipment on the smelter were considered. However, only lim-
ited primary emission control could be implemented due to
design constraints in the installed Soderberg technology.
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This technology was taking advantage of the heat in the
smelting pots for concurrent baking of carbon anodes placed
on the top of the pot. However, this very technological solu-
tion prevented covering the pots with hoods that would
enable closed air circulation during smelting.
An alternative technological solution, based on the use of
pre-baked anodes was studied for possible modernization of
the smelter. As environmental conditions were increasingly
deteriorating, the ZSNP management appealed to the state
administration to authorize reconstruction of the smelter.
Realizing seriousness of environmental deterioration caused
by the smelter, the Czechoslovak Federal Government passed
in 1968 a Resolution #172/69 on "significant reduction of
emissions of fluoride and polyaromatic hydrocarbons in the
ZSNP by the means of converting to the technology of pre-
baked anodes." In 1970, the Slovak Government passed a simi-
lar measure, Resolution #304/70.
At first, a domestic technological design was pursued by
research engineers. A new construction solution of the elec-
trolysis unit was designed in the ZSNP and a pilot unit was
built and tested in 1972. Consequently, plans for moderniza-
tion of the potlines were drafted and submitted for consid-
eration to the supervisory planning institutions - the State
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Planning Committee, the Federal Ministry of Smelting and
Heavy Engineering, and the Slovak Planning Committee. It was
proposed that the reconstruction starts in 1977.
However, the concept of potline modernization began to
change. In 1973, the ZSNP managing director wrote a letter to
the Ministry of Smelting and Heavy Engineering about infor-
mation he had obtained at the second Czechoslovak Aluminum
Conference in 1972. In discussion with industry representa-
tives, he was made aware of possibilities to acquire know-
how from foreign aluminum producers. Consequently, letters
of invitation to submit modernization proposals were mailed
out to all the major industry aluminum producers: Alcoa USA,
Reynolds USA, Kaiser USA, Alcan Canada, Pechiney France,
Aluswiss Switzerland, Vereinigte-Aluminum Werke Germany and
VAMI USSR. Three producers were selected for closer consid-
eration: Kaiser, Alcan, and Aluswiss. A group of ZSNP engi-
neers visited plants of the selected producers to see their
designs first-hand. However, no contracts about know-how
transfer were completed and ZSNP modernization was repeat-
edly postponed by the state administration.
At the beginning of 1980's, news of high current smelting
pots begin to come to the ZSNP. This new generation of smelt-
ing pots was already controlled by computers. It became
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apparent that the technological solution of the selected
industry leaders from the 1970's was no longer current.
A Norwegian industry representative came on visit to the
ZSNP who showed that his firm was able to prepare the modern-
ization project. In the meantime, one of the ZSNP engineers,
who went on the industry visits abroad a decade ago, was pro-
moted to the position of a technical director in Kovohute
Prague, the metallurgical industry headquarters. With his
assistance and after repeated visits of Norwegian represen-
tatives, the state administration was finally persuaded that
the modernization of the ZSNP production technology was
urgent. On December 12, 1985, the Czechoslovak Government
approved the decision #217 which proposed the modernization
at Ziar. The modernization program envisaged the construc-
tion of a new alumina plant (Bayer technology), a new anode
plant, a new smelter and a new casthouse. The existing "A" -
smelter was to be closed and converted to the new cast house.
The goals of the modernization were:
- reducing environmental damage by replacing Soderberg
smelters with a modern smelter;
- increasing production from 70,000 MTPY to at least
108,000 MTPY (not including remelting of recycled
aluminum);
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- reducing energy consumption; and
- improving labor productivity.
Following the decision of the Czechoslovak Government,
Kovohute Prague (the ZSNP headquarters), Ardal of Sundal
Verk Oslo (later became Hydro Aluminum), and Polytechna Pra-
gue signed an agreement on March 20, 1986 about a transfer of
know-how. At that time, the Norwegian technology was the
most advanced in the industry, being the only one using a
high current (220KA) smelting pot.
The modernization program was financed from ZSNP, Kovohute
Prague and the Federal Ministry of Smelting and Heavy Engi-
neering's resources. However, three years after the techni-
cal issues were settled and the modernization started, the
financing of the project fell apart. In 1989, Czechoslovakia
set out on the course of transition to market economy and
political democracy. Most funding from the state sources
dried up as the country struggled with the problems of tran-
sition and new policies towards the industry were adopted.
Funding through the system of state planning agencies was no
longer available.
As a response to the financing crisis, a consortium of
banks including the Commercial Bank, Czech State Savings
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Bank, Agrobanka, and the Investment Bank was put together to
provide needed 500 million crowns for modernization. But the
ZSNP management's attempt to secure financing from these
domestic commercial banks failed at first because no credit
guarantee for the loan was available either from these banks
or from the state Finance Ministry. The ZSNP workers, frus-
trated by bleak prospects of losing their jobs, established
a strike committee and threatened to cease aluminum supplies
to all domestic enterprises with the exception of the phar-
maceutical industry and sewage works. Their strike was to
begin on October 26, 1990. Following the announcement of the
imminent strike, a meeting was held in Prague between the
workers, the management and the government representatives.
For a short time following these events, further financing
was arranged for through a series of syndicated loans from
local banks led by Vseobecna Uverova Banka and largely guar-
anteed by the National Property Fund.
Although the workers strike surrounding the financial cri-
sis was averted in time, another strike shook the ZSNP due to
a political crisis. The workers went into a one hour strike
on April 24, 1991 in protest over the allegedly undemocratic
dismissal of former premier Vladimir Meciar by the Slovak
National Council. An appeal signed by more than 5,500 of
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7,000 ZSNP workers called for a reshuffle in the Slovak par-
liament presidium and for an early elections. Only 80 of Slo-
vakia's 8,000 enterprises and organizations have joined the
appeal. Vladimir Meciar, a leader of the Slovak separatists,
returned later to the head of the Slovak Government to pre-
side over the split of Czechoslovakia in 1992.
In the fall of 1991, the ZSNP was singled for privatiza-
tion. The ZSNP as the legal successor of the state owned
enterprise was transformed into a joint stock company by the
decision of the National Property Fund of the Slovak Repub-
lic on August 6, 1991 and partially privatized in the First
Wave of Privatization under the Large Scale Privatization
Law of the former Czechoslovakia. But the financing crisis
continued because most of the domestic loans were of consid-
erably shorter term than required by the project's cash
flow. To solve the financing crisis by gaining a longer term
credit, the ZSNP initiated discussions with potential for-
eign investors.
Initially, the ZSNP management started discussions with
Marc Rich & Co. AG. whose firm was interested in expanding
its extensive metals and other commodities activities into
the Central and Eastern Europe. A letter of intent was
exchanged and some $3 million was transferred to the ZSNP.
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But the deal broke down when a campaign led by the AFL-CIO
and British Trade Union Congress targeted labor groups in
former Eastern Bloc nations to discourage them from doing
business with Marc Rich & Co. The British labor unions staged
shows of solidarity with the United Steelworkers union mem-
bers locked out of Ravenswood Aluminum Corp. since November
1990, a plant allegedly controlled by the billionaire tax
fugitive Marc Rich. As part of the campaign, the trade unions
wrote a letter to the ZSNP calling the Marc Rich company "the
worst of Western capitalism" and detailing Rich's 65-count
indictment in the United States on tax evasion.
Following the breakdown of fairly advanced discussions
between ZSNP and Marc Rich & Co. AG, HAL began to explore the
possibility of investing in the modernization. In late 1992,
under tight credit conditions in Slovakia and with histori-
cally low world aluminum prices, ZSNP's financing for the
modernization program dried up. As a last resort, the ZSNP
reverted all of its operating funds into the capital expen-
diture program in order to prevent demobilization of con-
struction companies from building the new smelter. This
desperate step brought the ZSNP at a brink of bankruptcy. The
ZSNP stopped paying most of its contractors and suppliers
and the debt service on its local bank loans. When construc-
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tion effectively ceased in April 1993, the investment pro-
gram was approximately 65% complete and $185 million was
already spent on the modernization.
Faced with the imminent bankruptcy of the ZSNP and its
destructive effect on the regional economy, the ZSNP's man-
agement and the Slovak Government decided to carry out a fun-
damental restructuring of the ZSNP so that it was possible to
obtain international financing to complete the modernization
program. A leading role in the restructuring was played by
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development who
approached the ZSNP with a proposal to assist with financing
and reconstruction. The EBRD considered the project an
important investment - the largest private sector loan
undertaken by the Bank so far. In preparation of the project,
the EBRD mobilized technical cooperation funds from the
Dutch Government and the European Union's PHARE program to
finance environmental studies of the ZSNP site.
The political liberalization that started in 1989 brought
about change in the role of environmental groups. NGO's that
formerly focused on issues of landscape and biological con-
servation become more active in a new role of pressure
groups. While domestic NGO's such as the Union of Landscape
Protectors reoriented themselves in their activity, they
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were joined by international pressure groups who established
local branches in the Czech and Slovak Republics. A new coa-
lition of Greenpeace with the Union of Protectors of Nature
was formed.
The ZSNP project did not escape attention of the new pres-
sure groups. Greenpeace with the Union of Nature Protectors
wrote an open letter to the President of the EBRD. The Wash-
ington based International Environmental Law Institute wrote
another letter. The NGO's criticized the energy intensity of
the plant and its perceived reliance on subsidized power
prices. They also argued that financing of the project by the
EBRD would contravene the Bank's mandate to promote environ-
mentally sound and sustainable development. Another set of
issues concerned the pollution and risks associated with
existing electricity production facilities in Central Slova-
kia, which will in part be generating electricity for the
SLOVALCO. Lastly, the status of public participation on this
project was of concern.
The EBRD had to learn to respond to these letters and make
environmental documentation available within the limits of
confidentiality. Intensive discussion on mandate of NGO's
vis a vis international development bank took place in try-
ing to find the balance between private sector's need for
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confidentiality and public's right to know about issues
affecting it and involving the use of public funds.
As a major step in restructuring of the ZSNP, a whole
owned subsidiary of the ZSNP, SLOVALCO a.s. was formed in
1993 at the advice of a retained management consultant. The
objective of SLOVALCO's establishment was to take over the
construction of the partly complete new smelter and ancil-
lary facilities and to operate the smelter in line with west-
ern operating, control, accounting, and financial practices
with management support from a strategic western industrial
partner. Also, this transfer was made to insulate the new
smelter from the largely unknown financial and legal liabil-
ities of the ZSNP in a new legal entity and permit SLOVALCO
to attract foreign capital at the level comparable to the
leading western smelters.
Pending the equity investment by HAL and the EBRD, SLOV-
ALCO's ownership structure was specified as shown in Table
A.4: below.
Table A.4: Ownership Structure of SLOVALCO
Equity Control Board Seats
ZSNP 80% 60% 3
HAL 10% 20% 1
EBRD 10% 20% 1
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Table A.4: Ownership Structure of SLOVALCO
SLOVALCO' s voting shares would be held by ZSNP, HAL and
the European Bank in the ratio of 3:1:1. The board of the
company would consist of five members, three nominated by
ZSNP, one nominated by HAL and one nominated by the EBRD.
On July 1, 1994, SLOVALCO entered into an Asset Purchase
Agreement and related agreements with the ZSNP under which
it acquired title to the core assets and work in progress
relating to the new smelter and ancillary facilities. On
July 12, SLOVALCO entered into a Common Facilities Agreement
with ZSNP under which it gained access rights over other
facilities necessary to complete, start-up, and operate the
partly completed new smelter. SLOVALCO was comprised of the
following facilities:
- New smelter "C", including its ancillary facilities
(power substation and the unloading station and silo's
for alumina) ;
- New anode plant, including paste plant, baking fur-
naces and roding room;
- New cast house, excluding buildings and ground;
- Old cast house.
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SLOVALCO also secured extensive easement rights over the
ZSNP's land and facilities.
On July 12, 1994, SLOVALCO signed a sovereign guaranteed
Loan Agreement with the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development providing for a loan of USD 110 million to
finance the completion of the new smelter. Additionally to
that the EBRD and Hydro Aluminum a.s. committed to make an
equity investment of USD 15 million each in SLOVALCO. The
Slovak Republic, ZSNP and its subsidiary ALUFINAL would be
the Guarantors until the loan is paid back in 2003.
Early morning just before official signing of the loan,
the Slovak Cabinet met to discuss the proposal that the
National Property Fund undertake to guarantee the loan. The
Cabinet agreed to pledge the shares of the ZSNP, which are
owned by the National Property Fund, to the General Credit
Bank Bratislava and to the Slovak Savings Bank. The pledged
shares would cover the obligations of the National Property
Fund as stated in the "Agreement on Guarantee Realization
between the National Property Fund as the Guarantor, and the
Commercial Banks as Creditors" dated October 27, 1993. The
Cabinet also agreed that the National Property Fund signs
the "Agreement on Financial Aid" with the EBRD, the ZSNP,
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ALUFINAL, SLOVALCO, and HAL, and that it guarantees obliga-
tions included in this agreement.
The size of the Bank's exposure and the complexities of
this project created unusual risk for the EBRD. For this rea-
son, it carried out a particularly thorough analysis and
consulted on all key aspects with world renowned outside
experts - operating and capital costs, future business pros-
pects, aluminum price forecasts, environment, and economic
analysis. The project was also structured in a conservative
way with significant contingencies and prudent capital
structure, which made it financially resilient to unforeseen
events. Agreements were reached with all parties, which
could have a bearing on the success of the project and which
were involved in about 30 different legal agreements to be
signed before disbursements of EBRD's investment and loan.
The principal conditions of the EBRD loan were as follows:
The syndicate of Slovak banks with outstanding loans
to ZSNP agrees (i) to "stand still" on its claims
against ZSNP for repayment of existing debt until SLOV-
ALCO has operated successfully for six months and (ii)
to permit ZSNP to transfer all project assets to
SLOVALCO.
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- Agreement from the National Property Fund that they
will ensure the financial stability of ZSNP until
project completion.
- HAL a.s. agreement to invest USD 15 million in SLOV-
ALCO and to provide project completion, management and
emergency repair services to SLOVALCO.
- Agreement from ZSNP to prepare and implement a restruc-
turing plan.
- ZSNP to agree to a plan (the "Environmental Action
Plan") for closing its two obsolete Soderberg hazard-
ous smelters, alumina plants and brown coal fuelled
power generation plant if they are proven not finan-
cially viable when operated in accordance with
environmental and health and safety standards.
- ZSNP and the Slovak Republic agree with the EBRD on a
plan to remedy all historical environmental damage and
continuing sources of pollution identified in the
EBRD's environmental audit, including "red and brown
mud" waste dumps.
A critical Part of the project negotiation was the secur-
ing of market access for aluminum in the European Community.
This was necessary because beginning in August 1993,
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restrictions were imposed by the European Community on
imports of unwrought aluminum originating in the 15 coun-
tries of the former Soviet Union. The process leading to the
imposition of quotas began in February when French govern-
ment asked that Community safeguard measures applied to alu-
minum imports. CIS imports to the west were reported to have
quadrupled from 1990 to about 1 million tons in 1992 and fur-
ther increases were possible for the whole year 1993. The
restrictions took effect in spite of Russian authorities
having denied dumping and arguing that the "restrictions on
aluminum imports from Russia contradict numerous declara-
tions of Community representatives about support for Russian
reforms and trade liberalization." The European aluminum
Association asked the European Commission to extend the
quota in place until arrangement between the EC and the CIS
is negotiated (ECE 1993, p.45). No similar quota was imposed
on imports of aluminum from Slovakia.
A.4.1. Environment Development Interaction in Aluminum Plant
Modernization
The ZSNP complex was identified as a major source of air
and ground water pollution in the Slovak Republic and there
was also some evidence of serious occupational health prob-
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lems at the site. Environmental degradation caused by the
ZSNP was a result of both an obsolete technology which did
not allow adding on pollution abatement equipment, inappro-
priate environmental management practices, and inadequate
equipment maintenance. Air pollution was caused by releasing
high levels of sulphur dioxide, nitride oxides, fluorides,
tars, and dust. Ground water contamination primarily origi-
nated from red and brown mud piles leaching caustic soda.
In the past, the ZSNP complex produced its own alumina
using Soderberg and Bayer technology. During the manufactur-
ing process, bauxite was digested with caustic soda to
extract the alumina. About one half of the bauxite used in
the Bayer process resulted in a residue product, red mud.
This red mud still contained traces of harmful caustic soda.
Because the ZSNP stored the red mud in an unsecured open
dump, water penetrating the dump leached out this caustic
soda and polluted ground water inadvertently destroying veg-
etation around the red mud pile. According to the loan agree-
ment, the Bayer plant will remain in operation only if it is
shown that it can be operated economically with all required
pollution control measures. The red mud pile will be insu-
lated by a bentonite wall and the soil around the pile
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restored. If a decision is taken against producing alumina
on site, it can easily be purchased on world market.
The Sinter plant produces a similar residue as the Bayer
plant, called brown mud. The Sinter plant is regarded as at
the end of its useful life. The mechanical condition of the
equipment is poor and leads to an unacceptable environment
for the operators. Nitrous oxide emissions and dust are very
high leading to serious risks to occupational health. Opera-
tion of the Sinter plant has been stopped and will be closed
down completely as a part of the ZSNP restructuring if no
joint venture partner is found for its modernization. Some
talks in this regard have been held with Raynolds, but no
agreement has been signed as yet. The closure of the Sinter
alumina plant would reduce substantially the amount of mud
requiring disposal. The additional closure of the Bayer
plant would mean no net increase in the size of the existing
mud pile.
The structural condition of the existing smelters is also
very poor. The potlines require considerable maintenance
work and are based on outdated Soderberg technology. Emis-
sions to the air from the existing smelters do not meet cur-
rent and future environmental standards. Indoor and outdoor
concentrations of a number of pollutants are at unacceptable
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levels. The smelters are the main source of emissions of flu-
oride, poly-aromatic hydrocarbons (PAH) and tars and also
generate significant quantities of sulphur dioxide and dust.
Working conditions for the operators of the potlines create
a serious health risk. Fluoride compounds affect the health
of operating personnel and cause serious damage to vegeta-
tion. Continued exposure to high levels of fluoride affects
bones and teeth. Exposure to poly-aromatic hydrocarbons
(PAH) contained in tars is known to significantly increase
cancer risk. The mechanical condition of a number of pots is
such that the emissions of fluoride, PAH and tars are far
above the normal levels for Soderberg pots. In accordance
with the loan agreement, the three existing potlines will be
closed as soon as possible. The shut-down of the existing A-
and B- smelters, together with the start-up of the new C-
smelter will have a major beneficial effect on air quality
and occupational health and safety. Emissions of fluoride,
tars, nitrous oxides, and dust will decrease dramatically.
The old anode plant produces high levels of sulphur diox-
ide, nitrous oxide and dust emissions during high tempera-
ture calcinating activities. Measures are being taken that
will reduce emissions in the future. The old anode plant will
stay in operation if it can be shown that it can be done
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efficiently when implementing all the required pollution
control measures. Also, parts of the old anode plant will be
required in the production of pre-baked anodes for the new
smelter.
The power plant which generates steam for alumina produc-
tion and heat for the town of Ziar and the ZSNP complex meets
Slovak emission limits which however will progressively
increase in strictness until 1998. In the future, emissions,
especially sulphur dioxide should be reduced by conversion
to natural gas, by installation of desulphurization equip-
ment or through adoption of fluidized bed technology.
To guarantee environmental improvements on the site, an
Environmental Action Agreement between ZSNP and the EBRD was
signed prior to disbursement of the loan. The ZSNP agreed:
. permanently to close Smelter "A" prior to first dis-
bursement of Tranche A;
. permanently to close Smelter "B" no later than three
months from the date of the start-up of the fifty
cells at the new SLOVALCO smelter;
. permanently to close both alumina plants and the old
anode plant within one year of the date of the first
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disbursement under tranche B unless independent con-
sultants selected by the Bank demonstrate to the
satisfaction of the Bank that the relevant plants can
be operated in an economically viable manner in accor-
dance with environmental, health and safety standards
acceptable to the EBRD;
- permanently to close down or to convert to gas opera-
tion the on- site power generation plant, subject to
the same conditions as for the alumina plants and old
anode plant.
Further, the ZSNP, SLOVALCO, the Slovak Republic and the
EBRD agreed on an Environmental Remediation Agreement in
which they specified detailed conditions and timetable for
the containment of the red and brown mud pile and any other
historic environmental contamination discovered in the envi-
ronmental assessment and audit of ZSNP's and SLOVALCO's
assets. If necessary, the Slovak Republic agreed to under-
write the cost of such environmental remediation. The finan-
cial obligations under the Remediation Agreement were linked
to the cash flows from SLOVALCO. The taxes and dividends gen-
erated from the new production facilities will be used to
finance this remediation. The cost of all remediation
expenses, including desulphurization equipment for the
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existing power plant is estimated to be less than US$30 mil-
lion.
Table A.5: below shows the atmospheric emissions, before
and after the completion of SLOVALCO, for the entire ZSNP
complex including the power plant.
Table A.5: Current and Future Emissions Released from ZSNP
current future
fluoride (t/y) 519 63
tars (t/y) 1,171 4
dust (t/y) 2,060 636
SO 2 (t/y) 6,221 3,593
NOX (t/y) 1,990 262
The completion of the SLOVALCO project and the restructur-
ing of the ZSNP would bring the following benefits:
- avoid bankruptcy with the possible loss of over 5500
jobs;
" attract new capital and further privatize ZSNP and
SLOVALCO;
" replace ZSNP's inefficient and polluting smelters and
anode plant with a world class energy efficient
smelter equipped with the best available pollution con-
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trol technology;
e close ZSNP's inefficient alumina plants which produce
environmentally hazardous waste by-products;
- obtain closure or conversion entirely to gas of the
ZSNP's power station which is now primarily burning
brown coal;
- contain the pollution flowing from the red and brown
mud piles into the Danube River system;
- secure long term employment prospect in accordance
with western practices for majority of the remaining
workers at the site;
- develop a substantial Slovak company focused primarily
on the export market that will generate hard currency
earnings and become a significant local tax payer and
source of environmental remediation.
Since the ZSNP loan was an industrial rehabilitation
project with few new environmental impacts, project discus-
sion focused primarily on economic and financial and strate-
gic soundness of the investment. The main question raised in
the discussion concerned whether the smelter should be mod-
346
ernized at all at such a high expense or rather closed down
outright.
The critics pointed out that Ziar is not a prime location
for an aluminum smelter because of inland location without
deep water port, no access to cheap power, and no bauxite
mine nearby. Prices of aluminum were at their record low and
there already was production overcapacity in the world. The
critics also saw modernization of the smelter as a continua-
tion of the past ill conceived orientation towards heavy
industry at the expense of service sector and consumer prod-
uct sector.
The energy intensity of the plant and its perceived reli-
ance on subsidized power prices were criticized. It was also
stated by a number of NGO's that the proposed financing by
the bank would contravene the Bank's mandate to promote
environmentally sound and sustainable development.
The project proponents believed that in spite of the above
points, the project was still financially, economically and
strategically viable according to their analysis. They pri-
oritized major competitive factors for aluminum smelters in
the following order:
- alumina, power and labor costs, which together account
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for around 70% of the total cash costs;
The company would be at a significant disadvantage on alu-
mina costs since inland freight would add transport penalty
to each ton of metal produced. Electric power costs would
also be higher in comparison to average cost of other smelt-
ers. However, even with aggressive wage and salary increase
policies, the company would gain significant cost advantage
on labor cost which are below average worldwide labor costs.
- the quality of the smelting technology, which can sig-
nificantly increase the power and labor consumption;
The HAL technology to be employed by SLOVALCO, which con-
sumes 13,200 D.C. kWh per ton compared to the Western world
average of about 15,500 D.C. kWh, gives it a power cost
advantage and decreases consumption of all inputs other than
alumina.
. market position, including advantages in terms of
freight costs, scrap availability, and captive
customer;
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Ziar is well located in Central Europe, on the edge of
major markets. Taking into account freight costs to pro-
jected customers and the freight cost of the likely competi-
tion, SLOVALCO gains from its locational advantage. Also,
SLOVALCO benefits from having primary aluminum source next
to casthouse because it may possibly use thermal energy of
liquid aluminum for remelting without additional energy and
it will not lose metal due to oxidation.
capital costs, which if poorly financed can impose a
significant cash drain on the operation.
The net sum of penalties and advantages quantified and
compared in competitiveness analysis showed that SLOVALCO's
smelter would have operating cash costs well within the
first quartile of the aluminum industry.
However, the financial viability of the project depends
not only on its operating costs, but also on characteristics
of the aluminum market in which products are sold. The alumi-
num market is characteristic by chronic imbalances in supply
and demand due to the commodity nature of the product and the
lead times required to adjust capacity levels to demand. The
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important characteristic of the aluminum market is that a
producer can always sell commodity ingots to a broker at the
prevailing LME price.
Demand for aluminum is expected to increase in the West
from the transport, packaging and construction sectors. In
Eastern Europe, demand is expected to come mainly from
infrastructure development and the construction sector.
Future supply, and therefore inventories, are a function
of new capacity being brought on stream, existing capacity
being shut down and of future imports from the FSU. Because
prices were so low at the time of loan preparation, it was
expected that only limited new capacity would be started up.
Closures of existing capacity were already occurring because
of the low prevailing prices. The Russian exports were the
wild card. Because of the desperate need for hard currency
earnings, the main view was that the FSU would try to main-
tain its high level of exports even though it implied con-
tinuing catastrophic damage to the environment, as well as a
shortage of supply of aluminum to local industry.
The world price of aluminum, like price of many commodity
products, has historically been cyclical. The evolution of
aluminum prices depends on the growth rates of the major
economies, production capacities around the world, stockpil-
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ing, the volumes of exports from FSU producers and consump-
tion patterns from aluminum products. Aluminum prices at the
time of the project preparation were the lowest that they had
been in the 130 year history of the aluminum industry. The
situation resulted from combination of two events, one nor-
mal, the other not. The normal event was the world wide
recession which slowed down the growth in demand for alumi-
num and semi-finished aluminum products. The abnormal event
was the collapse of the FSU and that of its domestic markets
for aluminum which has triggered a continuing and unprece-
dented stream of exports to the West.
The internal rate of return of the project was calculated
taking into consideration the main variables that are likely
to affect the SLOVALCO's returns - the operating costs, cap-
ital costs, product price, production volume.
The project proponents argued that while it is true that
the proposed smelter, like any other smelter, will be a large
consumer of power, it should be stressed that it will be
among the most energy efficient smelters in the world. Also,
they argued, it will only consume 10% more power than the
existing smelters. As to the reliance on power subsidies,
the project proponents did not believe that the prices
charged to ZSNP and to SLOVALCO represented an unfair sub-
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sidy in view of the large requirements for power and the sta-
ble load the smelter represented. An economic analysis was
carried out assuming different power prices ranging from the
contractual price of 3 cents per kWh to 5 cents per kWh which
was at the very end of the estimates for the economic cost of
power. The economic rate of return, even under the most con-
servative assumption, was calculated satisfactory demon-
strating in the view of the project proponents that under any
reasonable scenario about power costs and future aluminum
prices the project represented an efficient and economically
justified use of resources.
The economic analysis was based on a number of key assump-
tions. The economic cost of power was defined as the cost
that Slovakia could avoid if the new smelter were not com-
pleted. In the calculation, the contract price and an esti-
mated marginal cost of power in Slovakia were used.
Next, the capital expenditure incurred so far were assumed
to be irrelevant in the decision because they had already
been incurred (sunk cost) . Another important assumption used
in the economic analysis was the economic shadow cost of
labor and the opportunity cost of capital to Slovakia.
Given these assumptions, a base case and a worse case
ratio for economic rate of return were calculated for a range
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of energy prices. The calculation did not include an esti-
mate of the actual environmental costs associated with the
project, particularly the waste disposal costs. However,
these costs would probably be compensated by the economic
benefits to Slovakia of an indigenous aluminum industry. A
major consideration in the strategic decision to allocate
resources to modernizing the smelter was the importance of
local supply of metal to the predominantly metal-manufactur-
ing industries in the region, ranging from automotive to
aerospace. Proximity to users in these sectors is important
in a number of ways, including savings in transport costs and
inventory carrying costs. Furthermore, interaction between
supplier and user of metal results in the development of more
tailored specifications for the metal, which can be an
advantage in the manufacture of precision cast aluminum
products like pistons which are increasingly in demand for
the western European automotive industry.
The project proponents believed that returns to the econ-
omy would be substantial because, with a limited incremental
investment, the project would dramatically improve the effi-
ciency and capacity of the existing aluminum operations at
Ziar and will allow ZSNP to restructure its activities and
return to profitability. Not completing the smelter would
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most likely result in a write-off of USD 185 million of cap-
ital expenditure with no possibility for the local banks or
the National Property Fund to recover the funds which
financed these expenditures. It would result in the cessa-
tion of an industrial activity in which the Slovaks have
built over 40 years significant expertise and for which all
necessary infrastructure is in place. It would also mean
that ZSNP would never be in a position to repay its existing
debt and restructure its other operations.
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Appendix B:
INVESTMENT ACTIVITIES OF MULTILATERAL
BANKS IN THE CZECH AND SLOVAK REPUBLICS
B.1. IBRD signed projects1
CSFR - Structural Adjustment Loan 1991 $450M
CSFR - Power and Environmental
Improvement Project 1992 $246M
CR - Telecommunications 1993 $80M
SR - Economic Recovery
B.2. IFC signed projects2
Cementarny a Vapenky Mokra A.S.
Zivnostenska Banka, a.s.
C.S. Cabot Spol.sr.o.
O.B. Sogelease A.S.
O.B. Heller A.S.
1994
1992
1992
1993
1993
1993
$80M
$17.2M
$6.4M
$20.3M
$0. 6M
$0.2M
1. source: World Bank Annual Report 1994
2. source: IFC Annual Report 1994
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Autokola Nova Hut a.s.
MAFRA, a.s.
Vetropack Moravia Glass, a.s.
1994
1994
1994
B.3. IFC Technical Assistance and Advisory Services
Skoda Pilsen
Grand Hotel Pupp
CKD Kompresory
Elitex Usti
Elitex Chrastava
First Brno
Kavalier Glassworks
Prague International Air Terminal
B.4. EBRD signed projects1
Czech Republic
Czech Investment Corp.
Cokoladovny
1. source: EBRD Annual Report 1994
1991
1991
ECU 7.46M
ECU 24.10M
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$16.2M
$14.20M
$19. 50M
CSA
Eurotel Prague
CZ - Cagiva, a.s.
Skoda Automobilova/Volkswagen
Telecom Project
TFP: Komercni Banka
Thurn Taxis Dobrovice
Praha Hyatt Regency Hotel
Kabel Net
Karosa - Renault Vehicules Industriel
Joint Venture
Barum Continental
Eurotel Prague/Expansion Finance
Tesla Y.S., a.s.
Corfin Credit Line
Technolen WF a.s.
Investicni a Postovni Banka a.s.
Ceske Drahy - Czech Rail Corridor
1992
1992
1992
1992
1993
1993
1993
1993
1994
s
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
ECU 20.80M
ECU 9.08M
ECU 8.39M
ECU 102.27M
ECU 72.45M
ECU 53.78M
ECU 4.14M
ECU 17.44M
ECU 8.5M
ECU 37.00M
ECU 30.46M
ECU 3.3M
ECU 6.0M
ECU 24.5M
ECU 8.9M
ECU 40.88M
ECU 42.5M
Slovak Republic
Eurotel Bratislava 1992 ECU 6.60M
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Slovak Telecom Project
Slovenska Polnohospodarska Banka
Sloveca Joint Venture
International Road Corridor
ZSNP
Slovak Trade Facilitation Project
Tatra Bank
Slovnaft a.s. Loan
Tatra Bank Credit Line
Slovnaft a.s. Equity
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1994
1994
1994
ECU 4.60M
ECU 5.17M
ECU 15M
ECU 112.04M
ECU 53.78M
ECU 3.35M
ECU 24.5M
ECU 15.9M
ECU 48.9M
B.5. GEF
Czech Republic
TA for the Phaseout of Ozone
Depleting Substances
Biodiversity Protection Project
Slovak Republic
Biodiversity Protection Project
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1994
1994
1994
1993 ECU 44.00M
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